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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three closely related studies investigating individual 
decision-making under risk and uncertainty, with a focus on decision weighting. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the common themes and theoretical framework 
for this research.  
Chapter 2 reports the development of a simple method to measure the 
probability weighting function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and 
rank-dependent utility theories. Our method, called the Neo-Lite method, is based on 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011)’s source method and the Neo-additive weighting function 
(Chateauneuf et al., 2007). It can be used for both risk (known probabilities) and for 
ambiguity (unknown probabilities). The novelty of our method lies in how data of 
decision weights are used to obtain the measurement of the whole function. 
Compared to the more widely used parametric fitting, our method is simpler, as it 
minimizes the number of decision weights required and does not rely on the 
elicitation of subjective probabilities (for ambiguity). An experiment of choice under 
risk demonstrates the simplicity and tractability of our method. The predictive 
performance of probability weighting functions measured using our method is shown 
to be almost equally good to that measured using the standard parametric fitting 
method.  
Chapter 3 presents a theory of choice under risk primarily to explain why 
individual probability weighting functions are often found to be non-linear and 
inverse-S shaped. Our rationale for non-linear probability weighting is based on a 
psychologically grounded feature of choice making, a feature we call attention-based 
state weighting. We show that, under well-defined circumstances, our theory can be 
equivalent to Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) with a 
probability weighting function depending on not only ranks but also sizes of 
outcomes of risky prospects. This allows our theory to accommodate evidence about 
probability weighting that cannot be explained by Prospect Theory or Cumulative 
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Prospect Theory.  
The evidence just mentioned refers to recent findings that people have 
stake-sensitive probability weighting functions. Chapter 4 reports an experiment that 
further explores the idea of stake-sensitive decision weighting. In addition, the 
experiment also tests hypotheses derived from the theory presented Chapter 3. In this 
chapter, we use a more general concept, decision weights, to refer to probability 
weights that can be stake-sensitive. Particularly we investigate whether and how 
decision weights are affected by two main properties of a lottery: outcome level (or 
expected payoff level) and outcome spacing (or the ratio of the best outcome of the 
lottery to its worst outcome). We elicit subjects’ Certainty-Equivalents for 
carefully-designed sets of lotteries and estimate their decision weights and utility 
curvatures using a model slightly more general than Cumulative Prospect Theory. 
Our main finding is that only outcome spacing has significant and systematic 
influence on decision weighting at the aggregate level, and that both outcome level 
and outcome spacing have systematic and significant effects at individual levels. 
This finding, together with the theory of Chapter 3, challenges the common 
understanding of probability weighting. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing all findings in previous chapters, 
discussing the implications, and pointing to directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction                 
 
 
 
Theories of individual decision-making play a fundamental role in economic theory. 
Most economically relevant decisions have to be made in the presence of uncertainty. 
Since Knight (1921), situations of uncertainty are normally thought to contain two 
different scenarios: decision under risk where probabilities of uncertain events are 
objectively given and known, and decision under ambiguity where the probabilities 
are unknown1. This thesis is a collection of three studies (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) 
reporting research that contributes mainly to the area of decision-making under risk. 
While each of the three chapters is self-contained and can be read independently 
from the others, there is a common topic for all three studies: probability weighting 
and decision weighting2. 
The two concepts become widely known since the seminal paper of Prospect 
Theory (PT hereafter, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which models how people make 
choices between lotteries with known probabilities. PT has been one of the most 
important theories of decision making under risk in the past decades and has been 
applied in a wide variety of contexts (Wakker 2010). It generalizes the classical 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT hereafter, Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945) by 
introducing probability weighting, reference-dependent evaluation of outcomes, and 
loss aversion, and provides systematic explanations for the major deviations from 
EUT such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), the certainty effect, and framing 
effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1985).  
In PT, lotteries are modeled as risky prospects which are often denoted as 
(𝑝1: 𝑥1, … , 𝑝𝑛: 𝑥𝑛), that is, yielding outcome 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ with probability 𝑝𝑖, where i =1, 
                                                             
1 Knight (1921) used the term ‘uncertainty’ to describe the latter case. It is in later literature what Knight called 
uncertainty is commonly labeled as ambiguity.  
2 Since the subtle difference between these two concepts is important for this thesis, we will explain this 
difference carefully later in this chapter. 
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2, …, n. Preferences over the prospects are then represented by the function  
 
𝑉(𝑝1: 𝑥1, … , 𝑝𝑛: 𝑥𝑛) = ∑ 𝑤(𝑝𝑖)𝑣(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝑤: [0,1] → [0,1]  is called the probability weighting function which 
transforms objective probabilities into probability weights, and 𝑣: ℝ → ℝ is a utility 
(or value) function that measures the decision maker’s subjective value of outcomes3. 
Empirical studies of the probability weighting function have been numerous (e.g. 
Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Wu & Gonzalez 1996, Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000) and 
have typically found it to be increasing, non-linear and inverse-S shaped, that is, 
𝑤(𝑝) > 𝑝 for small probabilities and 𝑤(𝑝) < 𝑝 for moderate or larger probabilities. 
This non-linear probability weighting is often interpreted as reflecting an intrinsic 
psychological element of people’s diminishing sensitivity towards less-extreme 
probabilities (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Wakker 1995, Prelec 
1998).  
Since EUT, the value of a lottery can be seen as a weighted average of the 
values of its outcomes. The weights attached to values of outcomes are often called 
decision weights. In EUT, decision weights are objective probabilities, whereas in PT, 
decision weights are probability weights, which can be different from objective 
probabilities. The latter implies that, for PT, decision weights are solely determined 
by the probability weighting function, which captures a decision maker’s 
misperceptions of likelihoods or her intrinsic attitude towards probabilities. As 
recognized by Tversky & Kahneman (1992), this may be too restrictive to capture the 
effect of important contextual factors on decision weighting. In addition, another 
feature of the PT model that has been a subject of criticism is that it allows violations 
of ‘stochastic dominance’ (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, pp. 283-284), which requires 
that a shift of probability mass from bad outcomes to better outcomes leads to an 
                                                             
3 In PT, an outcome can be either a gain or a loss based on the decision maker’s reference point, and the value 
function v(.) can be different for gains and for losses. Although PT does not restrict outcomes to be money, this 
thesis considers only monetary outcomes. 
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improved prospect (Fennema & Wakker 1997). 
These theoretical problems have been dealt with in a new version of PT, called 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT henceforth, Tversky and Kahneman 1992)4. In 
particular, CPT satisfies stochastic dominance and incorporates the rank-dependence 
feature of decision weighting that was introduced by Quiggin (1982) and Schmeidler 
(1989)5. As a result, decision weights in CPT depend not only on probability weights, 
but also on ranks of the corresponding outcomes among all possible outcomes of the 
lottery6. For the outcome domain of gains, the preference function of CPT can be 
written as 
 
𝑉(𝑝1: 𝑥1, … , 𝑝𝑛: 𝑥𝑛) = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑣(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝑥1 > ⋯ > 𝑥𝑛 and the decision weights 𝑑 are defined by: 
 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑤(𝑝𝑖), for i =1 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑤(𝑝1 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑖) − 𝑤(𝑝1 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑖−1), for 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
 
where w is the probability weighting function as in PT that captures people’s intrinsic 
attitude towards probabilities. CPT generalizes EUT and PT, because EUT is a 
special case of CPT when 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 and the characterization of PT that is captured by 
the formulation above becomes a special case of CPT when 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑤(𝑝𝑖). Hence, 
decision weight is a more general concept than probability weight, in the sense that 
the former refers to whatever is attached to the value of lottery outcomes and can be 
context-dependent7, whereas the latter is often thought as the part of decision 
weighting that reflects context-independent attitude towards objective probabilities 
                                                             
4 Models of similar forms were introduced by Starmer & Sugden (1989) and Luce & Fishburn (1991). 
5 Another improvement is that CPT also extends to the analysis of both decision under risk and decision under 
ambiguity. For a survey of non-expected utility, see Slovic et al. (1988), Camerer (1992), and Starmer (2000). 
6 The plausibility of the cumulative form of rank-dependence and the intuition of rank-dependent decision 
weights have been explicitly discussed in Wakker (1989) and Diecidue & Wakker (2001) respectively.  
7 Context-dependence here, and for the rest of the thesis, refers to the dependence on all sorts of elements of the 
decision context, such as lottery outcomes, decision tasks, source of uncertainty, etc., except objective 
probabilities. Context-dependent decision weights are weights that does not only depend on objective 
probabilities of the outcomes, but also on contextual elements.  
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due to psychological reasons such as human cognitive limitations8.  
While allowing decision weights to depend on the rank of lottery outcomes may 
increase the descriptive power of CPT, it certainly complicates the empirical 
measurement of the model (Abdellaoui 2000). However, since the way decision 
weights depend on probability weights are pre-specified in CPT, the only component 
of decision weights to be measured is the probability weighting function, which is 
thought to be a stable personal component of individual decision making under risk. 
And given that, in CPT, the decision weight of the best outcome of a lottery is still 
the same as its probability weight, the probability weighting function could be 
mapped with measurements of the decision weights for the best lottery outcome as 
the probability of that outcome varies from 0 to 1. This lays the theoretical ground 
for measuring the probability weighting function through the elicitation of the 
decision weights of the best lottery outcomes (e.g. Wu & Gonzalez 1996, Abdellaoui 
2000, Abdellaoui et al. 2011).  
The first study of this thesis has two goals. First we present a method to 
measure the probability weighting function. As CPT gains its prominence among 
decision theories, empirical studies, including those measuring CPT functions, 
becomes increasingly important. For example, the application of CPT to many 
aspects of the real world needs to be based on proper measurements of the 
probability weighting function (e.g. Bleichrodt et al. 1999, Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000). 
Since CPT provides a model for both the case of choice under risk and the case of 
ambiguity, it would be desirable to have a simple and tractable method which can 
measure the probability weighting function in both cases9. The method we introduce 
is called the Neo-Lite method. Unlike most existing methods, our method does not 
require data fitting techniques. Nor does it require the elicitation of subjective 
probabilities for ambiguity, which can be tricky because often assumptions about 
how probabilities are assigned to ambiguous events are needed (see e.g. Ellsberg, 
                                                             
8 See e.g., Edwards (1954, 1962), Tversky & Kahneman (1983), Brandstätter et al. (2002), Trepel et al. (2005). 
9 Many methods from the literature achieve this, e.g. Wakker & Deneffe (1996), Gonzalez & Wu (1999), 
Abdellaoui (2000), Van de Kuilen & Wakker (2011). Chapter 2 provides a more detailed review of existing 
methods. 
CHAPTER 1 
5 
 
1961).  
The second purpose of the first study is to test experimentally the predictive 
power of probability weighting functions measured with different methods and with 
different functional forms. Specifically, we want to compare our Neo-Lite method 
with the standard parametric fitting method, and to compare the non-linear class of 
weighting functions (e.g. Goldstein & Einhorn 1987, Prelec 1998) with the linear 
class (Chateauneuf et al. 2007). We elicited individuals’ Certainty-Equivalents (CE 
henceforth) of a set of lotteries as well as their choices between pairs of lotteries. 
Using the CEs we measured probability weighting functions using the two methods 
and various functional forms for each individual. The probability weighting functions 
measured were then used to make predictions about the choices. Our results show 
that the Neo-Lite method works as a good substitute for parametric fitting with the 
Neo-additive weighting function (Chateauneuf et al. 2007), but has its limitations as 
a substitute for parametric fitting with a nonlinear probability weighting function. In 
terms of predictive performance, we found that the non-linear probability weighting 
functions proposed by Goldstein & Einhorn (1987) and Prelec’s (1998) slightly 
outperform the Neo-additive function.  
Another important finding of the first study is that the probability weighting 
function measured using CE data is dramatically different from that measured using 
binary choice data. Although this is perhaps unsurprising in light of the well-known 
phenomenon of ‘preference reversal’ (e.g. Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971, Grether & 
Plott 1979, Seidl 2002, Cubitt et al. 2004), it reinforces the idea that, for theories of 
choice under risk that employ a decision weighting function and a value function, 
allowing decision weights to depend on non-probabilistic factors10 can considerably 
improve the descriptive power of the theories. This idea deeply motivated the second 
study of this thesis. 
Our second and third studies start to question the CPT model, particularly its 
modelling of decision weights. We are also motivated by the series of findings that 
                                                             
10 Here probabilistic factors basically refer to probabilities and probability weights, and in the case of preference 
reversal, the key non-probabilistic factor is the type of task used to elicit preferences.  
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decision weights are affected by lottery outcomes, particularly whether outcomes are 
perceived as gains or losses (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Abdellaoui et al. 2005) 
and the level of outcomes (Etchart-Vincent 2004, 2009; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010). In 
our second study (Chapter 3), a theory of decision-making under risk is presented, 
primarily to account for the dependence of decision weights on lottery outcomes and 
the preference reversal phenomenon (or the dependence of decision weights on the 
type of tasks used to elicit preferences). It is natural to think of a more complicated 
decision weight function for CPT. However, we chose an alternative approach. Our 
theory is based on the concept of the Savage-act (Savage, 1972), the framework of 
which is fundamentally different from that of PT or CPT. An important feature of the 
latter two is that lotteries, treated as prospects, are evaluated independently and the 
evaluations determine the results of choice-making. In contrast, Savage’s framework 
provides a natural way to build in important factors such as cross-act comparisons, 
that is, allowing the value of a lottery to depend on the alternatives to choose 
between (e.g. Loomes & Sugden 1982, 1986; Bordalo et al. 2012).  
The key outputs of the second study are the followings. First, building on a 
psychological intuition similar to Bordalo et al. (2012), our theory implies CPT with 
an inverse-S shaped probability weighting function (or the decision weight attached 
to the best outcome of a lottery as a function of the probability of the best outcome). 
In other words, we show that the inverse-S shape of the typically found probability 
weighting function can come from a decision-making mechanism that does not 
pre-suppose any form of probability weighting. Secondly, the implied probability 
weighting function also depends on lottery outcomes and can be different for gains 
and losses. We then show that this can accommodate the empirical findings 
mentioned earlier regarding the outcome-dependence of decision weights. Thirdly, 
our theory can imply substantially different probability weighting functions (in terms 
of their shapes) for money valuation tasks and for binary choice tasks under risk, thus 
can potentially explain the ‘preference reversal’ phenomenon. We provide intuitive 
analysis of this in Chapter 3 and analytical support for this in Appendix 3.4. In 
general, our theory can do what CPT could do with a probability weighting function 
CHAPTER 1 
7 
 
which depends on multiple non-probabilistic factors, but is more parsimonious and 
intuitive.  
In Chapter 4, we explore one of the key implications of our theory by studying 
experimentally the effect of lottery outcomes on decision weighting. As mentioned 
by Tversky & Kahneman (1992), both the level of outcomes and the spacing of them 
can have an effect on decision weights. For two-outcome lotteries, the latter basically 
refers to the difference between the best and worst outcomes of the lottery. There 
have not been many studies that investigate explicitly the effect of outcome level or 
outcome spacing or both on decision weights, though some evidence on the existence 
of both types of effect can be found in Camerer (1992). More recently, 
Etchart-Vincent (2004, 2009) studied this question for the domain of losses and 
found that, compared to small-loss gambles, large-loss gambles are associated with 
smaller decision weights of the worst outcome. Another study by Fehr-Duda et al. 
(2010) found that in the domain of gains, decision weights of the best lottery 
outcome decrease as the general stake level of the lotteries increase, and that in the 
domain of losses, stake level has little effect on decision weighting. On the one hand, 
our third study, which focuses on the effects of outcome level as well as outcome 
spacing, fills a gap in the literature by studying explicitly the two effects. On the 
other hand, compared to Etchart-Vincent (2004, 2009) and Fehr-Duda et al. (2010), 
we have a stronger experimental control to isolate the effect of outcome level from 
the effect of outcome spacing. This is important because the two factors interact with 
each other and both may affect decision weighting. Based on our intuition and on one 
of the key predictions from our theory, we hypothesize that outcome spacing has a 
significant effect on decision weighting and plays a more important role in 
determining decision weights than outcome level does.  
We elicited CEs from subjects and fitted data to a generalization of CPT with a 
focus on the change of decision weights as lottery outcome spacing and outcome 
level change. Our main results are that, in general, outcome spacing has a systematic 
and significant effect on decision weighting at both aggregate and individual levels, 
whereas outcome level only has a significant effect at individual level. For lotteries 
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with the same probability distribution over outcomes, the estimated decision weights 
of the best lottery outcome are smaller for lotteries with larger outcome spacing, and 
also smaller for lotteries with higher outcome levels. The latter is consistent with 
Fehr-Duda’s (2010) results and potentially explains finding that risk aversion 
increases as stakes are higher (e.g. Binswanger 1981, Holt & Laury 2002). These 
results also lend support to the theory presented in Chapter 3. 
  Since PT, the theoretical and empirical research of decision weighting under 
risk has attracted enormous attention from psychologists and economists. Yet, our 
knowledge of this topic may still be far from complete, because there could be other 
non-probabilistic factors to be discovered11 which systematically influence decision 
weights. The three studies (Chapter 2, 3, and 4) are mainly devoted to advancing our 
understanding of probability weighting and decision weighting for risk, and to 
providing a theoretical development as a better alternative to CPT when the 
descriptive power of the latter becomes weaker as evidence accumulates. This thesis 
ends with Chapter 5, which summarizes the key messages from the previous chapters, 
provides a more specific discussion of the contributions of our three studies, and 
points to potentially fruitful new directions for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 For example, decision weighs have also been found to be affected by factors such as individual demographic 
characteristics (e.g. Fehr-Duda et al. 2006; Harbaugh et al. 2002), on emotional state (e.g. Fehr et al. 2007), on 
the emotional or affective content of the payoffs (e.g. Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001), and on the sources of 
uncertainty (e.g. Kilka & Weber 2001, Abdellaoui et al. 2011). 
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Chapter 2: A Simple Method to Measure 
Probability Weighting Functions and its 
Experimental Implementation                       
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It has been understood, since Allais (1953), that Expected Utility Theory (EUT, von 
Neumann & Morgenstern 1945) has its limitation in describing individual behaviors 
under risk. A huge body of literature has documented violations of EUT (see e.g. 
Starmer, 2000 for a survey). Among non-EU theories, Prospect Theory (PT, 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979) is one of the most important (Wakker, 2010). In PT, 
most of the violations of EUT are accommodated by a (non-linear) probability 
weighting function, which is often regarded as one of the most important theoretical 
developments of behavioral economics.  
In terms of empirical research, an extension of PT, Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(CPT, Tversky and Kahneman 1992), has gained its importance and popularity. It 
generalizes the case of decision under risk and decision under ambiguity1, and 
introduces the key feature of rank-dependent utility theories (e.g. Quiggin 1982, 
Schmeidler 1989) that decision weights do not only depend on probability weights 
but also the rank of lottery outcomes. Nevertheless the probability weighting 
function in CPT still plays a crucial role in explaining deviations from EUT, 
capturing individual risk attitudes (when the probabilities of the events are known), 
                                                             
1 Decision under risk relates to situations where known statistical probabilities are available for uncertain events. 
It has been understood since Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) that statistical probabilities are often unknown or 
unavailable. For such cases, referred to as ambiguity, Savage (1954) proposed Subjective Expected Utility Theory 
(SEUT), where prospects are evaluated by their (subjective) probability weighted average utility. Ellsberg (1961) 
put forward a more fundamental problem: it seems that often people cannot assign probabilities, not even 
subjective ones, to random events (ambiguity). Ellsberg’s paradox puts the preference basis of SEUT into 
question. 
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subjective beliefs and ambiguity attitudes (when probabilities of the events are 
unknown). Developing tools to measure this function hence becomes important for 
both empirical research on decision under uncertainty and the application of the 
probability weighting function to real decision analysis.  
Various methods have been developed (e.g. Wakker & Deneffe, 1996; Gonzalez 
& Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2011) that can measure 
parametric-free decision weights under both risk and ambiguity. It is sometimes also 
useful to obtain measurements of parameterized probability weighting functions for 
purposes of both theoretical research and empirical study (such as predictive tests).  
This could be easy for the case of risk but tricky for ambiguity, because the latter 
normally requires the elicitation of subjective probabilities that enable the mapping 
of ambiguous events to probability weights. In many studies, measurement of the 
probability weighting function for ambiguity relied on stated subjective probabilities 
(e.g. Heath & Tversky, 1991; Fox & Tversky, 1998). Recently, the 
revealed-subjective-probability approach is more often used (e.g. Abdellaoui et al. 
2005, 2011) to avoid potential biases from stated subjective probabilities.  
This chapter first introduces a simple method, called the Neo-Lite method, to 
measure probability weighting functions of CPT, for both risk and ambiguity. More 
precisely, Neo-Lite provides a convenient way to use decision weights to obtain the 
probability weighting function. This method can be more efficient than previous 
measurement methods because it minimizes the amount of data (decision weights) 
required and greatly simplifies the processing of data. Moreover, unlike most 
existing methods, our method does not require the elicitation of subjective 
probabilities for ambiguity in the sense that the parameters of the probability 
weighting function can be obtained without any inference about the underlying 
subjective probabilities of the uncertain events.  
Since our method is based on the assumption of the Neo-additive probability 
weighting function (Chateauneuf et al., 2007), a second purpose of this study is to 
experimentally compare the predictive power of different classes of probability 
weighting functions widely used in the literature, particularly the non-linear class 
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represented by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Prelec 1998), and the Neo-additive 
(or linear) class (Chateauneuf et al., 2007). For the latter, we apply both the standard 
parametric fitting method and the Neo-Lite method to measure the probability 
weighting function and to see how the two measurements predict.  
In general, we find that the Neo-Lite method works as a good substitute for 
parametric fitting with the Neo-additive weighting function, both descriptively and 
predictively. Conditional on using a linear function, our method succeeds in 
revealing a function which is essentially indistinguishable from that generated with 
parametric fitting method. To compare the predictive power of the linear and 
non-linear classes of probability weighting functions measured from our experiment, 
we conduct both out-of-sample and in-sample predictive tests. We find that the 
performances of the two classes of weighting functions are very similar in the 
out-of-sample test, but the non-linear class outperforms the linear one in the 
in-sample test. This suggests that the latter class of weighting function has its 
limitation in describing and predicting choices under risk.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 briefly introduces CPT, the theory 
under which our method works. Section 2.3 provides a brief review of the existing 
measurement methods in the literature. Section 2.4 presents the Neo-Lite method. 
Experimental design and results are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Prospect Theory for Risk and Ambiguity 
 
In this section we introduce basic concepts, notations and the theoretical framework 
based on Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011). For simplicity, 
we use a similar set of concepts and notations as used by Abdellaoui et al. (2011). 
Let 𝑋 ∈ ℝ be the set of outcomes and S be the state space or the set of mutually 
exclusive uncertainty events E. Let (𝐸1: 𝑥1, … , 𝐸𝑛: 𝑥𝑛) denote a prospect yielding 
outcome 𝑥𝑗 if event 𝐸𝑗 happens, with j =1, 2, …n. For the purpose of this chapter, 
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outcomes are restricted to be gains of money, although this is not necessary for the 
new method we propose. A prospect is uncertain when only one of the events 𝐸1,
𝐸2, … , 𝐸𝑛 will happen but it is unknown ex ante which one will happen. Since in our 
measurements we only need two-outcome positive prospects (𝐸: 𝑥, not 𝐸: 𝑦), we 
use the simpler notation 𝑥𝐸𝑦 for such prospects, and by this notation we assume 
that  𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0. The Certainty-Equivalent (CE) of a prospect is the sure amount 
that makes the decision maker indifferent to the prospect.  
A decision theory for uncertainty specifies how the decision maker’s 
preferences over prospects are determined by a value function 𝑉. For instance, 
Expected Utility holds if a prospect (𝐸1: 𝑥1, … , 𝐸𝑛: 𝑥𝑛)  is evaluated by 𝑉 =
∑ 𝑝(𝐸𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑣(𝑥𝑗), with v, the utility function (also called value function) of outcomes, 
continuous and strictly increasing and 𝑝(𝐸𝑗) the probability of event 𝐸𝑗 . As in 
many other empirical studies on weighting functions, we use CPT for two-outcome 
prospects, which coincides with Quiggin’s (1982) rank-dependent utility because we 
only consider positive outcomes. It holds if there exists a utility function 𝑣: ℝ → ℝ 
and an event weighting function 𝑊 such that preferences maximize  
 
𝑉(𝑥𝐸𝑦) = 𝑊(𝐸)𝑣(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑊(𝐸))𝑣(𝑦)                 (2.1) 
 
where 𝑊 assigns a number 𝑊(𝐸) between 0 and 1 to each event E, such that 
𝑊(∅)= 0, 𝑊 is 1 at the universal event, and E ⊃ F implies 𝑊(𝐸) ≥ 𝑊(𝐹). If the 
probabilities of the events are known, then the prospects are evaluated by  
 
𝑉(𝑥𝐸𝑦) = 𝑤(𝑝(𝐸))𝑣(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝(𝐸)))𝑣(𝑦)              (2.2) 
 
where 𝑤(. ) is a probability weighting function2 that maps [0,1] to [0,1] and is 
strictly increasing and continuous, with 𝑤(0) = 0 and 𝑤(1) = 1. 
When probabilities are unknown or unknowable (i.e. under ambiguity), we are 
                                                             
2 For clarification, we use lower case w(.) to denote probability weighting functions for known probabilities 
exclusively.  
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back to equation (2.1). This generates great empirical difficulty in defining and 
measuring the weighting function for ambiguity. Therefore, the development of the 
source method by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) is important because it provides us a tool 
to measure the weighting function 𝑊 defined on subjective probabilities. They have 
formalized the definition of source of uncertainty3 and have shown, complementary 
to Ellsberg (1961)’s finding, that whenever the source of uncertainty is uniform to 
the decision maker (i.e. all the events from that source have a uniform degree of 
ambiguity), the decision maker can be seen as having a (subjective) probability 
measure p over the event space and a function 𝑤𝑄, carrying subjective probabilities 
to decision weights, such that for any event E from source Q we have  
 
𝑊(𝐸) = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐸))                          (2.3) 
 
where Q stands for the set of sources of uncertainty4. This generalizes Prospect 
Theory for risk because risk can be a special source of uncertainty. Now equation 
(2.1) becomes 
 
𝑉(𝑥𝐸𝑦) = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐸))𝑣(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐸)))𝑣(𝑦)             (2.4) 
 
In what follows we consider only two-outcome lotteries and assume that individual 
preferences for uncertain binary prospects are represented by equation (2.4) unless 
otherwise specified.   
 
 
2.3 Existing Methods in the Literature 
 
There have been generally three classes of empirical methods to measure the 
probability weighting function for risk: parametric fitting, non-parametric fitting, and 
                                                             
3 According to Abdellaoui et al. (2011), a source of uncertainty concerns a group of events that is generated by a 
common mechanism of uncertainty. In their paper, sources are modeled as algebras containing the universal event 
(certain to happen), the vacuous event (certain not to happen), the complement of each of their elements, and the 
union of each pair of their elements. In this chapter, we also take sources as algebras. 
4 We use Q instead of S to denote the set of uncertainty sources because the latter is used to represent ‘State’. 
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non-parametric non-fitting5.  
 
Parametric Fitting 
 
Needless to say, parametric fitting has been a standard method being widely used in 
empirical economics, due to the development of econometrics. A substantial part of 
empirical studies on choice under risk have used parametric fitting to measure the 
probability weighting function for various research purposes (e.g. Camerer and Ho 
1994, Wu & Gonzalez 1996, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000, Kilka & Weber 2001, 
Blavatskyy 2005, Booij et al. 2010).  
For more specific examples, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found direct 
evidence supporting the presence of probability weighting in decision making under 
risk, using parametric fitting to measure the probability weighting function. Hey and 
Orme (1994) used parametric fitting to test different theories of choice under risk and 
found that theories of the rank-dependence family perform relatively better than 
other families. More recently, Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) studied how risk tolerance 
varies with stake sizes. They fitted the value function and probability weighting 
function of Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and found that, for gains, 
risk aversion grows as stakes increase. A sub-class of parametric fitting, called the 
semi-parametric fitting, works by assuming a parametric form of only the objective 
function, and estimating the parameters of the objective function and the point values 
of other functions. This method was first proposed by Abdellaoui et al. (2008), and 
has been gaining popularity due to its efficiency (compared to standard parametric 
fitting).  
 
Non-Parametric Fitting 
 
Another measurement technique for probability weighting and utility functions can 
                                                             
5 The book by Peter Wakker (2010) can be a good source for introductions to many of the widely used empirical 
methods for weighting function measurement.   
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be called non-parametric fitting (e.g. Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui et al., 2007, 
2011; Stott, 2006). It uses data fitting but does not commit to any parametric family. 
Instead, it takes every value of the objective function as a parameter. For example, 
Gonzalez & Wu (1999) proposed a non-parametric method for estimating the 
probability weighting function for risk and confirmed the inverse-S shaped weighting 
function with their experimental data. A similar method was also used by Stott (2006) 
to discriminate, using experimental data, among various functional forms of the 
stochastic Prospect Theory models. Although not committing to any parametric 
functional forms can be an advantage for some research purposes, this method 
normally requires a large amount of data. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) and Van de Kuilen 
& Wakker (2011) provide a more detailed introduction and discussion of 
non-parametric fitting. 
 
Non-Parametric Non-Fitting 
 
Methods that use neither parametric functional forms nor data fitting techniques 
belong to this class. Most of these methods use specifically designed choice 
questions to elicit points of interests of the objective function. For example, 
Abdellaoui (2000) developed a method that has two steps: the first step consists of 
constructing a sequence of choice questions that elicit a sequence of outcomes 
equally spaced in utility by means of the trade-off method initially proposed by 
Wakker and Deneffe (1996); the second step uses the sequence of outcomes to obtain 
a sequence of probabilities equally spaced in terms of probability weighting. 
Alternative methods that use similar techniques include, e.g., Abdellaoui and Wakker 
(2005), Blavatskyy (2006), Abdellaoui et al. (2007), and van de Kuilen and Wakker 
(2011). These methods can generally be used to measure probability weighting 
midpoints which can reveal the shape of the weighting function. For example, Wu et 
al. (2005) applied Abdellaoui (2000)’s version of the trade-off method to 
discriminate between the original version of the PT (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
and the CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and found that the PT performs better. 
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For empirical studies on choice under ambiguity, similar methods of these 
classes have been used to measure the (subjective) probability weighting function, 
but often in more complex ways due to the need for the elicitation of subjective 
probabilities. For example, Hey et al. (2010) and Kothiyal et al. (2014) both tested 
the predictive performance of different models of choice under uncertainty and used 
parametric fitting with the subjective probabilities estimated as extra parameters. 
Another representative study using parametric fitting for choice under ambiguity is 
the paper by Abdellaoui et al. (2011). They found experimental evidence supporting 
the “source-dependence” nature of probability weighting functions. To obtain the 
weighting functions for ambiguity, they carried out complex procedures. They first 
used the semi-parametric method to measure the utility function, then obtained 
decision weights, elicited corresponding subjective probabilities from a sequence of 
choice questions, and finally did parametric fitting based on the measured decision 
weights and elicited subjective probabilities. Diecidue et al. (2007) tested the 
existence and nature of rank dependence for Rank-Dependent theories of choice 
under uncertainty, employing a non-parametric non-fitting method to elicit the 
decision weights of ambiguous events without eliciting subjective probabilities. 
Their method can be a good complement for our method in measuring the weighting 
function because their method can, as they have shown in their study, elicit decision 
weights in a simple way, and our method provides a simple way to obtain the 
parameters of the Neo-additive weighting function from the decision weights.  
 
 
2.4 The Neo-Lite Method 
 
Our method starts by assuming that the weighting function is Neo-additive 
(Chateauneuf et al. 2007), or loosely speaking, linear. Although the most common 
finding about weighting function is the inverse-S shape, the linear one can be seen as 
an approximation of the inverse-S shape. Indeed, several papers have argued for the 
CHAPTER 2 
17 
 
importance of the neo-additive family (e.g. Gilboa 1988; Cohen 1992; Loomes et al. 
2002; Teitelbaum 2007; Chateauneuf et al. 2007), and some studies have also found 
direct evidence of individuals exhibiting weighting functions very close to linear (e.g. 
Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Figure 4c, Figure 10 & 11). A major advantage of this family 
is its theoretical parsimony and resulting practical simplicity. Another important 
advantage is that interpretation of its parameters is clearer and more straightforward 
than other families (Wakker 2010, p.210). We will show this below. 
To show how our method can be applied to decision under ambiguity where the 
(subjective) probability weighting function can depend on the source of uncertainty, 
we will work with a source-dependent neo-additive weighting function, i.e. 
 
𝑤𝑄(𝑝) = {
0, 𝑝 = 0
    𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝,      0 < 𝑝 < 1   
1, 𝑝 = 1
 
 
where 0 ≤ 𝜇 < 1, 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 − 𝜇, and 𝑄 is the source of uncertainty and it can be 
either risky or ambiguous.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: A typical Neo-additive probability weighting function (the solid line) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, 𝜇  corresponds to the lower intercept and 𝛾 
      
𝑤(𝑝(𝐸))  
𝑝(𝐸) 
0 1 
𝜇 
1 − 𝜇 − 𝛾 
𝛾 
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corresponds to the slope. Even without looking at the graph it is straightforward to 
read off the shape of the weighting function from the parameter values. Moreover, 
two important features of probability weighting, likelihood-insensitivity and 
pessimism/optimism (Wakker, 2010), can be captured by extremely simple 
representations of 𝜇  and 𝛾 . The slope can be seen as an index of 
likelihood-sensitivity (in other words, 1 − 𝛾 the index of likelihood-insensitivity) 
because it reflects how much the decision weight changes when the probability 
changes by one unit. The aggregate pessimism/optimism can be measured by 
(1 − 𝜇 − 𝛾) − 𝜇, i.e., the difference between the upper intercept and the lower 
intercept, because this index reflects generally to what extent probabilities are 
underweighted or overweighted (Abdellaoui et al. 2011).  
Once the weighting function is restricted to be Neo-additive, it is 
straightforward to obtain its parameter measurements. For any two disjoint events A 
and B from S that are non-null and non-universal and the union of which (𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) is 
non-universal, we have  
 
𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) = 𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝(𝐴)                        (2.5) 
 
𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐵)) = 𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝(𝐵)                       (2.6) 
 
𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵)) = 𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵)                    (2.7) 
 
Manipulating equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), we have, since 𝑝(𝐴) + 𝑝(𝐵) = 𝑝(𝐴 ∪
𝐵), 
 
𝜇 = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) + 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐵)) − 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵))                (2.8) 
 
The right-hand side of equation (2.8) is an index of lower-subadditivity 
(Tversky & Wakker 1995)6. This equation shows that, when the weighting function 
is Neo-additive, the intercept 𝜇 is a measure of the degree of lower-subadditivity. In 
                                                             
6 According to Tversky & Wakker (1995), lower-subadditivity is a property of a probability weighting function. 
They defined lower-subadditivity with an inequality relation between certain decision weights: a probability 
weighting function 𝑤 satisfies lower-subadditivity if 𝑤(𝑝1) ≥ 𝑤(𝑝1 + 𝑝2) − 𝑤(𝑝2), for probabilities 𝑝1 
and 𝑝2 such that 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 < 1. 
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other words, the right hand side of equation (2.8) captures the boundary effect near 
zero probability. For example, 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) + 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐵)) > 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵))  would 
imply the “possibility effect” that an event has greater impact when it turns 
impossibility into possibility than when it merely makes a possibility more likely. 
Given that we have obtained an equation of 𝜇, one way to obtain 𝛾 is to measure 
the degree of upper-subadditivity7, i.e. to measure the upper intercept. Alternatively, 
𝛾 can also be obtained if we know the difference between the upper intercept and the 
lower intercept, which is equivalent to the index of pessimism/optimism. We notice 
that the index of pessimism/optimism is also easy to measure.  
Let 𝐴 be the complementary event of 𝐴 in source Q. We have 
 
𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) = 𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝(𝐴)                       (2.9) 
 
Adding equation (2.5) and (2.9), with 𝑝(𝐴) + 𝑝(𝐴) = 1, we have  
 
2𝜇 + 𝛾 = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) + 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) 
 
and hence 
 
1 − 2𝜇 − 𝛾 = 1 − 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) − 𝑤𝑄 (𝑝(𝐴))              (2.10) 
 
which is the index of pessimism/optimism. The right hand side of equation (2.10) 
measures the degree of pessimism/optimism because it can be re-written as (𝑝(𝐴) −
𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴))) + (𝑝(𝐴) − 𝑤𝑄 (𝑝(𝐴))). In other words, if a decision maker overweights 
any event as much as he underweights the complement of that event (i.e. 𝑝(𝐴) −
𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) − 𝑝(𝐴)), he can be seen as having no systematic tendency 
of pessimism or optimism towards probabilities.  
Combining equation (2.8) and (2.10), we have  
                                                             
7 See also Tversky & Wakker (1995). 
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𝛾 = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) + 2𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵)) − 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐴)) − 2𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐵))        (2.11) 
 
Although the equation of 𝛾 is less obvious, it is obvious that once we pin down the 
lower intercept and the difference between the upper intercept and lower intercept 
(i.e. the aggregate pessimism/optimism), the slope is also pinned down.  
Our method is general in the sense that it can be applied to any situation of risk 
and (uniform) ambiguity where the four uncertain events 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵, and ?̅? can be 
constructed. It provides a non-fitting way to measure the parameters of the weighting 
functions given that we know the four decision weights that appear on the right hand 
sides of (2.8) and (2.11). One way to obtain the decision weights is to design an 
experiment that enables either direct elicitation of the decision weights (e.g. Diecidue 
et al.,2007; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2011) or elicitation of both utility and decision 
weights (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Kothiyal et al., 2014).  
Before measuring the four decision weights, it is important to decide how to 
specify the four relevant events 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵, and ?̅?. To illustrate this, consider an 
Ellsberg-type urn containing four colors of balls: red, green, yellow, purple. A ball is 
to be randomly drawn from the urn to determine the results of some gambles on this 
urn. One way to specify the four events is the following: 
 
Event A= “the ball drawn is red”   
Event B= “the ball drawn is green”   
Event A∪B = “the ball drawn is either red or green”   
Event ?̅? = “the ball drawn is not red”   
 
There is obviously more than one way of specification, as long as none of the four 
events end up being null or universal. In the case of risk, where probabilities of all 
the events are known, Event A and Event B can have the same probability, reducing 
the minimum number of decision weights required from four to three. 
In practice, however, we don’t observe decision weights directly. Decision 
weights can be obtained by using the methods mentioned in Section 2.3, or by 
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measuring the utility function. For the latter, for example, consider a binary prospect 
𝑥𝐸0, with 𝑢(0) assumed to be 0. Eliciting the Certainty-Equivalent (CE) of this 
prospect and using equation (2.4), we have 𝑣(𝐶𝐸) = 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐸))𝑣(𝑥). The decision 
weight of event E can then be obtained by 𝑤𝑄(𝑝(𝐸)) = 𝑣(𝐶𝐸)/𝑣(𝑥). 
 
 
2.5 Measuring the Weighting Function for Risk  
 
Although we are interested in the plausibility and feasibility of the Neo-Lite method 
for both choice under risk and ambiguity, as a start, we examine the case of risk in 
this study, mainly because risk is the simplest experimental environment we could 
construct to test our method. This is an efficient way to obtain an impression of 
whether the non-fitting nature of the Neo-Lite method works. Application of this 
method to choice under ambiguity may deserve exclusive research beyond this one. 
 
 
2.5.1 Experimental Design 
 
The aim of this experiment is to generate a dataset which allows for: (i) the 
application of both the Neo-Lite method and standard parametric fitting to measure 
subjects’ probability weighting function for risk; (ii) the comparison and 
discrimination between the two classes of probability weighting functions. Our 
experiment has two parts to serve each of these purposes.  
 
The Measurement Set 
 
The Measurement Set refers to the dataset for the first part of the experiment. In the 
first part we elicit the Certainty-Equivalents of 16 risky prospects 𝑥𝑝0, with x = 4, 8, 
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12, 16 and p = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8. All four x and all four probabilities are used. We 
selected four probability levels 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 in order not only to apply the 
Neo-Lite method, but also to do a robustness check. As has been explained, in the 
case of risk, the minimum number of decision weights (or probabilities) needed for 
the Neo-Lite method is three. When there are four different probabilities, there is 
more than one way to specify the four events 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵, and ?̅?. It is unclear 
whether different specifications yield different measurements of the weighting 
function, and having at least four probability entries enables an investigation of this 
question. For simplicity, we didn’t have more than four probability entries. Having 
shown the economy of the Neo-Lite method in data requirements, we choose to 
apply both our method and parametric fitting to the same data (Measurement Set) in 
order to make a clean comparison between the two methods.  
We introduced some variations of the outcome x because we intend to use the 
semi-parametric method (Abdellaoui et al. 2008, 2011) to estimate the utility 
function of money. This method allows for an independent measurement of the 
utility function, i.e. measuring the utility function without imposing any restriction 
on the probability weighting function. With this benefit, we can hold the utility 
function constant for each subject when applying different methods to measure the 
weighting function. This is important for a clean comparison of the weighting 
function measurements. More details on the semi-parametric method are provided in 
the data analysis section. 
The 16 CEs are elicited in a randomized order for each subject using choice-list 
tasks. In our experiment, a choice-list task consists of two choice lists: a basic list 
and a zoom-in list. Figure 2.2 shows the experimental layout of an example basic list. 
The upper table shows the gamble to be evaluated. In the experiment the risky 
prospects were called “gambles”. The gambles were presented to subjects in a table, 
the first row of which contains possible risky events and the second row of which 
contains the corresponding outcomes of each of the events. Numbers representing the 
risky event will be explained later in this section. The lower table in this figure is a   
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Figure 2.2: A sample basic choice list 
 
 
Figure 2.3: A sample zoom-in choice list 
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standard choice list, with the non-risky options (right options) being sure amounts of 
money from £0 to the gamble prize (£8 in this case) in £1 intervals. As usual, only 
one switch from choosing left to choosing right is allowed. After the basic list is 
completed, a zoom-in list will be generated according to the decision maker’s 
choices in the basic list. If the decision maker switches, for instance, between £4 and 
£5 (i.e. if the gamble is preferred to £4 or less, and £5 or more is preferred to the 
gamble) in the basic list in Figure 2.2, a zoom-in list as shown in Figure 2.3 will be 
generated. The non-risky options in the zoom-in list then starts with £4 and end with 
£5 in steps of £0.10. We introduce zoom-in lists mainly to elicit CEs at greater 
precision.. 
 
The Prediction Set 
 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects complete 96 binary choice questions in 
randomized orders (see Appendix 2.1 for more details). These choices are referred to 
as the Prediction Set because we intend to use the measurements of the probability 
weighting function obtained from the Measurement Set to predict these choices and 
compare the predictive performance of different functional classes. Figure 2.4 shows 
the experimental layout of an example binary choice question. For each such 
question, subjects only have to click either the left or the right button to indicate their 
choice of the left or the right gamble. Each gamble is either a two-outcome risky 
prospect or a three-outcome risky prospect, with the outcomes of the gambles being 
respectively two or three of £6, £10, and £14. Gambles are presented in the same 
way to subjects as in the first part of the experiment. 
In order to distinguish the predictive performance of the Neo-additive weighting 
function and nonlinear weighting functions, we construct binary choice questions 
which have two features. First, for each pair of gambles in each choice question, the 
ratio of the expected payoff of the left gamble to the expected payoff of the right 
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Figure 2.4: An example binary choice question 
 
gamble is within the range [0.5, 2]. This is to guarantee that no choice is too “easy” 
(or no gamble is too “obviously” better than its alternative). Second, probabilities 
involved in these choice questions range from 0.05 to 0.95, in steps of 0.05 for 
probabilities smaller than 0.2 or larger than 0.8, and in steps of 0.1 for probabilities 
between 0.2 and 0.8. If the choice questions of the Prediction Set are to be visualized 
in a Machina (1992)-type unit probability triangle, the segments each of which 
represents a pair of gambles will symmetrically spread over the whole triangle (see 
figures in Appendix 2.1).  
Due to the second feature, there is higher density for choices involving extreme 
probabilities than those involving only moderate probabilities. Specifically, 43% of 
the 96 choice questions involve only probabilities between 0.2 and 0.8 (including 0.2 
and 0.8). We call these choices Prediction Subset A for the convenience of later uses 
(see Figure 2.5 below). For the rest choice questions, at least one of the two gambles 
involve probabilities smaller than 0.2 or larger than 0.8. We call these choices 
Prediction Subset B. Since the nonlinear and Neo-additive weighting functions are 
more likely to differ at two ends of the probability domain than at middle parts, this 
design may help reveal any potential difference between the two types of weighting 
functions.  
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Figure 2.5: Division of the full prediction set 
 
Chance Device and Incentive System 
 
We use a bag filled with 20 numbered balls as the chance device to resolve gambles 
in this experiment. These numbered balls are from 1 to 20, with each number 
appearing exactly once. In other words, when one ball is to be drawn from this bag, 
each number from 1 to 20 is equally likely to be drawn. As shown in Figure 2.2, 2.3 
and 2.4, in the experiment, each gamble is presented in the form of a table listing the 
risky events and the consequences of each event. These risky events relates to which 
numbered ball is to be drawn from this set of 20 balls. For example, the event “from 
1 to 12” refers to “if the number drawn is between 1 and 12”, thus denoting a 
probability of 0.6. We choose exactly twenty numbers because this allows us to have 
probabilities as small as 0.05 (e.g. “from 1 to 1”) and as large as 0.95 (e.g. “from 1 to 
19”).  
We implement a general form of the random incentive system to incentivize 
subjects. At the end of the experiment, one choice is selected for real for each subject. 
One ball is then randomly drawn from these 20 balls to determine the results of any 
gamble chosen by each subject in their selected “real choice”. The “real choice” is 
selected in the following way. For each subject, the computer first randomly selects 
either the first part or the second part of the experiment with equal probabilities. If 
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Part 2 is selected, one of the binary choices is randomly selected for real payment. If 
Part 1 is selected, one of the basic choice lists is randomly selected, and one choice 
(i.e. one row) in that list is randomly selected. The option chosen for that row 
determines the real payment, unless the row selected is one of the two ‘switch-point’ 
rows in that list. If the latter happens, one of the rows in the corresponding zoom-in 
choice list will be randomly selected to be the final choice for real payment. This 
system guarantees that any single choice the subjects make during this experiment 
could be the one selected for real payment. Since subjects are told that they will 
receive what they have chosen for the selected ‘real choice’ as their payoff, this 
system ensures incentive compatibility.  
The experiment was programed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) 
in the CeDEx laboratory at the University of Nottingham. 48 university students 
were recruited as subjects via the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2015). The experiment 
lasts approximately 70 minutes. The average payoff for each subject is £12 
(including a show-up fee of £3). 
 
 
2.5.2 Data Analysis 
 
We use the Measurement Set to measure the probability weighting function for risk. 
Three probability weighting functions are measured, with the second and third 
belonging to the non-linear class: 
 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝    (Neo-additive, Chateauneuf et al. 2007) 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝))𝜇)    (Prelec, 1998) 
𝑤(𝑝) =
𝛾𝑝𝜇
(𝛾𝑝𝜇 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜇)⁄     (Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987) 
 
We use semi-parametric estimation to obtain decision weights first, then apply 
standard parametric fitting for non-linear probability weighting functions and both 
the Neo-Lite method and the standard parametric fitting for Neo-additive weighting 
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function. For both methods, we use equation (2.4) and assume the power utility 
function 𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛼.  
The reason we also fit the Neo-additive weighting function is to allow for a 
decomposition of the two-dimensional difference between the Neo-Lite method and 
the standard parametric fitting (with a nonlinear weighting function). One dimension 
concerns the measurement techniques (fitting vs. non-fitting) and the other 
dimension concerns the weighting function forms (nonlinear vs. linear). Prelec’s two 
parameter function and the Goldstein & Einhorn’s are chosen as representatives of 
the non-linear family not only because they are widely used in parametric fitting but 
also because their parameters have very similar interpretations to those in the 
Neo-additive function, with 𝜇 measuring the degree of elevation (pessimism) and 𝛾 
measuring the degree of curvature (likelihood-insensitivity). Since it is not clear 
which of the nonlinear weighting functions fit our data better, we choose to use both 
and pick up the better one as the benchmark for comparison. We did the following 
analysis for each subject. 
Step 1: Utility Function We fitted utility function using the semi-parametric 
method of Abdellaoui et al. (2008). The power utility function 𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛼  is 
assumed because it is simple, widely used, and often gives a better fit than alternative 
families (Wakker, 2008). Specifically, we fitted equation (2.4), taking the decision 
weight 𝑤(𝑝) of the outcome-relevant event as an extra parameter. Fitting was done 
using nonlinear least-square estimation with CE as the dependent variable. The 
utility was estimated four times at different probability levels, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. 
For example, we first estimated the utility parameter, taking 𝑤(0.2) as an extra 
parameter. Then we re-estimate the utility parameter, taking 𝑤(0.4) as the extra 
parameter, etc. In this way we obtained four utility parameter estimates and a full set 
of estimated decision weights. We tested the equality of the utility parameters 
estimated with different decision weights and found no significant difference among 
these utility parameters (details provided in Appendix 2.2). Therefore we take the 
average of these values as the final utility parameter measurement which we report in 
the next section.  
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Table 2.1: Possible specifications of the four events for the Neo-Lite method  
Specification 𝒑(𝑨) 𝒑(𝑩) 𝒑(𝑨
∪ 𝑩) 
𝒑(?̅?) 
1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 
2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
3 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 
4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.6 
Note: 𝑝(. ) denotes probability. 
 
Step 2: Weighting Function With the estimated decision weights from the first 
step, we fitted the probability weighting function parameters using nonlinear 
least-square estimation. With the same set of decision weights, we also applied the 
Neo-Lite method. We also did robustness check with respect to the Neo-Lite method 
by testing the equality of the parameter sets (𝜇, 𝛾) measured under all the possible 
different specifications. For risk, each specification assigns a probability to each of 
the four events 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵, and ?̅? (see Table 2.1). Under each specification, one 
set of weighting function parameters can be measured. Again, no significant 
difference was found between these measurements (more details provided in 
Appendix 2.3). We therefore take the average of these measurements as the final 
weighting function parameter measurement (for the Neo-Lite method).  
Step 3: Predictive Test Utility functions and probability weighting functions 
obtained in the first two steps are used to predict the 96 binary choices in the 
Prediction Set. The predictive success rates, the proportion of correctly predicted 
choices, are calculated. This indicator of predictive performance does not take into 
account any stochastic component of decision making, in other words, the measured 
model can either predict correctly or incorrectly, and the more a model correctly 
predicts the better the model is.  
Due to the non-fitting nature of our method, incorporating decision error 
analysis in the measurement (and thus in the prediction test) is not possible. 
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Therefore, all models we fitted are deterministic, with no extra decision error 
parameter estimated, and the measured models are used deterministically in 
prediction tests. For the same reason, we did not choose any probabilistic indicators 
of predictive performance (such as the predicted log-likelihood used by Kothiyal et 
al. 2014) that are not comparable with the predictive success rate. Another reason for 
using a “deterministic” indicator is that it provides information about how useful 
these models are in predicting actual choices. 
 
 
2.5.3 Experimental Results 
 
We present results for 47 of the 48 subjects, with Subject 7 excluded from the 
analysis for that he exhibited the same CE for all 16 prospects in the first part of the 
experiment and always chose left in second part8. We think this subject was clearly 
using extremely simple decision rules, which is not helpful for our intended analysis, 
though including this subject would not have changed the qualitative results 
presented in this section. 
 
Measurements 
 
For the power utility function 𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛼, the median utility parameter estimated 
using the semi-parametric method is 𝛼 = 0.870, significantly smaller than 1 
(Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p-value 0.000). Median parameter values are considered 
instead of mean values because there is some skewness in the distribution of the 
utility estimates (see Figure 2.6).  
 
                                                             
8 Actually we looked at each subject’s choices and excluded subjects whose choices in the experiment are 
unlikely a reflection of their attitudes towards risk and incentives in real life. For this reason, we excluded 
subjects with either or both of the two features: (1) a zero or negative utility parameter 𝛼; (2) a probability 
weighting function part or all of which is downward-sloping. Luckily, no other subject other than Subject 7 needs 
to be excluded. 
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Figure 2.6: Distributions of the measured utility parameter  
 
Figure 2.6 shows the histogram distribution of the measured utility parameter. 
In general, there is slightly more subjects with concave utility functions than with 
convex ones. The excluded subject corresponds to the short bar to the most left in 
this figure, having an almost flat utility function with 𝛼 = 0.017, which is not 
significantly different from 0 according to the nonlinear Wald-test (p-value 0.324). 
The four decision weights estimated using the semi-parametric method are 
summarized in Table 2.2. Significant deviation from the Expected-Utility theory is 
found, as shown in the fifth column of Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Decision weights estimated with semi-parametric fitting 
Decision Weight Mean Median Interquartile 
t-test p-value 
(𝒘(𝒑) = 𝒑) 
𝒘(𝟎. 𝟐) 0.379 0.355 [0.250, 0.481] 0.000 
𝒘(𝟎. 𝟒) 0.508 0.495 [0.400, 0.630] 0.000 
𝒘(𝟎. 𝟔) 0.622 0.624 [0.524, 0.727] 0.048 
𝒘(𝟎. 𝟖) 0.748 0.761 [0.656, 0.856] 0.000 
 
For the Neo-Lite methods, we first measured 𝜇 according to equation (2.8), 
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and measured the pessimism/optimism index according to equation (2.10). The 
median intercept 𝜇 =0.26 and the median pessimism/optimism index (1 − 𝛾 −
2𝜇) = −0.11. Then the slope 𝛾  is solved from these two results. The median 
measurement is 𝛾 =0.59. The results of all the parameter measurements are listed in 
Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Median weighting function parameter measurements  
 
Prelec 
𝑤(𝑝) = 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝))𝜇) 
G&E 
𝑤(𝑝) = 
𝛾𝑝𝜇
(𝛾𝑝𝜇 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜇)⁄  
Neo 
𝑤(𝑝) = 
𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝 
Neo-Lite 
𝑤(𝑝) = 
𝜇 + 𝛾𝑝 
𝝁 0.67 0.61 0.26 0.26 
𝜸 0.75 1.30 0.58 0.59 
 
In Table 2.3, “Neo-Lite” denotes the Neo-additive weighting function measured 
using Neo-Lite method; “Neo”, “Prelec” and “G&E” denote respectively the 
Neo-additive weighting function, Prelec (1998)’s weighting function and Goldstein 
& Einhorn (1987)’s weighting function, all measured using parametric fitting. We 
will continue to use these meanings and denotations for the rest of the chapter. Again, 
due to skewness in the distribution of the parameters, we report the median 
weighting functions. It is worth noticing that although the parameters of the Prelec 
function and the G&E function have similar interpretations, their parameter values 
(especially of 𝛾) are not comparable. The difference between the 𝛾 of “Prelec” and 
of “G&E” actually entails a similarity in their functional shapes, as is shown in the 
figure below.  
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Figure 2.7: Median Probability Weighting Functions  
 
In Figure 2.7 we plot the four weighting functions listed in Table 2.3. It is not 
surprising that all non-linear weighting functions exhibit the common inverse-S 
pattern. With hindsight it is also not so surprising that for probabilities between 0.2 
and 0.8, the fitted weighting functions almost overlap, since we have only four 
observations of decision weights that are between 0.2 and 0.8. However, it is 
surprising that the median “Neo-Lite” weighting function is almost exactly the same 
as the “Neo” weighting function, given that completed different measurement 
techniques (non-fitting and fitting procedures) are used. In order to further compare 
the two techniques, we looked at the parameter distributions of the “Neo-Lite” 
weighting function and the “Neo” weighting function. The left histogram of Figure 
2.8 shows the distributions of measured 𝜇 (the intercept) and the right histogram 
shows the distributions of measured 𝛾 (the slope).   
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Figure 2.8: Distributions of parameters of the Neo-additive weighting function  
 
For 𝜇, although negative values are not allowed in theory, we found a few 
subjects having a negative 𝜇. This is not strange if one has an S-shaped weighting 
function but only the middle part of that function is measured with a linear functional 
form. Therefore we didn’t exclude subjects with negative 𝜇 because they may 
represent a certain, though not common, type of subjects (e.g. having an S-shaped 
weighting function). 
We used three tests to inspect whether the distributions of 𝜇 and 𝛾 of the 
Neo-additive function measured using Neo-Lite method and using parametric fitting 
are the same: the t-test (for equality of means), the Wilcoxon sign-rank test (for the 
equality of medians), and the Mann-Whitney two-sample test (for the equality of the 
entire distributions). The result is that, for both 𝜇 and 𝛾, there is no significant 
difference (at 5% level) of the means, medians, or the whole distributions between 
the two methods. The p-values of the three tests are respectively 0.541, 0.612, 0.979 
for 𝜇, and 0.419, 0.216, 0.889 for 𝛾.  
We also compared the resulting distributions of different types of subjects from 
different measurement methods. Subjects are classified according to their attitudes 
towards probabilities (i.e. how they weight probabilities)9. Each subject is classified 
                                                             
9 Since the measured median utility function is significantly different from linearity, the probability weighting 
function only reflects the decision maker’s attitude towards probabilities rather than attitude towards risk. 
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as one of the four types: inverse-S (for subjects overweighting small probabilities 
and underweighting large probabilities), S-shape (for subjects underweighting small 
probabilities and overweighting large probabilities), overweighting (for subjects 
overweighting all probabilities), and underweighting (for subjects underweighting all 
probabilities). Details of how subjects are classified are provided in Appendix 2.4. 
Figure 2.9 reports the (stack) distributions of the numbers of the four types of 
subjects for each of the four weighting functions “Neo”, “Neo-Lite”, “Prelec”, and 
“G&E”.  
 
 
Figure 2.9: Distributions of different types of subjects according to their attitude towards 
probability  
 
Each bar in Figure 2.9 is a stack of (from bottom to top) the number of the 
inverse-S type, the S-shape type, the overweighting type and the underweighting type, 
with numbers of all four types summing up to 47. Not surprisingly, regardless of the 
measurement methods or weighting function models, most of the subjects were 
classified as having an inverse-S shaped weighting function, as denoted by the 
lightest color in the figure. More importantly, according to the Mann-Whitney test of 
equality of distributions, all four bars have the same distribution of subjects with 
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respect to the four types of probability weighting10. 
These results suggest that the non-fitting technique of the new method seems to 
be a good substitute for parametric fitting. In other words, when the weighting 
function is restricted to be Neo-additive, the Neo-Lite method and the parametric 
fitting method generate essentially the same measurements. Indeed, we couldn’t find 
any statistically significant difference in all these three aspects of the two 
measurements. However, the Neo-Lite method seems to be more efficient in this case 
than parametric fitting of the decision weighting function, because with the former, 
parameters could simply be calculated from decision weights without extra work.  
 
Out-of-Sample Predictive Performance 
 
We expected the predictive performance test to help us distinguish and discriminate 
between the four probability weighting functions, especially between “Neo-Lite” and 
“Neo”, and between “Neo” and the two nonlinear weighting functions. The former 
comparison relates to the comparison between data fitting technique and the 
non-fitting technique of our method, while the latter relates to the comparison 
between the descriptive and predictive power of the Neo-additive (linear) weighting 
function and the nonlinear weighting functions. Since we have shown that the 
“Neo-Lite” functions are not significantly different from the “Neo” functions, we 
wouldn’t expect their average predictive performances differ significantly (though 
the performance distribution across subjects may differ). However, by the nature of 
our design of the prediction set, we do expect that either the nonlinear weighting 
functions performs significantly better than the Neo-additive functions, or the 
opposite.  
We calculate the predictive success rate for each subject with each type of 
probability weighting function, and report the mean success rate over all subjects in 
Table 2.4. The predictive success rate is calculated as the proportion of correctly 
                                                             
10 Since the Mann-Whitney test can only test the equality of two samples, we did this test for each two of the four 
weighting functions, and therefore did six tests. The minimum p-value obtained among the six tests is 0.743. 
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predicted choices in all choices considered. We use Predictive Test 1 to refer to the 
test in which we use the (probability weighting functions obtained from the) 
Measurement Set to predict (choices in) the Prediction Set. In general, predictive 
success rates are low when the Prediction Set is considered as the predictive target.  
 
Table 2.4: Mean Predictive Success Rate (for the whole Prediction Set) 
Prelec G&E Neo Neo-Lite 
52.3% 51.1% 52.0% 51.7% 
 
Although, not surprisingly, there is no significant difference between the 
performance of “Neo” and “Neo-Lite”, it is unexpected somehow that there is also 
no significant difference between the nonlinear weighting function class and the 
Neo-additive class. The only significant difference lies between “Prelec” and “G&E” 
(t-test, p-value 0.005). It seems that our prediction set does not achieve the purpose 
of distinguishing the nonlinear weighting functions from the Neo-additive ones. We 
speculate that this is because the four measured functions perform equally bad given 
that this predictive test is a very strong out-of-sample test, with measurements of the 
probability weighting function from four probabilities (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8) to predict 
binary choices involving probabilities from 0.05 to 0.95. In other words, there might 
be a common failure of the four functions to predict choices involving extreme 
probabilities, and this common failure may have largely reduced the performance 
gap between the two classes which would otherwise be salient. Therefore, we 
changed the predictive target from the full prediction set to its subsets (Subset A and 
B as mentioned earlier) and examine the predictive performances.  
Table 2.5 shows the mean predictive success rate for the four weighting 
functions when predicting Prediction Subset A (where only probabilities between 0.2 
and 0.8 are involved) and Prediction Subset B (where probabilities lower than 0.2 or 
higher than 0.8 are involved). There are three key messages from Table 2.5. First, for 
Prediction Subset A, the success rates are significantly improved whereas for 
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Prediction Subset B, the opposite happens. This is again expected because in the 
Measurement Set, only probabilities between 0.2 and 0.8 are involved. In other 
words, the two ends of the weighting functions are not measured. Secondly, for 
Prediction Subset B, the predictive success rates even dip below 50%, indicating a 
systematic deviation of subjects’ attitudes towards probability from what has been 
elicited from the Measurement Set. Thirdly, whereas for Prediction Subset B there is 
no significant difference between the Neo-additive weighting functions and the 
nonlinear weighting functions, for Subset A, the nonlinear class performs 
significantly better than the Neo-additive class11. Subset B seems to be where the 
common failure lies.  
 
Table 2.5: Mean Predictive Success Rate (for subsets of the Prediction Set) 
Predictive Target Prelec G&E Neo Neo-Lite 
 
Prediction Subset A 
(non-extreme probabilities) 
 
 
58.0% 
 
 
57.9% 
 
 
56.9% 
 
 
56.5% 
 
Prediction Subset B 
(extreme probabilities) 
 
47.5% 
 
48.0% 
 
48.4% 
 
48.2% 
 
 
 
In-Sample Predictive Exercise 
 
We intended to discriminate between the Neo-additive weighting functions and the 
nonlinear weighting functions, but obviously the result of the out-of-sample test is 
enough for us to claim support for either of the two classes. Although for moderate 
probabilities, the nonlinear class performs better than the Neo-additive class, the 
absolute difference in the mean predictive success rates is less than 2%. Moreover, 
we failed to discriminate between the nonlinear weighting functions from the 
                                                             
11 We did t-tests for the equality of the mean predictive success rates between each pair of the linear-nonlinear 
weighting functions. The p-values for the null hypotheses “Prelec”= “Neo”, “Prelec”= “Neo-Lite”, “G&E”= 
“Neo”, and “G&E”= “Neo-Lite” are respectively 0.015, 0.031, 0.019, and 0.037. 
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Neo-additive ones at the probability domain (i.e. Subset B) where both classes of 
weighting functions fail to predict.  
It may be argued that our out-of-sample predictive test is perhaps too hard for 
the CPT model we work with, in light of the well-known preference reversal 
phenomenon (e.g. Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Grether & Plott, 1979). For this 
reason, we speculate that performing in-sample tests, or using the binary choices as 
both a measurement set and a prediction set, would generally improve the predictive 
success rates of both classes of weighting functions, and this may also make the 
differences of performances distinguishable between the two classes. So we fitted the 
probability weighting functions “Prelec”, “G&E” and “Neo” with binary choices 
from Prediction Subset A, using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation introduced by 
Harrison (2008)12. We chose Prediction Subset A (instead of the full Prediction Set) 
as the new measurement set in order to make it more comparable to the original one 
because now both involve only probabilities between 0.2 and 0.8. We didn’t apply 
the Neo-Lite method in this case because it is much more complicated to obtain the 
decision weights first (than to fit the utility and weighting function parameters 
directly). However, this does not matter because the purpose of this additional 
analysis is to discriminate between the Neo-additive class and the nonlinear class of 
weighting functions. In other words, we need only to compare “Neo” with “Prelec” 
or “G&E”.  
We simultaneously fitted a power utility function with each of the three 
weighting functions (estimation results are shown in Appendix 2.5). The measured 
utility and weighting functions were used to predict the full Prediction Set, within 
which about 60% of choices involved probabilities lower than 0.2 or higher than 0.8. 
Table 2.6 reports the results. 
In this case we used a subset of the Prediction Set to predict the full set and the 
two complementary subsets. For all three predictive targets, the nonlinear weighting 
functions now performs significantly better than the fitted “Neo” function, with an 
                                                             
12 Details of these estimations can be found in Appendix 2.5. 
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absolute gap from approximately 3% to 9%13. This suggests that the nonlinear 
probability weighting functions seem to have more predictive (and hence descriptive) 
power than the Neo-additive weighting functions. In addition, Table 2.6 also shows 
that, again, choices involving extreme probabilities (Prediction Subset B) are harder 
to predict than choices involving no extreme probabilities.  
 
Table 2.6: Mean Benchmark Predictive Success Rate  
Predictive Target Prelec G&E Neo 
Full Prediction Set 66.7% 69.2% 62.6% 
Prediction Subset A 
(non-extreme probabilities) 
65.7% 71.2% 64.3% 
Prediction Subset B 
(extreme probabilities) 
67.0% 68.3% 62.3% 
Note: Prediction subset A is also the measurement set in this case. 
 
It now seems that although the Neo-Lite method works almost as well as 
parametric fitting when the Neo-additive weighting function is used, as shown by our 
evidence that that the Neo-Lite method generate almost exactly the same 
measurements of the Neo-additive weighting function as those generated by 
parametric fitting (with the robustness check of our method indicating its capability 
to exploiting more data which potentially favors parametric fitting), our method may 
not be a good substitute of parametric fitting because, in general, the Neo-additive 
weighting function seems to have less predictive power than the nonlinear class of 
weighting functions, especially when extreme probabilities are involved. 
So far we have done six predictive exercises. For convenience of analysis, the 
six exercises are named from Predictive Test 1 to 6 as shown in the table below. 
Strictly speaking, only Prediction Test 5 is an in-sample test, and all others are 
out-of-sample tests. The results for Test 1 is shown in Table 2.4, results for Test 2 
and 3 are shown in Table 2.5, and results for Test 4, 5, and 6 are shown in Table 2.6. 
                                                             
13 For each predictive target, we did t-tests for the equality of the mean predictive success rates between each 
pair of the three functions. All p-values are 0.000. This time, the “G&E” function performs significantly better 
than “Prelec” and “Neo”. 
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In general, we can see that the performance of Test 4, 5 and 6 is much better than 
Test 1, 2, and 3. In other words, we used two different measurement sets (one based 
on CEs and the other based on binary choices) to measure subjects’ utility and 
probability weighting functions, and the two measurements have substantially 
different predictive performances in predicting the same three sets of choices. This is 
somewhat unexpected because the two measurement sets involve the same range of 
probabilities (from 0.2 to 0.8). 
 
Table 2.7: The six predictive tests  
 
Probability weighting functions  
measured from  
Predictive target 
Predictive Test 1 the Measurement Set Prediction Set 
Predictive Test 2 the Measurement Set Prediction Subset A 
Predictive Test 3 the Measurement Set Prediction Subset B 
Predictive Test 4 Prediction Subset A Prediction Set 
Predictive Test 5 Prediction Subset A Prediction Subset A 
Predictive Test 6 Prediction Subset A Prediction Subset B 
 
Not surprisingly, the in-sample predictive success rates (Test 5) are significantly 
better than the corresponding out-of-sample success rates (Test 2). However, the 
facts that success rates in Test 4 are much higher than in Test 1, and that success 
rates in Test 6 are much higher than in Test 3 suggest that there might be some 
crucial difference between probability weighting functions measured using CE data 
and those measured using choice data. This is confirmed by Figure 2.10, which 
shows the probability weighting function we estimated from choices of Prediction 
Subset A. These weighting functions are quite different from those we obtained using 
the Measurement Set (i.e. CE data). The estimated weighting functions exhibit an 
uncommon shape: almost S-shaped for the nonlinear weighting functions and 
universally underweighting for the Neo-additive function. 
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Figure 2.10: Median probability weighting functions estimated from Prediction Subset A 
 
This finding has reminded us of the famous preference reversal phenomenon 
(see e.g. Seidl, 2002 for a survey), that is inconsistency between preference revealed 
from binary choices tasks and from evaluation tasks. Various explanations for this 
phenomenon have been studied (e.g. Loomes & Sugden, 1983; Loomes et al., 1989; 
Cubitt et al., 2004). However, our finding that different types of tasks of 
decision-making under risk reveal completely different probability weighting 
functions (inverse-S vs. S-shaped) brings up new interesting questions. For example, 
is preference reversal (and factors contributing to preference reversal) a cause for or 
a result of individuals having different weighting functions for different types of 
tasks? If the latter is true, what could then explain why people have different 
weighting functions for choice tasks and for evaluation tasks? These questions may 
deserve future research. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
 
We have introduced a non-fitting method, based on the Neo-additive parametric form 
and the subadditivity properties of the probability weighting function, to measure the 
probability weighting function for choice under uncertainty. For risk, the advantage 
of this method is mainly efficiency of the data analysis process. For ambiguity, the 
main advantage is that no elicitation of the subjective probabilities is needed. In this 
chapter, we did an experiment of choice under risk to test our method against 
standard parametric fitting method, and to test the non-linear class of probability 
weighting function against the Neo-additive weighting function.  
We have shown with our experiment that, in combination with a method that 
elicits decision weights, the Neo-Lite method provides a most simple and quick way 
to obtain measurements of the Neo-additive weighting function. These measurements 
do not differ from the Neo-additive weighting function measured using standard 
parametric fitting. However, as our predictive tests show, the non-linear class of 
probability weighting functions generally performs better than the Neo-additive 
function, particularly when we use choice data to predict choices. The usefulness of 
our method seems to be bounded by the natural limitations of the linear weighting 
functions to describe choices involving extreme probabilities. In other words, the 
Neo-Lite method works well whenever the Neo-additive weighting function is 
considered appropriate for use. It is not clear how our method works for ambiguity, 
but for risk, we generally suggest using this method as a quick and convenient way to 
obtain some pre-analysis results or to get a sense of the degree of pessimism and 
likelihood insensitivity of the decision maker, than as a rigorous empirical method in 
formal decision analysis. 
    In addition, our finding that people exhibit dramatically different shapes of 
probability weighting raises three important questions. The first is to what extent is 
the inverse-S shaped probability weighting function representative of individual risk 
preferences. The second is how we should interpret a probability weighting function 
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that is sensitive to the type of task used to elicit preferences. The third question is 
whether there are more fundamental regularities underlying decision-making that can 
explain this sensitivity. The answers to these questions may provide insights for how 
CPT can be extended or modified, or how future theories can be developed to 
accommodate violations of EUT as well as the preference reversal phenomenon.  
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Appendices for Chapter 2  
 
Appendix 2.1 More details of the Prediction Set 
 
Table 2.8: The list of all the binary choice questions in the Prediction Set of the experiment 
Question Left Option Right Option 
1 (£14, 0.9 ; £10, 0.1) (£14, 0.95 ; £6, 0.05) 
2 (£14, 0.85 ; £10, 0.15) (£14, 0.95 ; £6, 0.05) 
3 (£14, 0.85 ; £10, 0.15) (£14, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) 
4 (£14, 0.8 ; £10, 0.2) (£14, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) 
5 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.3) (£14, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) 
6 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.3) (£14, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) 
7 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.3) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
8 (£14, 0.6 ; £10, 0.4) (£14, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) 
9 (£14, 0.6 ; £10, 0.4) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
10 (£14, 0.5 ; £10, 0.5) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
11 (£14, 0.5 ; £10, 0.5) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
12 (£14, 0.4 ; £10, 0.6) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
13 (£14, 0.4 ; £10, 0.6) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
14 (£14, 0.4 ; £10, 0.6) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
15 (£14, 0.3 ; £10, 0.7) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
16 (£14, 0.3 ; £10, 0.7) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
17 (£14, 0.2 ; £10, 0.8) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
18 (£14, 0.2 ; £10, 0.8) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
19 (£14, 0.2 ; £10, 0.8) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
20 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.85) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
21 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.85) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
22 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.85) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
23 (£14, 0.6 ; £10, 0.4) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
24 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.9) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
25 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.9) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
26 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.9) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
27 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.95) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
28 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.95) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
29 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.95) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
30 (£10, 0.95 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
31 (£10, 0.95 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
32 (£10, 0.95 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
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33 (£10, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
34 (£10, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
35 (£10, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
36 (£10, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) (£14, 0.25 ; £6, 0.75) 
37 (£10, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
38 (£10, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
39 (£10, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
40 (£10, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
41 (£10, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
42 (£10, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
43 (£10, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
44 (£10, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
45 (£10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
46 (£10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
47 (£10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
48 (£10, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
49 (£10, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
50 (£10, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
51 (£10, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) (£14, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) 
52 (£10, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
53 (£10, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) 
54 (£10, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.1 ; £6, 0.9) 
55 (£10, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) (£14, 0.1 ; £6, 0.9) 
56 (£10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) (£14, 0.1 ; £6, 0.9) 
57 (£10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) (£14, 0.05 ; £6, 0.95) 
58 (£10, 0.1 ; £6, 0.9) (£14, 0.05 ; £6, 0.95) 
59 (£10, 0.75 ; £6, 0.25) (£14, 0.5 £10 0.5) 
60 (£14, 0.85 ; £10, 0.1 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) 
61 (£14, 0.8 ; £10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.9 ; £6, 0.1) 
62 (£14, 0.8 ; £10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) 
63 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.25 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) 
64 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.25 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.85 ; £6, 0.15) 
65 (£14, 0.8 ; £10, 0.1 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
66 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.2 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
67 (£14, 0.7 ; £10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.8 ; £6, 0.2) 
68 (£14, 0.6 ; £10, 0.3 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
69 (£14, 0.6 ; £10, 0.25 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
70 (£14, 0.5 ; £10, 0.4 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
71 (£14, 0.5 ; £10, 0.35 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.7 ; £6, 0.3) 
72 (£14, 0.4 ; £10, 0.5 ; £6, 0.1) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
73 (£14, 0.3 ; £10, 0.65 ; £6, 0.05) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
74 (£14, 0.25 ; £10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
75 (£14, 0.25 ; £10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.15) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
76 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.25) (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
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77 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.25) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
78 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.65 ; £6, 0.3) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
79 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.5 ; £6, 0.4) (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
80 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.35 ; £6, 0.5) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
81 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.4 ; £6, 0.5) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
82 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.25 ; £6, 0.6) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
83 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.3 ; £6, 0.6) (£14, 0.3 ; £6, 0.7) 
84 (£14, 0.15 ; £10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
85 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.2 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
86 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.25 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.2 ; £6, 0.8) 
87 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.25 ; £6, 0.7) (£14, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) 
88 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.1 ; £6, 0.8) (£14, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) 
89 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.8) (£14, 0.15 ; £6, 0.85) 
90 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.15 ; £6, 0.8) (£14, 0.1 ; £6, 0.9) 
91 (£14, 0.05 ; £10, 0.1 ; £6, 0.85) (£14, 0.1 ; £6, 0.9) 
92 £10 (£14, 0.6 ; £6, 0.4) 
93 £10 (£14, 0.5 ; £6, 0.5) 
94 £10 (£14, 0.4 ; £6, 0.6) 
95 £10 (£14, 0.2 ; £10, 0.6 ; £6, 0.2) 
96 £10 (£14, 0.1 ; £10, 0.8 ; £6, 0.1) 
 
In Figure 2.11, we sketch all the choices in the table above on a unit probability 
triangle. Each choice question is represented by a segment in the triangle, with each 
of the two end nodes of a segment representing each of the two gambles in a choice 
question. The triangle is positioned in a square divided into 20 rows and 20 columns. 
Each row (column) has a height (width) of 1/20 of the side length of the large square. 
In other words all three sides of the probability triangle are divided into probability 
intervals of 0.05. At the top corner is the best outcome £14, at the left bottom corner 
is the middle outcome £10, and at the right bottom corner is the worst outcome £6. 
Figure 2.11a sketches the choices with two-outcome gambles and Figure 2.11b 
shows choices involving three-outcome gambles. 
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Figure 2.11a: Choice questions of the Prediction Set involving only two-outcome gambles 
 
 
Figure 2.11b: Choice questions of the Prediction Set involving three-outcome gambles 
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Appendix 2.2 Measurements of utility 
 
To use the semi-parametric method to estimate the utility function and the decision 
weights, we first divided the Measurement Set into four subsets. Each of the subsets 
contains four Certainty-Equivalents of gambles having the same probability but 
different stakes. For each of these subsets of CEs, we estimated the power utility 
parameter 𝛼, taking the corresponding decision weight as an extra parameter (see 
Table 8). Since in the Measurement Set we have four probabilities 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 
0.8, we ended up with four utility measurements for each of the probabilities (or 
decision weights) for each subject. 
 
Table 2.9 Semi-parametric fitting of the utility parameter and decision weights 
Data for Estimation Parameters Estimated 
Estimated Utility 
Median Mean 
CE(𝟒𝟎.𝟐𝟎), 
CE(𝟖𝟎.𝟐𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟐𝟎.𝟐𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟔𝟎.𝟐𝟎) 
𝛼, w(0.2) 𝛼 = 0.86 𝛼 = 0.88 
CE(𝟒𝟎.𝟒𝟎), 
CE(𝟖𝟎.𝟒𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟐𝟎.𝟒𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟔𝟎.𝟒𝟎) 
𝛼, w(0.4) 𝛼 = 0.84 𝛼 = 0.83 
CE(𝟒𝟎.𝟔𝟎), 
CE(𝟖𝟎.𝟔𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟐𝟎.𝟔𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟔𝟎.𝟔𝟎) 
𝛼, w(0.6) 𝛼 = 0.86 𝛼 = 0.85 
CE(𝟒𝟎.𝟖𝟎), 
CE(𝟖𝟎.𝟖𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟐𝟎.𝟖𝟎), 
CE(𝟏𝟔𝟎.𝟖𝟎) 
𝛼, w(0.8) 𝛼 = 0.90 𝛼 = 0.88 
Note: The model estimated is equation (2.4), with power utility 𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛼 . CE(𝑥𝑝𝑦) 
denotes the Certainty-Equivalent of the gamble 𝑥𝑝𝑦. 
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We tested the equality of the four utility measurements at the aggregate level. 
Specifically, we tested the equality of the median utility parameters (the third column 
of Table 2.8) using Wilcoxon sign-rank test and found no significant difference any 
two of the four measurements (the minimum p-value 0.243). We tested the equality 
of the mean utility parameters (the fourth column of Table 2.8) using t-test and found 
no significant difference between any two of the four measurements (the minimum 
p-value 0.435). We also tested the hypothesis that these measurements are drawn 
from the populations with the same distribution using the Mann-Whitney test, and 
again no significant difference has been found (the minimum p-value 0.275). 
Therefore for each subject, we averaged the four utility parameter measurements and 
reported the averaged median utility parameter (over subjects) and the averaged 
utility parameter distribution (over subjects) in Section 2.5.3 of the main text.  
 
 
Appendix 2.3 Robustness checks for Neo-Lite method  
 
After obtaining, for each subject, the four decision weights 𝑤(0.2) , 𝑤(0.4) , 
𝑤(0.6) and 𝑤(0.8), we could obtain four potentially different sets of weighting 
function parameters for each different specifications of the relevant events (see Table 
2.9). We therefore did a robustness check for the Neo-Lite method by testing the 
equality of the four weighting function measurements, as what we have done for the 
four utility measurements generated using different subsets of the Measurement Set. 
At the aggregate level, we again used t-test to test the equality of means, 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test to test the equality of medians, and Mann-Whitney test to 
test the equality of the distributions. We found no significant difference between any 
two of these measurements of 𝜇 and 𝛾. Specifically, for 𝜇, the minimum p-values 
for mean tests, median test, and distribution tests are respectively 0.415, 0.560, and 
0.466; for 𝛾, the minimum p-values for mean tests, median test, and distribution 
tests are respectively 0.412, 0.382, and 0.620. We therefore average the four 
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measurements of 𝜇 and 𝛾 for each subject and reported the median (over subjects) 
of the averaged weighting function parameters in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.10: Median weighting function parameters measured using Neo-Lite with different 
specifications 
Specifications of the Four Events Median Parameter Measurements 
p(𝑨)=0.2, p(𝑩)=0.2, p(𝑨 ∪ 𝑩)=0.4, 
p(𝑨)=0.8 
𝜇 = 0.25, 𝛾 = 0.61 
p(𝑨)=0.2, p(𝑩)=0.4, p(𝑨 ∪ 𝑩)=0.6, 
p(𝑨)=0.8 
𝜇 = 0.27, 𝛾 = 0.58 
p(𝑨)=0.2, p(𝑩)=0.6, p(𝑨 ∪ 𝑩)=0.8, 
p(𝑨)=0.8 
𝜇 = 0.25, 𝛾 = 0.60 
p(𝑨)=0.4, p(𝑩)=0.4, p(𝑨 ∪ 𝑩)=0.8, 
p(𝑨)=0.6 
𝜇 = 0.27, 𝛾 = 0.58 
 
 
Appendix 2.4 Classification of subjects  
 
For each subject, we obtained four measured probability weighting functions 
“Prelec”, “G&E”, “Neo”, and “Neo-Lite”. For each measured function, we generated 
20 decision weights for probabilities from 0.05 to 0.95, in steps of 0.05. Let 
𝑤𝐹𝑈𝑁(𝑝) denote the sequence of generated decision weights with 𝑝=0.05, 0.10, …, 
0.90, 0.95 and 𝐹𝑈𝑁= “Prelec”, “G&E”, “Neo”, “Neo-Lite”. We then generated 
another sequence ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(𝑝) = 𝑤𝐹𝑈𝑁(𝑝) − 𝑝. Given a weighting function 𝐹𝑈𝑁, a 
subject is classified as one of the four types below: 
Inverse-S type, if ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(0.05) > 0 and ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(0.95) < 0; 
S type, if ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(0.05) < 0 and ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(0.95) > 0; 
Overweighting type, if ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(𝑝) > 0 for all 𝑝; 
Underweighting type, if ∆𝐹𝑈𝑁(𝑝) < 0 for all 𝑝; 
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Since we have confirmed that there is no subject whose measured weighting 
functions cross the 45-degree line (i.e. the identity line where 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝) more than 
once, we think this is a proper classification of subjects based on their attitudes 
towards probabilities.  
 
 
Appendix 2.5 Measuring probability weighting functions using 
binary choices in Prediction Subset A  
 
Using the binary choice data from Prediction Subset A, where no probabilities 
smaller than 0.2 or larger than 0.8 are involved, we fitted the power utility function 
v(x) = xα  and three probability weighting functions: “Prelec”, “G&E”, “Neo”. 
Results of parameter estimates are shown in Table 2.11. 
 
Table 2.11 Median measurements of power utility (alpha) and probability weighting function 
parameters 
 Prelec 
𝒘(𝒑) = 
𝐞𝐱𝐩 (−𝜸(− 𝐥𝐧(𝒑))𝝁) 
G&E 
𝒘(𝒑) = 
𝜸𝒑𝝁/(𝜸𝒑𝝁 + (𝟏 − 𝒑)𝝁) 
Neo 
𝒘(𝒑) = 𝝁 + 𝜸𝒑 
𝝁 1.16 1.46 -0.13 
𝜸 2.00 0.50 1.12 
𝜶 1.03 0.73 0.39 
 
 
Appendix 2.6 Experimental Instructions 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making which will last about an hour. You 
will be paid £3 for coming so long as you complete all of the required tasks. In 
addition, you may earn up to an additional £16 depending on your decisions and 
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upon chance. We will pay you in cash at the end of the experiment. There are some 
general rules you must follow:  
1. Please put away your mobile phones and do not talk to others at any time during 
the experiment.  
2. You will use your computer to make decisions during the experiment. Do not use 
your mouse or keyboard to play around with the software running on your computer. 
If you unintentionally or intentionally close the software program running on your 
computer, we will ask you to leave.  
3. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand. The 
experimenter will come to answer your questions. 
 
Details of the Experiment  
In this experiment, you will make a series of choices involving gambles and certain 
amounts of money. At the end of the experiment, you might play a gamble for real to 
determine part of your payoff from the experiment.  Here is an example gamble 
which we refer to as Gamble A.  
Gamble A 
From 1 to 12 From 13 to 20 
£10.00 £0.00 
This gamble results in one of two possible outcomes: either winning £10 or 
winning nothing.   The possible prizes are written in the second row of the table.  
The numbers in the first row of the table (“1 to 12” and “13 to 20”) relate to a set of 
balls, numbered from 1-20 that will be used to determine the outcome of any gamble 
that you could play for real. 
As you may have noticed when you enter the lab, there are 20 balls on the desk 
in the middle of the lab. Each ball has a number on it and there is exactly one ball 
with each of the numbers from 1 to 20. 
At the end of the experiment, these balls will be put into a bag and one ball will 
be randomly drawn from this bag to determine your payoff. So for example, if you 
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play Gamble A at the end of the experiment, you would get £10 if the number drawn 
is from 1 to 12; or you would get £0 if it is from 13 to 20. 
During the experiment, you will see gambles with different numbers of possible 
prizes.  For example, while gamble A has two prizes, Gamble B below has three 
prizes: If you were to play Gamble B for real you would get £10 if the number drawn 
is 1; £7 if the number drawn is from 2 to 15; or £1 if it is from 16 to 20.  
Gamble B 
From 1 to 1 From 2 to 15 From 16 to 20 
£10.00 £7.00 £1.00 
 
Finally, some options that we describe as gambles offer sure prizes.  Gamble C 
is an example which gives you a sure prize of £5 whatever the number drawn from 
the bag.  
Gamble C 
From 1 to 20 
£5.00 
 
The experiment has two parts. 
Part 1: Choice Lists 
In this part, you will complete some “choice lists”. To understand what a choice 
list is, please look at Screenshot 1 which is in the ‘screenshot booklet’ on your desk. 
This shows an example choice list. 
Above the example choice list there is a gamble – referred to as the “current 
gamble”. The  example choice list is then presented as a table which, in this case, 
contains 11 choices each of which requires you to choose between the current 
gamble (which is always the Left option) or a specific amount of money (the Right 
option). For each choice, you should indicate your preferred option by clicking either 
the Left or Right circle in the “Your Choice” column.  
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Notice that the amounts of money given for the Right options in the choice list 
range, in £1 intervals, from the lowest gamble payoff (zero in this case) to the highest 
gamble payoff (£10 in this case). Therefore, we expect that everyone will want to 
choose Left in the first choice (because you might win something with Left, whereas 
choosing Right would guarantee that you get nothing).  By contrast, for the bottom 
choice in this list (Choice 11) we expect that everyone will want to choose Right 
(because then you are guaranteed £10 whereas Left only offers a chance of that). 
Since the Left option stays the same moving down the choice list and the Right 
option gets better, we also expect that you will only switch once: in fact the computer 
will only allow a single switch between Left and Right in any choice list. It is, 
however, entirely up to you to decide where to switch from choosing Left to Right in 
any choice list. 
Once you have completed all the choices in a list and are happy with your 
decisions, you should click the Confirm button to proceed. Once you have done this 
you will not be able to change your confirmed choices. 
Now please look at Screenshot 2. There are two choice lists on this screenshot. 
Screenshot 2a on the left reproduces the example choice list that you saw in the 
previous screenshot but with two differences. First, it is now labelled a “Basic List”. 
We will explain why in a moment. Secondly, notice that this basic list has been 
completed by a hypothetical decision maker who decided to choose Right for the first 
time at Choice 6. Once this decision maker had confirmed their choices for this Basic 
List they would then see what we call a “Zoom-in List”. The relevant Zoom-in List is 
shown as Screenshot 2b.  
Notice that via their responses to the Basic List, the decision maker has told us 
that they prefer the current gamble to an amount of £4 or below, but they prefer an 
amount of £5 or more to the current gamble. The Zoom-in list for this gamble, then 
presents choices between the current gamble and money amounts which range 
between £4 and £5 (in 10p intervals).  Notice that the first and last choices of the 
Zoom-in list are decisions that have already been confirmed in the Basic List so these 
will be fixed by the computer. To complete a Zoom-in List, you must provide 
CHAPTER 2 
56 
 
decisions for the remaining 9 choices. Again, the computer will make sure that there 
is a single switch from Left to Right in any Zoom-in List.  
In Part 1, you will be asked to make decisions about a set of different gambles 
using choice lists. For every gamble you will see a Basic List followed by a Zoom-in 
list, determined by where you switch in the Basic List. 
We ask you to think about each choice in each choice list as if it were for real 
and as if it were the only choice you had to make. It makes sense for you to provide a 
considered response for each single choice because at the end of the experiment, we 
will randomly select one decision that you have made and use your decision to 
determine your payoff.    
 
Part 2: Choices between pairs of gambles 
For Part 2, you will be asked to make some choices between pairs of gambles. 
Now please look at Screenshot 3 which shows an example of the sort of choice you 
will face in Part 2. Gambles are presented in the same way as they were for Part 1 
and the numbers shown in the top row of the table refer to the same set of 20 
numbered balls. For each such task, you should consider which of the two gambles 
you would prefer and indicate your choice by clicking either the left or the right 
button. This will lead you to the next choice question, and you will not be able to 
change the choices you have made. Therefore, please think carefully before you 
make any click in this part. As you make your choices, please keep in mind that one 
of your choices will be for real.   
 
How payment is determined 
After you have finished Part 1 and 2, everyone will wait until all participants have 
finished their tasks. The computer will then randomly select one of your choices to 
be implemented for real payment.  
The ‘real choice’ will be selected in the following way. For each participant, the 
computer will first randomly select either Part 1 or Part 2, with equal probabilities. If 
Part 2 is selected, one of the choices will be randomly selected for real payment. If 
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Part 1 is selected, one of the Basic Lists will be randomly selected, and one choice 
(i.e. one row) in that list will be randomly selected. This row gives the choice for real 
payment, unless it is one of your two ‘switch-point’ choices in that list. If the choice 
selected in the Basic List is one of the two ‘switch-point’ choices, then one of your 
choices in the resulting Zoom-in List will be randomly selected to be the only choice 
for real payment. Thus any choice you face at any point could be the one selected for 
real payment. 
Following on from this process, the selected real choice, and what you chose in 
it, will be shown to you. You will receive what you chose. This may be a sure prize 
or it may be a gamble. In the latter case, what you receive will be determined in the 
following way. At the end of experiment, the experimenter will ask one of you to 
draw a ball from the bag of 20 numbered balls. That number will determine the 
payoff from any chosen gamble in your ‘real choices’. 
Before Part 1 begins, we ask you to complete a quiz. Once you have finished the 
quiz, click the Start Experiment button. You will only be able to start the experiment 
if you have answered all the quiz questions correctly. If you have any questions now 
or later, please raise your hand. 
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Chapter 3: Why People Have Non-linear 
Probability Weighting Functions: An 
Alternative Theory of Choice under Risk   
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the concept of decision 
weighting has been widely accepted and well-studied. Decision weights are found to 
be a non-linear function of probabilities, typically with overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of moderate and large probabilities. This function is 
called probability weighting function and is often interpreted as reflecting an 
intrinsic1 human attitude towards probabilities, driven by, for example, diminishing 
sensitivity towards less extreme probabilities.  
However, experimental evidence that challenges this interpretation has been 
accumulating. For example, probability weighting has been found to depend on the 
domain of outcomes involved in the lotteries (i.e. whether the lotteries result in gains 
or losses) (see e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Abdellaoui 2000). Although theories 
featuring probability weighting have generally allowed for different weighting 
functions for gains and losses, following Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1992), it is not clear from these theories why probability weighting 
should be expected to depend on the domain of outcomes.  
More recently, evidence has emerged suggesting that probability weighting is 
affected by the payoff sizes of lottery outcomes (see e.g. Kühberger 1998; 
                                                             
1 ‘Intrinsic’ here and hereafter basically means decision-context-independent. 
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Etchart-Vincent 2004, 2009; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010). This means, for instance, when 
people are evaluating the two-outcome lottery (£x, p; £y, 1-p), their weighting of 
probability p would be affected by the absolute (or relative) sizes of x and (to) y. This 
evidence suggests that probability weighting is more than an 'intrinsic' response to 
chances, but also context-dependent.  
Another typical contextual factor that seems to affect probability weighting is 
the type of task used to elicit preference (based on which we can measure probability 
weighting). Indirect evidence suggests that probability weighting exhibits a stable 
inverse-S pattern when preferences over lotteries are elicited through money 
valuation tasks such as Certainty-Equivalent tasks (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1992; 
Gonzalez & Wu 1999; Abdellaoui et al. 2011) but is much less regular when 
preferences are elicited through binary choice tasks (e.g. Hey & Orme 1994; 
Camerer & Ho 1994; Wu & Gonzalez 1996; Humphrey & Verschoor 2004; Conte et 
al. 2011). For the latter cases, other shapes of probability weighting than the 
inverse-S one can prevail.  
In light of all these evidences discussed above, we think it would be helpful to 
re-think about why people are often found to have inverse-S shaped probability 
weighting functions and to what extent this reflects an intrinsic decisional attitude 
towards objective probabilities. We try to answer these questions by looking into the 
decision making process of choice under risk and building a model that does not 
pre-impose any type of probability weighting function. We propose a theory 
featuring an attention-based state weighting mechanism and show how our theory 
accommodates the evidence. This theory highlights a potentially important reason for 
the observation probability weighting under CPT. Briefly speaking, people weight 
probabilities non-linearly because their perceptions about probabilities are affected 
by the salience of the outcomes associated with the corresponding states. In our 
theory, a state is said to be the most salient if choosing differently leads to the largest 
welfare difference under that state.  
The best example to illustrate this intuition is the case where people buy lottery 
tickets. When people decide to spend £1 or £2 to buy lotteries that can yield them a 
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million, it is not hard to imagine that they keep telling themselves “what if I win…”. 
By doing this, people are already subconsciously overweighting the probability of 
winning. Their attention seems almost completely drawn to the winning state, 
because the winning state, with a stake of a million, is much more salient than the 
losing state, where the stake is only £1 or £2. Based on this idea, we formalize our 
theory with the following ingredients. 
 
State-weighting (instead of probability weighting) This entails two things. First, 
when choices are made, lotteries are viewed as (Savage) acts instead of prospects. In 
other words, lotteries specify state-contingent outcomes. Second, states are evaluated 
one by one and the overall preference is determined by a weighted sum of the 
within-state comparisons. Many theories are built on the general framework of acts, 
such as Regret Theory (Loomes & Sugden 1982) and third-generation Prospect 
Theory (Schmidt et al. 2008), but not many have incorporated state-weighting (e.g. 
the Salience Theory of Bordalo et al. 2012). 
Attention-weighted states The core ingredient of our model is that states are 
weighted by decision weights representing the attention of the decision maker drawn 
to the corresponding state. The attention paid to a state would depend on: (i) the 
probability of that state; (ii) how salient the outcomes associated with that state are 
compared to all other states. Our theory is similar to Salience Theory (Bordalo et al. 
2012) in this aspect, but we have some crucial differences, which will be discussed in 
Section 3.2.2. 
Context-dependent reference points We keep the ingredient of a 
reference-dependent value function from PT and CPT, but allow reference points to 
be context-dependent. Although we are not the first to explore this idea (e.g. Tversky 
& Kahneman 1991; Kőszegi & Rabin 2006; Schmidt et al. 2008), allowing the 
reference point to be context-dependent can greatly increase the explanatory power 
of our theory, given certain plausible assumptions about how reference points are 
context-dependent.  
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Though, as noted above, each of these ingredients has precedents in the 
literature, our combination and use of them is novel and distinctive. It provides a 
unified explanation for the set of findings of probability weighting (and thus for the 
behavioral ‘anomalies’ that can be explained with non-linear probability weighting) 
mentioned above. 
To demonstrate that our theory is able to explain all these findings, we derive 
propositions showing that our theory is observationally equivalent to a form of CPT, 
the most popular theory in empirical studies of choice and probability weighting, but 
with specific probability-weighting functions that can depend on lottery outcomes 
and are tied down by our theory. Our propositions 1 and 2 show how, under our 
theory, the implied probability-weighting functions of CPT can depend can depend 
on the sizes and domains of lottery outcomes, when preferences over lotteries are 
elicited through the commonly used Certainty-Equivalent tasks. In Section 3.3.2 we 
provide intuitive analysis of how our theory need not imply the inverse-S shape of 
probability weighting when preference is elicited through binary choice tasks.  
In general, we show that even if there is no context-independent probability 
weighting functions in the decision maker's cognitive system, individual behaviors 
can exhibit typical features that are attributed to probability-weighting in the 
framework of CPT. In this sense, we provide a theory of the appearance of 
probability weighting. However, what our analysis puts into question is not the 
concept of probability weighting per se, still less the appearance of it, but rather any 
interpretation under which probability weights reflect intrinsic, context-independent 
human attitudes towards probabilities. We think that what we call the attention-based 
state weighting mechanism, the key feature of our model, can be an important cause 
for the common observation of non-linear probability weighting. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we sketch the 
model. In Section 3.3 we show how our theory explains the findings about 
probability weighting. Section 3.4 concludes.  
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3.2 A Theory of Attention-Based State Weighting 
 
3.2.1 The Model 
 
Let preferences be defined over Savage acts. A choice problem is described by a set 
of states of the world 𝑆, where each state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 occurs with objective and known 
probability 𝑝𝑠  such that ∑ 𝑝𝑠𝑠∈𝑆 = 1 , a set of outcomes 𝑋  of real numbers 
representing monetary payoffs, and a set of acts 𝐹, where an act 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 specifies for 
each state 𝑠 the resulting outcome 𝑓𝑠 ≡ 𝑓(𝑠) ∈ 𝑋. In this chapter we consider only 
binary choices, i.e., a set of two acts 𝐹 = {𝑓, 𝑓′}, where at least one of the acts is a 
non-degenerate lottery. When an act is a degenerate lottery, or a certainty, we call it a 
constant act, whose consequences are the same in every state. The binary choice 
problem with n states can be shown in the following payoff matrix, where we choose 
between act 𝑓 and 𝑓′: 
 
Table 3.1: The general state-payoff matrix of a decision problem 
 
State 1 State 2 … State n 
Act 𝑓 𝑓1 𝑓2 … 𝑓𝑛 
Act 𝑓′ 𝑓1
′ 𝑓2
′ … 𝑓𝑛
′ 
 
Similar to the third-generation Prospect Theory (Schmidt et al, 2008), we allow 
the reference point, denoted by 𝑟, to be a (degenerate or non-degenerate) lottery, so 
we will call 𝑟 the reference act, with 𝑟𝑠 ≡ 𝑟(𝑠) ∈ ℝ. Accordingly, gains and losses 
will be defined state by state as (𝑓𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠). The most general form of our theory 
consists of three functions: preference function, attention weight function, and 
salience function. The preference function for act 𝑓, given the alternative act 𝑓′ and 
the reference act 𝑟, is 
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𝑉(𝑓, 𝑓′, 𝑟) = ∑ 𝜔𝑠𝑣(𝑓𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠)𝑠∈𝑆                                                (3.1)  
 
where 𝑓𝑠  and 𝑟𝑠  denote respectively the monetary outcomes of act 𝑓 and 𝑟 in 
state s. The decision maker chooses 𝑓 or 𝑓′, depending on the relative values of 
𝑉(𝑓, 𝑓′, 𝑟) and 𝑉(𝑓′, 𝑓, 𝑟). We use the same concept of utility (or value) function 
𝑣(. ) as in PT and CPT. In other words, 𝑣(. ) is an increasing (decreasing) function 
of gains (losses) of monetary outcomes given a reference point, and 𝑣(0) = 0. 
Different to PT and CPT, preferences V are determined by a weighted sum of state 
outcomes, and the decision weights assigned to each state, 𝜔𝑠 , depend on the 
attention paid to that state, which further depends on state probabilities and state 
(outcome) saliences:  
 
𝜔𝑠 =
𝜑𝑠
𝜂
∙ 𝑝𝑠
∑ 𝜑𝑘
𝜂
∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑘∈𝑆
                                                             (3.2) 
 
In this attention weight function, 𝑝𝑠 is the probability of state s and 𝜑𝑠 is a 
measurement of how salient state s is, in terms of the outcomes, among all possible 
states. Attention paid to a state depends on the probability of the state 𝑝𝑠 and the 
relative degree of salience of that state 𝜑𝑠. The parameter 𝜂 captures the extent to 
which salience distorts the decision maker’s perception of probabilities. In other 
words, 𝜂 measures the decision maker’s sensitivity towards saliences. When 𝜂 = 0, 
we have 𝜔𝑠 = 𝑝𝑠 as in Expected Utility. Unless stated otherwise, we assume 𝜂 ≥ 0, 
indicating that if two states have the same probability, the more salient state gets 
more attention, and hence relatively a larger decision weight. It is easier to see this 
from the following equation, which is an immediate implication of equation (3.2) and 
uses States 1 and 2 for illustration.  
 
𝜔1
𝜔2
=
𝑝1
𝑝2
∙ (
𝜑1
𝜑2
)
𝜂
                                                            (3.3) 
 
The ratio of decision weights for states 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 depends not only on the ratio of 
their probabilities, but also on their relative degree of saliences. The latter is given by 
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the salience function: 
 
𝜑𝑠 ≡ 𝜑(𝑓𝑠, 𝑓𝑠
′, 𝑟𝑠) =
|𝑣(𝑓𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠) − 𝑣(𝑓𝑠
′ − 𝑟𝑠)|
|𝑣(𝑓𝑠𝑚 − 𝑟𝑠) − 𝑣(𝑓𝑠𝑚
′ − 𝑟𝑠)|
                                 (3.4) 
 
where 𝑣(. ) is the same utility function as in (3.1), 𝑓𝑠
′ denotes the payoff of act 𝑓′ 
in state 𝑠, and 𝑠𝑚 denotes the most salient state (i.e. the state with the largest value 
difference between choosing act 𝑓 and choosing 𝑓′). By this definition we have 
𝜑𝑠𝑚 = 1 and 𝜑𝑠 < 1 for 𝑠 ≠ 𝑠𝑚. A state is more salient if there is greater welfare 
gap between choosing one option to choosing the other. We use the distance 
|𝑣(𝑓𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠) − 𝑣(𝑓𝑠
′ − 𝑟𝑠)| to capture this welfare gap instead of using simply the 
payoff difference |𝑓𝑠 − 𝑓𝑠
′|. This is basically to allow for individual heterogeneity 
and the effect of reference-dependence on judging the salience of outcomes. It is also 
worth noticing that given a reference point 𝑟 (where 𝑟 ≠ 𝑓 and 𝑟 ≠ 𝑓′), we have 
𝜑(𝑓𝑠, 𝑓𝑠
′) = 𝜑(𝑓𝑠
′, 𝑓𝑠)  and so 𝜔𝑠 = 𝜔𝑠
′ . This means that the decision weights 
assigned to state s is the same for both acts in the choice set. Then the decision maker 
would (weakly) prefer 𝑓 to 𝑓′ if and only if: 
 
∑ 𝜔𝑠(𝑣(𝑓𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠) − 𝑣(𝑓𝑠
′ − 𝑟𝑠)) ≥ 0
𝑠∈𝑆
                                         (3.5) 
 
We want to again address the common ingredients and differences between our 
theory and PT. The latter has two key ingredients, a reference-dependent utility 
function and a probability weighting function, and both functions are treated as 
exogenous, so that a decision maker’s behaviors under risk can be predicted with the 
knowledge of his utility function and weighting function parameters (and some 
assumption about the reference point). In contrast, our theory shares the same 
concept of an exogenous reference-dependent utility function, but drops the 
probability weighting function and replaces it with an attention-based state weighting 
mechanism (i.e. function (3.2) and (3.4)). Therefore, the only exogenous components 
of our preference model are the utility function 𝑣(. ), the reference act 𝑟, and the 
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parameter of salience sensitivity 𝜂. In this sense, our theory can be seen as one of 
‘endogenous probability weighting’. 
 
 
3.2.2 Some important features of the model 
 
Since the concepts of salience and attention-weighting are core to our model, it is 
worth clarifying the connections between our model and Salience Theory (Bordalo et 
al, 2012) in which salience is also plays a key role. Although our theory has some 
similarities to theirs, there is difference in crucial aspects2. We will use these 
comparisons to highlight some of the important features of our theory.  
The first difference lies in how (outcome) salience is determined. Instead of 
proposing a specific salience function, Bordalo et al. (2012) considered three 
properties of the salience function: ordering, diminishing sensitivity, and reflection. 
The example below illustrates the definition of these properties.  
 
Table 3.2: An example choice problem in the framework of Savage-acts 
 
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 
Lottery 1 10 4 5 -5 
Lottery 2 2 8 9 -9 
 
The payoff matrix of Lottery 1 and 2 are shown in this table. According to 
ordering, State 1 is more salient than State 2, because the interval (4, 8) is a subset of 
(2, 10). According to diminishing sensitivity, State 2 is more salient than State 3, 
because (5, 9) = (4+1, 8+1). According to reflection, State 3 is exactly as salient as 
State 4, because the payoffs differ only in signs. With these properties, Salience 
Theory permits some predictions about ranks of state saliences just on the basis of 
                                                             
2 Bordalo et al have a follow-up working paper (Bordalo et al. 2017) which develops salience theory in a 
different way to model consumer behaviors. Here we compare our model to their original Salience Theory model 
(Bordalo et al. 2012), as the latter is the one that ours relates to most closely. 
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these properties. However, this can only be done when the payoff matrix of the 
lotteries have specific patterns, as those in Table 3.2. For example, if the payoffs in 
State 3 is (5, 10) instead of (5, 9), even the three properties taken together cannot 
determine the relative saliences between State 2 and 3, and some assumption has to 
be made about the salience function. 
In our theory, state saliences are determined by state payoffs, the shape of the 
utility function 𝑣(. ), and the reference point. As mentioned, we use the same 
concepts of utility function and reference point as in PT and CPT. Although we 
proposed a specific salience function (3.4), our theory is actually more general than 
Salience Theory, because in our theory, the three properties are implied only under 
certain assumptions about the utility function 𝑣(. ) (e.g. an increasing, concave, and 
symmetric utility function for gains and losses). This generalization brings the 
benefit of allowing for individual heterogeneity with respect to the ranking of 
salience, even when the payoff matrix has the pattern of Table 3.2.  
The second important difference between this theory and Salience Theory lies in 
whether rank-dependence is imposed. In many theories of rank-dependence such as 
CPT, decision weights are assigned to prospect payoffs and dependent on only the 
probability and the rank of corresponding payoffs. This causes the well-known 
counter-intuition that very small changes of a payoff can lead to a dramatic change to 
its decision weight if the rank of that payoff among all possible payoffs also changes. 
In Salience Theory, decision weights are assigned to states and dependent only on 
the state probability and the rank of state saliences. The similar counter-intuition 
remains: small changes in salience can lead to dramatic changes to decision weights. 
These forms of rank-dependence can cause discontinuity in probability weighting 
and lottery valuation3. It is easy to see from our attention weight function and 
equation (3.3) that our theory avoids this problem because under equation (3.3), 
marginal changes in relative salience 𝜑𝑠 always have smooth effects on relative 
state weights 𝜔𝑠.  
Thirdly, unlike Salience Theory, our model incorporates reference-dependence, 
                                                             
3 For a critical comment on Salience Theory (2012), see Kontek (2016). 
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another key ingredient in PT. More importantly, we allow reference acts to be 
context-dependent. This adds considerable flexibility and power to our theory in 
explaining the evidence of probability weighting, and provides a unified framework 
to account for some other behavioral anomalies such as preference reversals. 
Sometimes shifts of reference points can have significant influence on preferences 
over lotteries because as reference points change, gains and losses are coded 
differently. This feature is particularly relevant to our theory because it is a key tenet 
of behavioral models of decision making that losses ‘loom larger’ than gains, and 
shifts of reference points can generate states of losses even if all payoffs are positive. 
We will show later, in Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, that the complicated findings on 
probability weighting can be nicely explained by our theory with the help of some 
plausible assumptions about context-dependent referencing. 
 
 
3.3 Implications on probability weighting  
 
In this part we will show how the theory presented implies that the agent behaves as 
if according to CPT preferences, but with a probability-weighting function that is 
endogenous and predicted by our theory. We also show how this explains typical 
findings on probability weighting and some observations that are hard for CPT alone 
to rationalize. Since these findings have generally been the results of lab experiments, 
we focus on two typical types of experimental tasks used to measure probability 
weighting: money valuation task (e.g. CE tasks and Willingness-To-Pay tasks) and 
binary choice task (e.g. the method proposed by van de Kuilen & Wakker 2011).  
Crucially, our theory predicts that probability-weighting will appear to take 
different forms in the two types of tasks. We will show that: (i) in money valuation 
tasks, probability weighting would be inverse-S shaped, gain-loss asymmetric, and 
be influenced by the level and spacing of outcomes; (ii) in binary choice tasks, 
probability weighting is less regular and can exhibit non-inverse-S shapes. By 
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implication, what pattern of probability-weighting is most commonly observed in 
studies using CPT will depend in part on the form of the tasks from which it is 
elicited.  
 
 
3.3.1 Money valuations and probability weighting 
 
Typically, to measure probability weighting functions, money valuations of lotteries, 
such as CE and Willingness-To-Pay (WTP for short), are elicited using valuation 
tasks. In such tasks, the decision maker can be seen as making a series of choices 
between the lottery to be valued and different sure money payoffs. In other words, 
sometimes it is literally true that the agent is making a series of choices between the 
lottery and sure sums, but, even when the task appears to have a more open-ended 
form, such comparisons may plausibly be taken to drive how the agent thinks about 
them. For example, in choice-list tasks, subjects are directly faced with multiple such 
choices in one list, while in WTP tasks, there might be a choice list in the decision 
maker’s mind used to decide how much to pay for the lotteries. For this reason, we 
characterize money valuation tasks as a decision context where a series of choices 
between a lottery and a certainty are made. We denote this context as 
Lottery-vs-Certainty (L-vs-C for short). 
What does our theory imply about choices in L-vs-C contexts? According to the 
intuition that greater salience attracts more attention and higher decision weight, the 
lottery tends to be preferred when the upside or the ‘winning state’ of the choice is 
more salient than the downside. For example, in choice between (£10, 0.1; £0, 0.9) 
and £1, the ‘winning state’ has a probability of 0.1. This ‘winning state’ is more 
salient because the former can make you better-off by £9 whereas in the ‘losing state’ 
your stake is just £1. This leads to overweighting of the probability 0.1 and a 
tendency to bet. By similar reasoning, the certainty tends to be preferred when the 
‘losing state’ of the choice problem is more salient than the ‘winning state’, a 
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situation often associated with large probabilities of ‘winning’ (e.g. choosing 
between (£10, 0.9; £0, 0.1) and £9). So far, our explanation about overweighting 
(underweighting) of small (large) probabilities has been very simple: small (large) 
probabilities are overweighted (underweighted) because they are often associated 
with more (less) salient states in L-vs-C contexts. 
Now consider moderate probabilities. People are widely found to be 
underweighting moderate probabilities greater than some critical value, which may 
be around 1/3. For instance, in choice between (£10, 0.5; £0, 0.5) and £5, people are 
often found to be risk averse, which is often interpreted as due to the underweighting 
of the probability 0.5 associated with winning £10 rather than the concavity of the 
utility function 𝑣(. ). Under our theory, this means that the ‘losing state’ of the 
choice (i.e. the state where you end up with £0 if the lottery is chosen) is often more 
salient than the ‘winning state’. We hypothesize that this may be naturally explained 
by loss aversion, which can arise as a result of a shift of reference point. More 
generally, we think that when choosing between a lottery and a certainty, people tend 
to subconsciously take the certainty as a reference point, because the certainty is 
immediately available and tends to be seen as something already “in the pocket”. For 
example, winning nothing while you could have got the sure £5 can feel as bad as a 
loss of £5 rather than as a reduced gain. Since losses ‘loom larger’ than gains, it is 
natural that the ‘losing state’ becomes more salient than the ‘winning state’ and the 
probability associated with the latter be underweighted. 
To explore the implications of this idea and to formalize our analysis, we make 
the following assumption about reference points.  
Assumption 1: In Lottery-vs-Certainty choice contexts, the reference act is the 
constant act whose consequence in every state is the certainty. For 
Lottery-vs-Lottery choices, the reference act is status quo, that is, the constant act 
whose consequence in every state is zero4. 
                                                             
4 There are cases where neither the certainty nor the status quo is likely to be taken as the reference act. For 
example, in Willingness-To-Accept tasks, the lottery being valued is likely to be perceived as an endowment and 
thus taken as the reference act. Our analysis here focuses on situations where the lottery is not perceived as an 
endowment. 
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Without loss of generality, let 𝑐 be the money valuation5 of a lottery (𝑥,  𝑝;  𝑦,  1 −
𝑝), where 𝑥 > 𝑐 > 𝑦 ≥ 0 and 1 > 𝑝 > 0, so that the decision maker is indifferent 
between receiving c and playing the lottery (see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: The money valuation decision problem (positive payoffs) 
 
State 1 
p 
State 2 
1-p 
The Lottery 𝑥 𝑦 
Certainty (reference point) 𝑐 𝑐 
 
According to our theory, this indifference implies the equation 
 
𝜔1𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐) + 𝜔2𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑐) = 0                                                 (3.6) 
 
For the convenience of deriving theoretical results, we make a standard assumption 
about the Prospect-Theory-type utility function with loss aversion. 
 
Assumption 2:  
 
𝑣(𝑥) = {
(𝑥 − 𝑟)𝛼   ,                   𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−(𝑥 − 𝑟))𝛼 ,        𝑥 < 0
 
 
where 𝑟  is the consequence of the reference act, 𝜆 > 0  is the loss aversion 
parameter, and 𝛼 > 0 is the power parameter capturing the curvature of the utility 
function. We further assume that the power parameter of the utility function is the 
same for gains and for losses. This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis. 
To begin our exposition of how our theory accounts for the evidence about 
probability weighting, we present Proposition 1. This proposition shows that, when 
we consider positive payoffs and money valuations of lotteries, our theory is 
observationally-equivalent to a particular parameterized form of CPT. We use CPT 
                                                             
5 When we say ‘money valuation’ of a lottery, we generally refer to the Certainty-Equivalents of the lottery. 
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basically because it has been one of the most widely used theories in empirical 
studies of probability weighting. The key message from this proposition is that, if a 
decision maker behaves according to our theory but is treated as a CPT agent with 
his preferences elicited through money valuation tasks, she will be found to have the 
weighting function w (for proofs see Appendix 3.1). 
 
Proposition 1 Consider an agent’s valuation of the lottery (𝑥,  𝑝;  𝑦,  1 − 𝑝), where 
𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0 and 1 > 𝑝 > 0. The following two statements are equivalent:  
(i) The agent has a utility function 𝑣(𝑥) as specified in Assumption 2 and his 
valuation of the lottery is determined by equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.6); 
(ii) The agent has the same utility function 𝑣(𝑥)  but behaves according to 
Cumulative Prospect Theory with 𝑟 = 0 (i.e. status quo) and with the weighting 
function: 
 
𝑤(𝑝) =
[𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
 
where  
 
𝑔(𝑝) =
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝜆
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
  
 
For clarity, we will refer to the weighting function, w(p), in part (ii) of the 
Proposition as “the implied probability weighting function”. Proposition 1 shows that 
the implied probability weighting function also depends on non-probabilistic factors: 
lottery payoffs x, y, utility function parameter6 𝛼, degree of loss aversion 𝜆, and 
degree of salience sensitivity 𝜂. In this sense, the implied probability weighting 
function is endogenous under our theory. Moreover, it reflects payoffs in a different 
                                                             
6 It may need to be clarified that, theoretically, the value of 𝛼 in our theory is the same as the 𝛼 in Cumulative 
Prospect Theory. This is natural because both share the same concept of utility function. Crucially, this concept 
implies that the utility function captures individuals’ exogenous attitudes towards outcomes. Based on this 
exogenous part, CPT introduces another independent part (the weighting function) to model preferences, whereas 
we introduce a component of decision making process that can be seen as the implied probability weighting 
function 𝑤(𝑝). In neither case is the shape of the utility function affected by the shape of the weighting function. 
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way from the rank-dependent structure of CPT and, rather than being a primitive 
intrinsic response to probability, it reflects other preference parameters, including the 
salience sensitivity parameter which is distinctive to our theory and does not feature 
in standard formulations of CPT. The function 𝑔(𝑝) resembles the two-parameter 
probability weighting function proposed by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), which 
exhibits the typical inverse-S shape with 𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0 and with a wide range of 
parameter values. Therefore, as we will elaborate below, the function w(p) can also 
exhibit inverse-S shapes with typical parameter values. 
Figure 3.1 below presents the implied probability weighting function w(p), for 
different values of the parameters of our preference model and for different values of  
outcomes x and y. The first panel holds all terms constant at particular values, except 
for 𝜆 which is varied. Similarly, second panel varies 𝜂 only, the third varies 𝛼 
only, and the fourth varies only the payoff ratio x/y. Specifically, Figure 3.1a 
illustrates that 𝜆 seems to influence only the elevation of the weighting function, 
with greater loss aversion associated with less elevation (or more pessimism). Figure 
3.1b illustrates that the salience sensitivity parameter 𝜂 seems to affect the degree of 
curvature of the weighting function (or likelihood insensitivity), with higher 𝜂 
related to greater likelihood insensitivity. Figure 3.1c illustrates that utility function 
parameter 𝛼  seems to have an impact on both elevation and curvature of the 
weighting function, with w seemingly more elevated and less curved when the utility 
function for gains is more concave.   
Although it is easy to see that the implied probability weighting function now 
depends on the outcomes x and y, it is only affected by the relative outcome spacing, 
or the ratio x/y. For example, doubling both x and y would have no impact on w. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.1d, the larger the ratio x/y is, the more elevated the weighting 
is, indicating greater optimism about the upside of risk. It is worth mentioning that 
the weighting function of Proposition 1 has a specific implication about how relative 
outcome spacing x/y affects the decision weighting: For individuals with concave 
utility functions (i.e. 0< 𝛼<1), their weighting functions are generally more elevated 
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Figure 3.1: Plotting 𝑤(𝑝) and manipulate different parameter values 
 
for (two-outcome) lotteries with larger relative outcome spacing, whereas for those 
with convex utility functions (i.e. 𝛼 >1), their weighting functions are generally less 
elevated for (two-outcome) lotteries with larger relative outcome spacing7.  
                                                             
7 Although this implication is perhaps true only in our model and only when the utility function has the simplest 
power functional form, it points to an intuitive idea that the way probability weighting is sensitive to lottery 
𝛼 = 1, 𝜂 = 1 𝑦 = 0 
Figure 3.1a: Manipulating 𝜆 
 
𝛼 = 1, 𝜆 = 1.5, 𝑦 = 0 
Figure 3.1b: Manipulating 𝜂 
 
𝜂 = 1, 𝜆 = 1.5 𝑦 = 0 
Figure 3.1c: Manipulating 𝛼 
 
𝛼 = 0.8, 𝜂 = 1, 𝜆 = 1.5, 𝑦 ≠ 0 
Figure 3.1d: Manipulating 𝑥/𝑦  
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In general Proposition 1 gives an account of why the commonly-found 
inverse-S probability weighting function might have that form and why and how 
probability weighting are found to be affected by the spacing or relative sizes of 
outcomes. It is also implied that individual heterogeneity of the weighting function 
found in experiments may be closely related to individual difference in their utility 
function curvature 𝛼, degree of salience sensitivity 𝜂, and degree of loss aversion 
𝜆.  
So far we have been considering positive lottery outcomes. Next consider 
negative outcomes8. Let 𝑐− denote the decision maker’s money valuation of the 
lottery (𝑥,  𝑝;  𝑦,  1 − 𝑝), where 𝑥 < 𝑦 ≤ 0 and 1 > 𝑝 > 0. 
 
Table 3.4: The money valuation decision problem (negative payoffs) 
 
State 1  
p 
State 2  
1-p 
The Lottery 𝑥 𝑦 
Certainty (reference point) 𝑐− 𝑐− 
 
Under our theory, this indifference means the equation 
 
𝜔1𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐
−) + 𝜔2𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑐
−) = 0                                             (3.7) 
 
Our result regarding negative payoffs and probability weighting is shown in the 
proposition below (proofs provided in Appendix 3.2), which also gives a 
CPT-equivalent of our theory in the domain of loss. It shows how our theory can 
explain a specific pattern of difference between probability weighting for gains and 
losses, under Assumption 1 and 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
outcomes would depend on the curvature of the decision maker’s utility function over the outcomes or attitude 
towards the outcomes. Proof of this implication is provided in Appendix 3.3. 
8 Here positive outcomes basically refer to the case where lottery outcomes are gains of money, and negative 
outcomes refer to the case where lottery outcomes are losses of money. But, under our theoretical framework, in 
each case it is possible for an outcome to lie either side of the reference-point. For the decision maker, a positive 
outcome can be treated as a loss if it lies below her reference point, and a negative outcome can be treated as a 
gain if it lies above the reference point.  
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Proposition 2 Consider an agent’s valuation of the lottery (𝑥,  𝑝;  𝑦,  1 − 𝑝), where 
𝑥 < 𝑦 ≤ 0 and 1 > 𝑝 > 0. The following two statements are equivalent:  
(i) The agent has a utility function 𝑣(𝑥) as specified in Assumption 2 and his 
valuation of the lottery is determined by equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.7); 
(ii) The agent has the same utility function 𝑣(𝑥)  but behaves according to 
Cumulative Prospect Theory with 𝑟 = 0 (i.e. status quo) and with the probability 
weighting function: 
 
𝑤(𝑝)− =
[−𝑔(𝑝)−𝑥 − (1 − 𝑔(𝑝)−)𝑦]𝛼 − (−𝑦)𝛼
(−𝑥)𝛼 − (−𝑦)𝛼
 
where  
𝑔(𝑝)− =
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝜆−
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
 
 
We can see by comparing Proposition 2 to Proposition 1 that the difference 
between the implied probability weighting for gains and losses comes from loss 
aversion9. Loss aversion is relevant both when x, y > 0 and when x, y < 0, because, in 
both cases, a consequence may exceed or fall short of the reference point. But, as 
Propositions 1 and 2 show, how 𝜆 enters the implied probability weighting function 
is subtly different in the two cases.  
When there is no loss aversion (i.e. 𝜆 = 1), 𝑔(𝑝) = 𝑔(𝑝)−, and the shape of 
𝑤(𝑝) and 𝑤(𝑝)− will be exactly the same given the values of the other parameters. 
When 𝜆 > 1 , 𝜆−
1
𝛼 < 𝜆
1
𝛼  for any 𝑝 ∈ (0,1)  and any 𝛼 > 0 , so that 𝑔(𝑝)− >
𝑔(𝑝) for any given 𝑝. Since 𝑤(. ) is an increasing function of 𝑔(𝑝), 𝑔(𝑝)− >
𝑔(𝑝) entails 𝑤− > 𝑤, for any 𝑝. In other words, under Assumption 1, our theory 
predicts that probability weighting for losses is generally more elevated (implying 
greater pessimism) than for gains, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. This is very intuitive 
because under CPT, the probability weighting function depicts probability weights 
                                                             
9 Note the difference between the denominators of 𝑔(𝑝) and 𝑔(𝑝)−. The two weighting functions 𝑤(𝑝) and 
𝑤(𝑝)− are identical, except for having different 𝑔(. ) functions. And that the only difference in the latter is the 
sign of the exponent on 𝜆 in the denominator. 
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associated with the largest gain or the largest loss, which corresponds to State 1 in 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Comparing 𝑤(𝑝) and 𝑤(𝑝)− with specific parameter values 
 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. However, State 1 is a state of gain in the case of gain (Table 
3.3) but a state of loss in the case of loss (Table 3.4). Due to loss aversion, the State 1 
in Table 3.3 is less salient than the State 1 in Table 3.4 given any probability 𝑝. This 
𝛼=0.8,  𝜂=1, 𝜆=1.5, 𝑦=0 
Figure 3.2a 
𝛼=1.2,  𝜂=1, 𝜆=1.5, 𝑦=0 
Figure 3.2b 
𝛼=1.2,  𝜂=1, 𝜆=2, 𝑦=0 
Figure 3.2c 
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implies a more elevated weighting function for loss under CPT.  
Figure 3.2 also illustrates that the size of the gap seems to be larger either when 
𝛼 is smaller (to see this compare Figure 3.2a and 3.2b) or when 𝜆 is larger (to see 
this compare Figure 3.2b and 3.2c). In the literature, while probability weighting has 
been widely found to be inverse-S shaped for both gains and losses, the difference 
between these two seems to be much less patterned. Although there are many 
findings that the weighting function for loss is more elevated than that for gains (e.g. 
Tversky  & Kahneman 1992, Abdellaoui 2000, Kusev et al 2009) as implied by 
Proposition 2, there are also evidence where it is not (e.g. Lattimore et al 1992, 
Bruhin et al 2010).  
We speculate that this mixture of evidence might be accounted for once we 
relax or change our assumptions underlying Proposition 2. For example, besides loss 
aversion, another source of the gap between probability weighting for gains and 
losses may be the asymmetry in the utility function curvature (i.e. allowing 𝛼 to be 
different for gains and losses), which has been typical in the literature. In addition, if 
the domain of outcomes turns out to be another contextual factor influencing the 
determination of reference points (i.e. allowing Assumption 1 to be different for 
gains and losses), there can also be more variations of this gap, depending on how 
the domain of outcomes affect the determination of reference points.  
Unlike other theories that simply allow for probability weighting to be different 
for gains and losses, our theory provides a framework within which such a difference 
is endogenous and predicted. Proposition 1 and 2 together show how one of those 
factors, loss aversion, can explain one of the most prevalent patterns found in the 
literature that probability weighting for loss is generally more elevated than for gains. 
We have shown that a typical decision maker, who has a slightly concave utility 
function (e.g. 𝛼 around 0.8), is slightly loss-averse (e.g. 𝜆 around 1.5), and is 
moderately sensitive to payoff salience (e.g. 𝜂 around 1), can exhibit the typical 
patterns of empirically observed probability weighting functions.  
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3.3.2 Binary choices and probability weighting 
 
As has been shown, our theory implies the appearance of inverse-S shaped 
probability weighting in the case of money valuations because there small (large) 
probabilities are often associated with more (less) salient states when a two-outcome 
lottery is being evaluated against some sure amounts of money. An interesting 
follow-up question would be, how about other cases than money valuations? In this 
part we discuss our theoretical implications about probability weighting in the case 
of binary choices between lotteries, or specifically the case where probability 
weighting is measured using binary choice data. We denote this decision context as 
Lottery-vs-Lottery (L-vs-L for short). Although money valuation data such as 
Certainty-Equivalents is popular for researchers, a significant part of empirical 
studies of probability weighting use binary choice data (e.g. Lattimore et al. 1992, 
Harrison & Rutström 2009, Hey et al. 2010). Somewhat surprisingly, in most of 
these studies, the inverse-S pattern of probability weighting is not dominant.  
Our theory implies distinctive features of probability weighting in the case of 
binary choices. Specifically, probability weighting can be much less regular and the 
weighting function can exhibit a variety of shapes depending on the lotteries used in 
the tasks. This result is based on two differences between the L-vs-C context (money 
valuations) and the L-vs-L context (binary choices). First, the status quo seems to be 
a more natural reference point when there is no certainty in the choice set (as 
specified in Assumption 1). Second, as the number of state increases from two to 
more, in the latter case, states with small probabilities need no longer be associated 
with greater salience. For example, consider two stochastically independent lotteries 
A= (𝑥1, p; 𝑥3, 1-p) and B= (𝑥2, q; 𝑥3, 1-q) where 𝑥1>𝑥2>𝑥3 and p < q. As will be 
clear in Table 3.5 below, probability p is associated with two states 1 and 2. Even if p 
is small and State 2 is salient enough to draw disproportionally high attention (i.e. to 
be overweighted), State 1 may be underweighted because it can be less salient than 
State 2 and State 3. As a result, the net effect of outcome salience on probability p 
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may be positive or negative, leading to respectively overweighting or underweighting. 
Following this reasoning, small probabilities are no longer always overweighted and 
large probabilities need not be underweighted. 
 
Table 3.5:  A Lottery-vs-Lottery choice problem 
 
State 1 
pq 
State 2 
p(1-q) 
State 3 
(1-p)q 
State 4 
(1-p)(1-q) 
Lottery A 𝑥1 𝑥1 𝑥3 𝑥3 
Lottery B 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥2 𝑥3 
 
Therefore, we can show that, under CPT, a decision maker can be found to have 
a non-inverse-S probability weighting function in this case10. Specifically, the shape 
of the underlying weighting function will depend on the outcomes and probabilities 
of the lotteries in the choice set. Take Lottery A and B in Table 3.5 as an example. 
Our theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, the probability p is more likely to be 
overweighted (underweighted) when 𝑥2 is closer (further) to 𝑥3. This is because 
when 𝑥2 is closer to 𝑥3, the difference between 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 is larger and State 1 
becomes more salient. The probability p is also more likely to be overweighted 
(underweighted) when, ceteris paribus, q is smaller (larger). This is because State 1 
occurs with probability pq. Suppose State 1 is assigned a distorted decision weight, 
i.e. a decision weight higher than its probability pq, due to its outcome salience. The 
larger q is relative to p, the more this distortion can be seen as attributed to the 
distorted probability weight of q than to the distorted probability weight of p. 
Symmetrically, whether probability q is overweighted or underweighted depends on 
all the other lottery parameters, (i.e, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, and p) in a similar way.   
An interesting implication of this result is that we can potentially manipulate the 
shape of the underlying probability weighting function we try to measure by 
manipulating the set of lottery parameters (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , p, q) we use to elicit 
preferences. Moreover, we can roughly identify conditions of these parameters for 
                                                             
10 For analytical results see Appendix 3.4. 
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different patterns of probability weighting. For example, we would expect that, 
fixing 𝑥1  and 𝑥3 , there exists a set of (𝑥2 , p, q) such that probability p is 
underweighted and probability q is overweighted, which is consistent with the S 
shape of probability weighting11. The sensitivity of probability weighting to the 
lottery parameters also means that preferences between lotteries are sensitive to these 
parameters. For example, for a typical choice of trade-off where people choose 
between a small probability to win a large prize and a large probability to a small 
prize, we predict that preferences can be extremely sensitive to the relative sizes of 
the prizes and probabilities. It may be a mistake to think either that most people 
would choose the latter because of risk aversion or that they would prefer most of the 
time the former because small probabilities are overweighted.  
 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
3.4.1 A summary 
 
In this chapter we propose a potential explanation for why, under CPT, people appear 
to have non-linearly probability weighting functions and why these functions are 
typically found to be: (i) inverse-S shaped, (ii) different for the domain of gains and 
losses, (iii) sensitive to the spacing or relative sizes of outcomes. There is also 
evidence, though less well-known, that the patterns of measured probability 
weighting seem to be sensitive to the type of tasks used to elicit preferences. Some of 
these evidences cannot be well accounted for by PT or CPT, or any theory that 
imposes a single context-independent probability weighting function.  
We provide a theory of attention-based state weighting as our explanation and 
have shown how this theory fits into the findings about probability weighting. Rather 
than proposing specific functional forms for probability weighting, with Proposition 
                                                             
11 For analytical results see Appendix 3.4. 
CHAPTER 3 
81 
 
1 and 2 we aim at illustrating, under some specific assumptions, that what has been 
seen as probability weighting (and also the inverse-S shape of the probability 
weighting function) may simply be a result of the attention-based state weighting 
mechanism, in which deviations of decision weights from probabilities come from 
disproportionate allocations of decisional attention.  
The two propositions show that an agent who behaves according to our theory 
can exhibit the typical inverse-S probability weighting function with its shape 
determined by the agent’s utility function parameter, degree of loss aversion, salience 
sensitivity, the reference point, and the level and spacing of outcomes, when 
probability weighting is measured from money valuation tasks. In addition, Section 
3.3.2 presents an intuition for the implication that the implied probability weighting 
function can exhibit any shape depending on the agent’s utility function parameter, 
salience sensitivity, and the lottery probabilities and payoffs, when probability 
weighting is measured using binary choice tasks. The key message from that section 
are that probability weighting can be sensitive to decision contexts (such as to the 
types of experimental tasks) and that our theory can provide an account for such 
context-sensitivity.  
Again, our theoretical results challenge the popular understanding of decision 
weighting as reflecting a certain type of intrinsic attitudes towards probabilities. We 
prefer to interpret decision weighting as a result of both intrinsic imprecise 
perception of probabilities and the attention-based state-weighting heuristic induced 
in typical decision contexts under risk. The former makes it possible for the latter to 
play a role. We think that in light of the accumulating experimental findings of 
context-dependent decision weighting, our theory provides a more intuitive and 
systematic account for the evidence than a theory that simply imposes different 
weighting function for different decision contexts.  
 
 
3.4.2 Prospects for experimental tests 
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The theory we present has a wide scope for experimental tests. The first testable 
implication is that decision weights are affected by not only outcome ranks but also 
(relative) outcome spacing, as implied by Proposition 1. Most straightforwardly, 
since our theory has a CPT-equivalent (Proposition 1 and 2), it can explain most of 
the experimental evidences which CPT could explain, and also some of the evidence 
that CPT couldn’t. This is mainly because our theory implies the appearance of 
probability weighting in forms that vary with factors that would be irrelevant under 
CPT. Therefore we consider our theory a ‘best-buy’ alternative of CPT. We think 
that our theory can do better, both descriptively and predictively, in fitting 
experimental data of choice under risk, with an equal or even less number of 
parameters than what CPT would require.  
It would be more interesting to test the novel implications of our theory. One 
important implication is the differentiation between valuation tasks and choice tasks 
in terms of their probability weighting patterns. We suggest that the inverse-S pattern 
of probability weighting is rather stable for money valuation tasks, but very sensitive 
to the lottery parameters in choice tasks. Consequently, we can vary the lotteries used 
in choice tasks to manipulate the probability weighting function measurements we 
obtain from the choice tasks. We think this is a simple way to test our theory. 
Another interesting scope for test relates to the well-known preference reversal 
phenomenon. Our theory provides an explanation for the standard pattern of 
preference reversal: its persistence is largely due to a stable and dominant preference 
for the $-bet (i.e. a small probability to win a large prize) over the P-bet (a large 
probability to win a small prize) in money valuation tasks. This preference is stable 
and dominant because when preferences are revealed through money valuation tasks, 
small (large) probabilities tend to be seen as overweighted (underweighted). 
Therefore, people always have a tendency to put a higher money value on the $-bet. 
However, our theory predicts that preferences (for the P-bet) in choice tasks are less 
dominant and can easily be altered when the lottery parameters are different. As a 
result, the rate of standard preference reversal can somehow be manipulated by 
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manipulating the lotteries used to elicit preferences. Furthermore, our theory predicts 
that the preference for the $-bet may become much less dominant if we use 
non-money valuation tasks. For example, if we used probabilistic valuations instead, 
where people evaluate a lottery with another lottery, the decision context essentially 
becomes a Lottery-vs-Lottery case and the prevalence of the standard preference 
reversal may disappear12.  
Finally, we think that our assumption about context-dependent reference points 
also generates some interesting implications. For instance, under Assumption 1, we 
would find a potential link between loss aversion and probability weighting, 
particularly the component representing the degree of pessimism or optimism. 
However, our theory predicts that loss aversion plays a role only in money valuation 
tasks but not in binary choice tasks, because of a shift of reference points (from the 
status quo) to the sure money options. Although it is certainly unsurprising that a 
change of reference points often leads to systematic changes of behaviors, we think it 
is important to recognize that in experimental settings subjects’ reference points 
often deviate from the status quo and that these deviations often follow some 
regularities. It would be very helpful to identify these regularities and utilize them to 
explain experimental behaviors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 Cubitt et al (2004) use probabilistic valuation tasks as well as monetary valuation tasks, and found markedly 
different patterns of preference reversal relative to choice in the two cases. See also Butler and Loomes (2007) for 
a similar result.  
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Appendices for Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3.1 Proof of Proposition 1 
 
For Proposition 1, let 𝑐 denote the decision maker’s money value of the lottery 
(𝑥,  𝑝;  𝑦,  1 − 𝑝), where 𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0 and 1 > 𝑝 > 0. So probability weighting is 
measured based on indifference between the lottery and c. The following table is the 
same as Table 3.3. 
 
 
State 1 
p 
State 2 
1-p 
The Lottery 𝑥 𝑦 
Certainty (reference point) 𝑐 𝑐 
 
We first start with our theory. The indifference implies the equation 
𝜔1𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐) + 𝜔2𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑐) = 0 
which is, under Assumption 1 and 2, 
𝜔1𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐) − 𝜔2𝜆𝑣(𝑐 − 𝑦) = 0    
𝑜𝑟 
  
𝜔1
𝜔2
=
𝜆𝑣(𝑐 − 𝑦)
𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐)
                                                       (3.8) 
According to equation (3.3), the left-hand side of equation (3.8) is equal to 
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
∙ (
𝜑1
𝜑2
)
𝜂
 
where  
𝜑1
𝜑2
=
𝑣(𝑥−𝑐)
𝜆𝑣(𝑐−𝑦)
. Equation (3.8) can be written as  
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
∙ (
𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐)
𝜆𝑣(𝑐 − 𝑦)
)
𝜂
=
𝜆𝑣(𝑐 − 𝑦)
𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐)
 
Rearrange this we have  
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
= (
𝜆𝑣(𝑐 − 𝑦)
𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐)
)𝜂+1                                               (3.9) 
Under our theory, equation (3.9) can be seen as the simplified preference condition 
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for the decision problem in Table 3.4. Notice that equation (3.9) holds regardless of 
whether State 1 or State 2 is more salient to the decision maker. Now under the 
assumption of the power utility function 𝑣(. ), we have  
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
= (
𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑦)𝛼
(𝑥 − 𝑐)𝛼
)𝜂+1 
Now we do a series of rearrangements: 
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
= (
𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑦)𝛼
(𝑥 − 𝑐)𝛼
)𝜂+1 
                                  ⇒            (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) =
𝜆
1
𝛼(𝑐 − 𝑦)
𝑥 − 𝑐
 
                                  ⇒            (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
(𝑥 − 𝑐) = 𝜆
1
𝛼(𝑐 − 𝑦) 
                                  ⇒            𝑐 =
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) 𝑥 + 𝜆
1
𝛼𝑦
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝜆
1
𝛼
 
which is further equivalent to  
𝑐 =
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝜆
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝑥 +
𝜆
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝜆
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝑦 
 
Now define  
𝑔(𝑝) ≡
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝜆
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
                                      (3.10) 
Since we have assumed that 𝜆 > 0, 𝛼 > 0, 𝜂 ≥ 0, and 0 < 𝑝 < 1, we would have 
0 < 𝑔(𝑝) < 1. Now equation (3.9) is equivalent to: 
𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦                                                   (3.11) 
Take the power of 𝛼 to both sides of equation (3.11) we have  
𝑐𝛼 = [𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]𝛼                                              (3.12) 
Now let the right-hand side of (3.12) be equal to 𝑤(𝑝)𝑥𝛼 + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑦𝛼, where 
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𝑤(𝑝) is a probability weighting function as in CPT. We can then solve for 𝑤:  
𝑤 =
[𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
                                      (3.13) 
In other words, equation (3.12) is equivalent to  
𝑣(𝑐) = 𝑤(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑣(𝑦)                                   (3.14) 
where 𝑣(. ) = (. )𝛼 and 𝑤(𝑝) specified as in equation (3.13).  
 
Now we start with CPT, i.e. equation (3.14), (3.13) and (3.10), and show that the 
preference condition of our theory, i.e. equation (3.9), can be obtained.   
With power utility function and equation (3.12), (3.13) can be written as 
𝑐𝛼 =
[𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
𝑥𝛼 +
𝑥𝛼 − [𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]𝛼
𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼
𝑦𝛼 
which can be simplified to 
𝑐𝛼(𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼) = [𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]
𝛼
(𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼) 
Since x>y and 𝛼 > 0, we have 𝑥𝛼 − 𝑦𝛼 > 0. Hence 
𝑐𝛼 = [𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦]𝛼 
And since c>0 and 𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦 > 0, we can remove the power on both 
sides to get equation (3.11): 
𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑝)𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝))𝑦                                              (3.11) 
Since 0 < 𝑝 < 1, 𝑔(𝑝) can be written as, by dividing both the numerator and 
denominator by (1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1), 
𝑔(𝑝) =
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝜆
1
𝛼
                                               (3.15) 
Combining equation (3.11) and (3.15), we have 
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𝑐 =
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) 𝑥 + 𝜆
1
𝛼𝑦
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝜆
1
𝛼
 
Rearrange this we have  
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
(𝑥 − 𝑐) = 𝜆
1
𝛼(𝑐 − 𝑦) 
Since x>c, this is equivalent to  
(
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) =
𝜆
1
𝛼(𝑐 − 𝑦)
𝑥 − 𝑐
 
Take the power of 𝛼(𝜂 + 1) to both sides and we have equation (3.9) 
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
= (
𝜆𝑣(𝑐 − 𝑦)
𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐)
)𝜂+1 
By this we have shown that whether we start with CPT or our theory, we end up with 
the other preference condition. So Proposition 1 is proved. ∎ 
 
 
Appendix 3.2 Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Now consider the domain of loss. let 𝑐− denote the decision maker’s money value 
of the lottery (𝑥,  𝑝;  𝑦,  1 − 𝑝), where 𝑥 < 𝑦 ≤ 0 and 1 > 𝑝 > 0. The following 
table is the same as Table 3.4 
 
 
State 1 
p 
State 2 
1-p 
The Lottery 𝑥 𝑦 
Certainty (reference point) 𝑐− 𝑐− 
 
Under our theory, this indifference means the equation 
𝜔1𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐
−) + 𝜔2𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑐
−) = 0 
which is now equivalent to 
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−𝜔1𝜆𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐
−) + 𝜔2𝑣(𝑐
− − 𝑦) = 0   𝑜𝑟   
𝜔1
𝜔2
=
𝑣(𝑐− − 𝑦)
𝜆𝑣(𝑥 − 𝑐−)
 
Following similar procedures as we do in the proof of Proposition 1, we have the 
rearranged preference condition in this case: 
𝑐− = 𝑔(𝑝)−𝑥 + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝)−)𝑦                                             (3.16) 
where 
𝑔(𝑝)− =
𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
𝜆−
1
𝛼(1 − 𝑝)
1
𝛼(𝜂+1) + 𝑝
1
𝛼(𝜂+1)
                                     (3.17) 
Again, consider the CPT preference condition in this case. There is a weighting 
function for loss, 𝑤(𝑝)−, and a value function as specified in Assumption 2, such 
that 
𝜆(−𝑐−)𝛼 = 𝑤(𝑝)−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛼 + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝)−)𝜆(−𝑦)𝛼                           (3.18) 
Further rearrange (3.16) to be 
(−𝑐−)𝛼 = [𝑔(𝑝)−(−𝑥) + (1 − 𝑔(𝑝)−)(−𝑦)]  𝛼                            (3.19) 
Let equations (3.18) and (3.19) be equivalent and solve for 𝑤(𝑝), we have  
𝑤(𝑝)− =
[−𝑔(𝑝)−𝑥 − (1 − 𝑔(𝑝)−)𝑦]𝛼 − (−𝑦)𝛼
(−𝑥)𝛼 − (−𝑦)𝛼
                         (3.20) 
Hence, starting with our theory, we have obtained an equivalent representation of 
CPT, i.e. equations (3.18) and (3.20). Similar to our proof of Proposition 1, we can 
also start with equations (3.17), (3.18), and (3.20) and obtain the preference 
condition of our theory. Proposition 2 can be proved accordingly.  
 
 
Appendix 3.3 Proof of Proposition 1’s implication 
 
Proposition 1 implies that, for two-outcome lotteries (x, p; y, 1-p), where x>y>0 and 
0<p<1, the decision weight of x (i.e. function w), is an increasing function of the 
ratio x/y when 0 < 𝛼 < 1 (i.e. concave utility function), but a decreasing function 
of the ratio x/y when 𝛼 > 1. Here’s the proof.  
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Let x/y = z. Then w can be rewritten as  
𝑤 =
[𝑔(𝑝)𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔(𝑝)]𝛼 − 1
𝑧𝛼 − 1
 
For a given probability p and a given decision maker, we can treat 𝑔(𝑝) and 𝛼 as 
exogenous parameters, so that w(.) can be seen as a function of 𝑧: 
𝑤(𝑧) =
(𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔)𝛼 − 1
𝑧𝛼 − 1
 
Since 𝑔 ∈ (0,1), 𝛼 > 0, and 𝑧 > 1, 𝑤(𝑧) is differentiable. Then we check the 
FOC for its monotonicity. 
𝑤′(𝑧) =
𝛼𝑔(𝑧𝛼 − 1)(𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔)𝛼−1 − 𝛼𝑧𝛼−1((𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔)𝛼 − 1)
(𝑧𝛼 − 1)2
 
Since (𝑧𝛼 − 1)2 > 0, we have 𝑤′(𝑧) ≶ 0 if and only if 
𝛼𝑔(𝑧𝛼 − 1)(𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔)𝛼−1 ≶ 𝛼𝑧𝛼−1((𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔)𝛼 − 1) 
Now let ℎ = 𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔. Since z >1 and 𝑔 ∈ (0,1), we have z > h > 1. The 
inequality above now becomes 
𝛼𝑔(𝑧𝛼 − 1)ℎ𝛼−1 ≶ 𝛼𝑧𝛼−1(ℎ𝛼 − 1) 
Rearrange this we have 
𝑔 ≶
ℎ −
1
ℎ𝛼−1
𝑧 −
1
𝑧𝛼−1
 
Now define function 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑡 −
1
𝑡𝛼−1
 with the domain 𝑡 ≥ 1 . Obviously this 
function is continuous and at least two times differentiable on its domain. Now we 
check its concavity/convexity. 
𝑓′′(𝑡) = 𝛼(1 − 𝛼)𝑡−𝛼−1 
Since 𝛼 > 0  and 𝑡 ≥ 1 , we know that 𝑡−α−1 > 0 , so that the sign of 𝑓′′(𝑡) 
depends on the sign of  (1 − 𝛼).  
When 𝛼 > 1, 𝑓′′(𝑡) < 0, function 𝑓(𝑡) is concave on the domain. According 
to concavity, we have that for any 𝑡1, 𝑡2 within the domain, and for any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), 
𝑓((1 − 𝜃)𝑡1 + 𝜃𝑡2) > (1 − 𝜃)𝑓(𝑡1) + 𝜃𝑓(𝑡2) 
Now let 𝑡1 = 𝑧 ,  𝑡2 = 1 , and 𝜃 =
𝑧−ℎ
𝑧−1
. Since 𝑓(1) = 0 , the inequality above 
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becomes 
𝑓 ((1 −
𝑧 − ℎ
𝑧 − 1
) 𝑧 +
𝑧 − ℎ
𝑧 − 1
) > (1 −
𝑧 − ℎ
𝑧 − 1
) 𝑓(𝑧) 
which can be simplified to 
𝑓(ℎ) > (1 −
𝑧 − ℎ
𝑧 − 1
) 𝑓(𝑧) 
Since ℎ = 𝑔𝑧 + 1 − 𝑔, we have 
𝑓(ℎ) > (1 −
𝑧 − ℎ
𝑧 − 1
) 𝑓(𝑧) = (1 −
𝑧 − 𝑔𝑧 − 1 + 𝑔
𝑧 − 1
) 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑔𝑓(𝑧) 
Therefore we have 
𝑓(ℎ)
𝑓(𝑧)
> 𝑔 
and hence 
𝑔 <
ℎ −
1
ℎ𝛼−1
𝑧 −
1
𝑧𝛼−1
 
and hence w′(z) < 0. So when 𝛼 > 1, w(p) is a decreasing function of z, which is 
the ratio x/y. 
When 0 < 𝛼 < 1, we can see that 𝑓′′(𝑡) > 0, and 𝑓(𝑡) is convex on the 
domain. And we will have  
𝑔 >
ℎ −
1
ℎ𝛼−1
𝑧 −
1
𝑧𝛼−1
 
as well as 𝑤′(𝑧) > 0. So when 0 < 𝛼 < 1, w(p) is an increasing function of the 
ratio x/y. ∎ 
 
 
Appendix 3.4 Analytical analysis of the case of binary choice tasks 
 
To support our statements in Section 3.3.2, we again examine the CPT equivalent of 
our theory in the case of binary choices. The table below is the same as Table 3.5. 
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State 1 
pq 
State 2 
p(1-q) 
State 3 
(1-p)q 
State 4 
(1-p)(1-q) 
Lottery A 𝑥1 𝑥1 𝑥3 𝑥3 
Lottery B 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥2 𝑥3 
 
However, unlike in the previous case where a whole CPT-equivalent weighting 
function can be derived, we can now only obtain the CPT-equivalent probability 
weights (because one choice does not reveal the decision maker’s value of the 
lotteries). The following proposition shows the properties of these probability 
weights, with a focus on the domain of positive payoffs. 
 
Proposition 3 Consider an agent’s choice between lotteries A= (𝑥1, p; 𝑥3, 1-p) and 
B= (𝑥2 , q; 𝑥3 , 1-q) where 𝑥1 >𝑥2>𝑥3 ≥ 0 and 0<p<q<1. The following two 
statements are equivalent: 
(i) The agent has a utility function 𝑣(𝑥) as specified in Assumption 2, a reference 
point as specified in Assumption 1, and his preference over the two lotteries are 
determined by equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.5); 
(ii) The agent has the same utility function 𝑣(𝑥)  but behaves according to 
Cumulative Prospect Theory with 𝑟 = 0 (i.e. status quo) and with the following 
weights w(p) and w(q) assigned respectively to outcome 𝑥1  of lottery A and 
outcome 𝑥2 of lottery B: 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑇𝑝  &  𝑤(𝑞) = 𝑞 ∙ 𝑇𝑞 
where 
𝑇𝑝 =
𝑞𝐿1,2 + (1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
𝑇𝑞 =
𝑝𝐿1,2 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
and 𝐿1,2 = (𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2))
𝜂 , 𝐿1,3 = (𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂  and 𝐿2,3 = (𝑣(𝑥2) −
𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂. 
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The key message of this proposition is that in this context, whether and how 
much a probability is overweighted or underweighted depends not only on the 
probabilities and outcomes of the lottery being valued, but also on the probabilities 
and outcomes of the alternative lottery in the choice set. For example, p is 
overweighted (underweighted) if 𝑇𝑝> (<) 1, and the size of 𝑇𝑝 depends on all the 
variables of the choice problem: 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, p, and q. Small probabilities now need 
not be overweighted because a small p does not necessarily lead to 𝑇𝑝> 1. The 
similar analysis applies for q. We can roughly examine how these variables affect the 
probability weights with some assumption about the value of 𝜂. For simplicity, we 
assume 𝜂 = 1 (which has been shown to give an inverse-S shaped probability 
weighting in valuation tasks with typical values of 𝛼 and 𝜆). Then it can be shown 
that:  
1. 𝑇𝑝 is a decreasing function of q and an increasing function of 𝐿1,2. This means 
that, ceteris paribus, when 𝑥2  decreases (getting closer to 𝑥3 ) or q decreases 
(getting closer to p), probability p is more and more likely to be overweighted.  
2. 𝑇𝑞 is a decreasing function of p and an increasing (decreasing) function of 𝐿1,2 if 
p >(<) 0.5. For similar reasons, the larger p is, the less likely that q gets overweighted. 
In addition, given 𝑥1  and 𝑥3 , as 𝐿1,2  increases, 𝐿2,3  has to decrease. Since 
probability q is related to the two states with outcome pairs (𝑥1, 𝑥2) and (𝑥2, 𝑥3), its 
weight will be increasing in 𝐿1,2 only if the increase of 𝐿1,2 has greater effect on 
𝑇𝑞 than the decrease of 𝐿2,3. This requires p > 0.5.  
From Proposition 3 we can also roughly identify conditions for 𝑇𝑝 and 𝑇𝑞 that 
are consistent with different shapes of the underlying probability weighting function. 
For example, consider only four types of the weighting function: Inverse-S type, S 
type, Overweighting type (i.e. all probabilities are overweighted) and 
Underweighting type (all probabilities are underweighted). Since p < q, if p is 
overweighted and q underweighted, we can think that the underlying probability 
weighting function is consistent with the Inverse-S type. Similarly, if p is 
underweighted and q overweighted, the underlying probability weighting function is 
consistent with the S type. If both are overweighted or underweighted, the underlying 
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probability weighting function cannot be identified. Specifically, we can derive the 
approximate conditions from this proposition for different types of probability 
weighting. This is shown in the table below, with the first row and first column 
listing the corresponding conditions. 
 
Table 3.6: Approximate conditions for different types of implied probability weighting 
 𝐿1,3 > 2𝑞𝐿2,3 𝐿1,3 < 2𝑞𝐿2,3 
p > 0.5 Inverse-S type not Overweighting type 
p < 0.5 not Underweighting type S type 
 
In a typical choice between a small probability of winning large prize and large 
probabilities of small prize, the typical preference for the latter can be consistent with 
the S type probability weighting as p is small and q is large. For example, consider 
the preference-reversal-type choice between the lottery (£10, 0.4; £0, 0.6) and (£5, 
0.8; £0, 0.2). The underlying weighting function for this choice will be consistent 
with the S type if (𝑣(10) − 𝑣(0))𝜂 < 1.6(𝑣(5) − 𝑣(0))𝜂, which can hold with a 
concave utility function.    
 
 
Appendix 3.5 Proof of Proposition 3 
 
The table below is the same as Table 3.5. 
 
 
State 1 
pq 
State 2 
p(1-q) 
State 3 
(1-p)q 
State 4 
(1-p)(1-q) 
Lottery A 𝑥1 𝑥1 𝑥3 𝑥3 
Lottery B 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥2 𝑥3 
 
We begin with our theory, according to which, A is preferred to B if 
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𝜔1(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2)) + 𝜔2(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥3)) + 𝜔3(𝑣(𝑥3) − 𝑣(𝑥2)) > 0 
which can be rearranged to be 
(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝑣(𝑥1) + 𝜔3𝑣(𝑥3) > (𝜔1 + 𝜔3)𝑣(𝑥2) + 𝜔2𝑣(𝑥3)                       (3.21) 
Now consider the preference condition from Cumulative Prospect Theory. According 
to CPT, A is preferred to B if there is a probability weighting function 𝑤(. ) such 
that 
𝑤(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥1) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑝))𝑣(𝑥3) > 𝑤(𝑞)𝑣(𝑥2) + (1 − 𝑤(𝑞))𝑣(𝑥3)               (3.22) 
For condition (3.21) to be equivalent to (3.22), we have 
𝑤(𝑝)
1 − 𝑤(𝑝)
=
𝜔1 + 𝜔2
𝜔3
  &  
𝑤(𝑞)
1 − 𝑤(𝑞)
=
𝜔1 + 𝜔3
𝜔2
   
Solving for 𝑤(𝑝) and 𝑤(𝑞), we obtain 
𝑤(𝑝) =
𝜔1 + 𝜔2
𝜔1 + 𝜔2 + 𝜔3
=
1 +
𝜔2
𝜔1
1 +
𝜔2
𝜔1
+
𝜔3
𝜔1
 
 
𝑤(𝑞) =
𝜔1 + 𝜔2
𝜔1 + 𝜔2 + 𝜔3
=
1 +
𝜔3
𝜔1
1 +
𝜔2
𝜔1
+
𝜔3
𝜔1
 
According to equation (3.3), we have 
𝑤(𝑝)
=
𝑝𝑞(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2))
𝜂
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂
𝑝𝑞(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2))
𝜂
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝑞(𝑣(𝑥2) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂 
 
𝑤(𝑞)
=
𝑞𝑝(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2))
𝜂
+ 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)(𝑣(𝑥2) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂
𝑝𝑞(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2))
𝜂
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝑞(𝑣(𝑥2) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂 
 
Now define 𝐿1,2 , 𝐿1,3  and 𝐿2,3  such that 𝐿1,2 ≡ (𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥2))
𝜂 , 𝐿1,3 ≡
(𝑣(𝑥1) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂 and 𝐿2,3 ≡ (𝑣(𝑥2) − 𝑣(𝑥3))
𝜂, we have 
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𝑤(𝑝) =
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
𝑤(𝑞) =
𝑞𝑝𝐿1,2 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
Rearrange the equations to be 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝 ∙
𝑞𝐿1,2 + (1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
𝑤(𝑞) = 𝑞 ∙
𝑝𝐿1,2 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
and define  
𝑇𝑝 ≡
𝑞𝐿1,2 + (1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
𝑇𝑞 ≡
𝑝𝐿1,2 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
𝑝𝑞𝐿1,2 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝐿1,3 + 𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝐿2,3
 
 
Proposition 3 is proved. ∎ 
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Chapter 4: An Experimental Study of 
Outcome-sensitive Decision Weighting    
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
An enormous body of experimental and field evidence (for surveys see e.g. Starmer 
2000, Wakker 2010) has indicated descriptive limitations of the Expected Utility 
Theory (EU). The most popular alternatives to EUT belong to the family comprising 
Prospect Theory (PT henceforth, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT henceforth, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). A convenient 
feature of these models is that they retain the classical 'dual' structure of EUT, in the 
sense of having two components capturing, respectively, attitudes towards outcomes 
and towards probabilities. Unlike EUT, they model subjectivity toward probability 
through a probability weighting function which can be non-linear. In CPT, they also 
distinguish between decision weights and probability weights, with the former 
depending on the latter as well as on ranks of outcomes. Probability weighting has 
received many interpretations, but since PT, it has been widely understood as 
reflecting the intrinsic human attitude towards, or psychophysics of, chance 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999).  
The probability weighting function has been extensively investigated, both 
theoretically (e.g. Diecidue et al. 2009; Prelec 1998) and empirically. The most 
typical and widely found empirical result is an inverse-S shaped probability 
weighting function at the aggregate level (Abdellaoui 2000; Lattimore et al. 1992; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1992). However, evidence has been accumulating that the 
probability weighting functions may also sometimes be non-inverse-S (e.g. Alarié 
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and Dionne 2001; Humphrey and Verschoor 2004; Harbaugh et al. 2002) and to be 
dependent on non-probabilistic factors, such as people’s demographic characteristics 
(such as gender, e.g. Fehr-Duda et al. 2006; or age, e.g. Harbaugh et al. 2002), on 
their emotional state (e.g. Fehr et al. 2007), on the nature of outcome (whether it is 
gain or loss) (e.g. Abdellaoui 2000), on stake sizes (e.g. Fehr-Duda et al. 2010), and 
on the emotional or affective content of the payoffs (e.g. Rottenstreich and Hsee 
2001). Apart from the distinction between gains and losses, none of these factors is 
suggested by CPT, and the effects of stake sizes are inconsistent with it, unless they 
conform to the specific rank-dependent formulation of CPT. These factors are only 
consistent with the psycho-physical mechanisms to the extent they are mediated 
through perceptual mechanisms. 
This evidence challenges our common understanding of the decision weighting 
function as the intrinsic part of individual decision-making under uncertainty and can 
hardly reconcile with PT or CPT, if decision weights do not only depend on 
probabilities or ranks of outcomes. Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have 
implicitly expressed their concern about this:  
“…despite its greater generality, the cumulative functional is unlikely to be 
accurate in detail. We suspect that decision weights may be sensitive to the 
formulation of the prospects, as well as to the number, the spacing and the level of 
outcomes. In particular, there is some evidence to suggest that the curvature of the 
weighting function is more pronounced when the outcomes are widely spaced.”  
Note that, in this passage, they use ‘decision weights’ instead of ‘probability 
weights’, because if the dual structure of the decision model is retained, the former is 
a more accurate description of the weight attached to the value of outcomes. They 
mention four non-probabilistic factors that they thought might systematically affect 
decision weighting, two of which will be our focus: outcome spacing and outcome 
level. Outcome spacing is the size of gaps, in the case of monetary outcomes, 
between possible outcomes of a gamble, and outcome level refers to the general 
stake level or the expected payoff level of a gamble.  
The effect of these two factors on decision weighting has been indirectly shown 
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in some experimental studies1. However, we are aware of only a few studies that 
explicitly investigate the question of whether and how outcome level and outcome 
spacing affect decision weighting. For example, Etchart-Vincent (2004, 2009) 
studied this question for the domain of losses. She found that, compared to small-loss 
gambles, large-loss gambles appear to enhance probabilistic optimism (or lower the 
decision weight of the worst outcome), while larger outcome spacing tends to 
increase pessimism (or decrease the decision weight of the best outcome). Fehr-Duda 
et al. (2010) studied the effect of stake level and find that, in the domain of gains, 
decision weights of the best lottery outcome are generally smaller for high-stake 
gambles than for low-stake ones, indicating that the effect of stake levels on decision 
weighting may contribute to the well-known evidence that risk aversion increases 
with stake levels (e.g. Binswanger 1981, Holt & Laury 2002), They also find that in 
the domain of losses, stake level has little effect on decision weighting. While their 
studies suggest outcome spacing and levels may affect decision weighting, they 
didn't isolate the two effects from one another. The two factors interact with each 
other and both can affect decision weighting. In other words, the change of a lottery’s 
outcome spacing (level) could be accompanied with its change in outcome level 
(spacing). To examine the effect of either of the two factors, we need to control for 
the other one.  
The primary goal of this chapter is to investigate experimentally whether and 
how outcome level and spacing, in the domain of gain, affect decision-weighting. 
More importantly, we will separate the effect of outcome level on decision weighting 
from the effect of outcome spacing, with the help of a clean experimental control. If 
decision weights are found to depend on outcome level and outcome spacing, it lends 
support to the theory presented in Chapter 3, in which Proposition 1 predicts the 
implied probability weighting function to be outcome-sensitive. However, please 
note that this experiment is not primarily designed to test our theory or to distinguish 
it from other theories of risk, although our experimental data would allow for a 
convenient test of one of the implications of Proposition 1 from the theory of Chapter 
                                                             
1 See for example: Allais 1988, p. 243; Camerer 1992, p. 237; Harless and Camerer 1994, p. 1282. 
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3, which predicts that the effect of outcome spacing on decision weights vary with 
the utility curvature of the decision maker (see Appendix 3.3). In Section 4.4.4 we 
present the result of this test.  
For simplicity, we consider only two-outcome lotteries in the form of {x, p; y, 
1-p} with p being a probability, x and y being monetary outcomes, and x>y>0. 
Particularly we investigate how the decision weight attached to the best outcome x 
vary with lottery outcome level and outcome spacing.  
In this chapter, outcome level of a lottery is defined as its expected payoff level, 
and outcome spacing of a lottery is defined as the relative outcome difference, i.e. the 
ratios of its best outcome to its worst outcome x/y. We investigate relative rather than 
absolute outcome spacing because the theory presented in Chapter 3 has specific 
predictions regarding how relative outcome spacing affects decision weighting. In 
addition, it seems more intuitive that relative rather than absolute outcome spacing is 
more likely to affect decision weighting. For example, consider two lotteries {£11, 
0.3; £1, 0.7} and {£1000, 0.3; £990, 0.7}, which have the same absolute outcome 
spacing but dramatically different relative outcome spacing. A gap of £10 would 
probably be perceived as much more salient in the first lottery than the latter. We 
think this is likely to result in that people attach different weights to the best outcome 
of the first lottery and to that of the second lottery, even if outcome level has no 
effect on decision weighting. In contrast, PT and rank-dependent utility theories 
including CPT would predict that for lotteries {x, p; y, 1-p} with x>y, the decision 
weights attached to x should be independent of both x and the ratio x/y, provided p is 
held constant and variation in x and y does not affect either their ranking or their 
signs.  
We report an econometric analysis of the data from a new experiment designed 
to test this prediction and a contrary prediction of the theory presented in Chapter 3. 
We apply econometric methods to estimate the behavioral model parameters of 
subjects, with a focus on the estimated decision weights attached to outcome x. Our 
main experimental finding is that, in general, outcome spacing has a systematic effect 
on decision weighting at both aggregate and individual levels, whereas outcome level 
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only has a systematic effect at individual level. For a given probability p, the 
estimated decision weights on x are generally smaller for lotteries with larger 
outcome spacing, and also smaller for lotteries with higher outcome levels. The 
theory from Chapter 3 is consistent with our data, but no strong conclusion can be 
drawn from our results about the implication of relations between utility curvature 
and the effect of outcome spacing.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
experiment. Section 4.3 explains our theoretical framework and data analysis strategy. 
Results are reported and discussed in Section 4.4. The last section concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Experimental Design 
 
A key step in our experimental design is construction of four sets of lotteries, two of 
which differ in outcome levels and the other two in outcome spacing. We elicit each 
subject's Certainty Equivalents (CEs) for all lotteries in these sets. The four sets of 
lotteries have the following features2:  
 
Set 1, with high average expected payoffs and high average x/y ratios;  
Set 2, with low average expected payoffs and high average x/y ratios;  
Set 3, with high average expected payoffs and low average x/y ratios;  
Set 4, with low average expected payoffs and low average x/y ratios.  
 
Table 4.1: The basic design structure 
 
High Payoff Low Payoff 
High Spacing 
Set 1 
(8 lotteries) 
Set 2 
(8 lotteries) 
Low Spacing 
Set 3 
(8 lotteries) 
Set 4 
(8 lotteries) 
                                                             
2 For a full list of the lotteries see Appendix 4.1. 
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As shown in Table 4.1, Set 1 and 2 together make Set HS (High Spacing), Set 3 and 
4 together make Set LS (Low Spacing), Set 1 and 3 together make Set HP (High 
Payoff), and Set 2 and 4 together make Set LP (Low Payoff). To examine the effect 
of outcome spacing, we estimate subjects’ preference parameters with HS lotteries 
and LS lotteries respectively, and compare the results. Similarly, by comparing 
preference parameters estimated with HP and LP lotteries we can know the effect of 
outcome level on decision weighting.  
While the HS (HP) lotteries have generally higher x/y ratios (expected payoffs) 
than LS (LP) lotteries, it is important that there is also variability, with respect to 
both the payoff ratio and payoff level, for lotteries within each set, mainly because of 
the data analysis strategy we adopt. The reason for this will be better explained after 
we have introduced our econometric methods in the next section. As mentioned 
before, a key feature of our design is the capability to isolate the potential effect of 
outcome spacing from that of outcome level. To achieve this, we define Sets HP and 
LP in such a way that they have statistically indistinguishable distributions of lottery 
payoff ratio x/y, and define Sets HS and LS in such a way that they have statistically 
indistinguishable distributions of lottery expected payoffs. In this sense we can 
investigate the effect of either of the two factors while controlling for the other. 
 
Table 4.2 shows that, statistically, HS and LS lotteries only differ in their 
distributions of the ratio x/y but not in their distributions of expected payoffs, and 
that statistically, HP and LP lotteries only differ in their distributions of expected 
payoffs but not in their distributions of ratio x/y. The technique we used is 
Mann-Whitney two-sample test with the null hypothesis that the two samples have 
the same distribution3.  
 
 
 
                                                             
3 For details of the statistics of the x/y ratio and expected payoffs of lotteries of each set, see Appendix 4.1. 
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Table 4.2: P-values of hypothesis tests regarding properties of different sets of lotteries  
Lottery Probability 
 On ratio x/y  On expected payoff 
 𝐻0: HS=LS 𝐻0: HP=LP  𝐻0: HS=LS 𝐻0: HP=LP 
p=0.09  0.000 0.993  0.993 0.000 
p=0.21  0.000 1.000  1.000 0.000 
p=0.33  0.000 0.993  0.993 0.000 
 
Again, all lotteries are in the form of {x, p; y, 1-p} with x>y>0. We use three 
probabilities: p=0.09, 0.21, 0.33, and for each probability there are 32 lotteries 
divided into sets in the way shown in Table 4.1 as discussed above. We chose small 
probabilities spread across the range that previous studies have shown most likely to 
be overweighted, mainly because according to literature, the decision weights of 
these small probabilities seem to be more sensitive to lottery outcomes than moderate 
or large probabilities (e.g Etchart-Vincent 2004, Fehr-Duda et al 2010, Vieider et al. 
2013). We had three probability levels primarily because we want to introduce some 
probability variance to the lotteries to prevent subjects potentially from forming 
some very simple decision heuristics, which may arise if they see only a single 
probability throughout the experiment. In addition, the variance in probability levels 
can also serve as a robustness check for our results. On the other hand, since our 
design is within-subject, we did not want to have too many different probabilities 
because each extra value of p requires another 32 CE tasks for subjects to complete 
and we don’t want subjects to face too many tasks.  
It is worth mentioning that we have spent considerable efforts on simulation 
tests to determine the details of our design and to ensure that our design works well 
with our econometric methods. Specifically, simulation tests helped us to arrive at 
suitable design choices, such as the number of lotteries in each set, the range of the 
x/y ratios and expected payoffs in each set, and the extent to which the HS (HP) and 
LS (LP) sets differ in their distributions of the x/y ratios (expected payoffs). To be 
more precise, these design choices are made such that our econometric methods can 
recover or back out the preference parameters of interest with simulated subjects’ CE 
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data4. The current version of design we use has the highest chance to achieve this 
goal among all the versions we have tried5.  
The experimental task for subjects is to report their CEs of each of the 96 
lotteries6. Figure 4.1 shows the type of task subjects saw. Lotteries were displayed on 
the left as a pie chart, and to make the task as simple as possible to subjects, we let 
them make their decisions by entering their CE of the lottery into the textbox on the 
right. They can enter any money amount (i.e. in pound and pence) between the 
lowest and highest money payoffs of the corresponding lottery. The order of the 96 
tasks was randomized for each subject. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: A sample CE-task screen 
 
For each subject, the CE task for one randomly selected lottery was 
payoff-relevant. To incentivize subjects to truthfully report their CEs, we asked 
subjects to pick an envelope from a box of sealed envelopes before the experiment 
started, and told them that the envelope contains the information about their 
                                                             
4 We define ‘recover’ as follows: the preference parameters are recovered if the distributions of the estimated 
parameters (over simulated virtual subjects) are statistically indistinguishable from the true parameter 
distributions, i.e. the parameter distributions we simulated. The simulations of virtual subjects were based on 
assumptions of normally distributed behavioral parameters, in our case, typical CPT model parameters. 
5 With each version of design, we simulated 40 samples each containing 40 subjects, applied our econometric 
method, and checked how many samples out of the 40 would pass our test. A sample passes our test if all 
parameter distributions we have simulated are recovered with this sample. The current version of the design had 
the best performance (26 out of 40 samples passed the test).  
6 As can be seen from Figure 4.1, we asked subjects to state the amount they see just as good as the lottery, 
instead of using the term Certainty Equivalent. Incentives are explained below. 
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payoff-relevant lottery and about an offer of an amount of sure money. Subjects are 
told that the payoff-relevant lottery could be any of the 96 lotteries they would see in 
the experiment, and the amount of offer could be any between the lowest and highest 
prizes of the payoff-relevant lottery. They were then told that they will play the 
payoff-relevant lottery if their reported CE of this lottery is larger than their offer of 
sure money, and they will receive the offer if their stated CE is equal to or less than 
their offer. The whole payoff determination process was carefully explained in the 
experimental instructions (see Appendix 4.4) to make sure subjects understood it 
clearly. In addition, we also introduced a quiz before the main tasks to test subjects’ 
understanding of the tasks and the incentive scheme, and they were not allowed to 
start the main tasks unless they have answered all the quiz questions correctly.  
The experiment was run at the CeDEx laboratory at the University of 
Nottingham. 96 student subjects participated in this experiment with an average 
payoff of £18.20 including a show-up fee of £3. They were placed into five separate 
sessions. For each session, subjects first picked an envelope from a full set of 96 
(corresponding to the 96 lotteries in the experiment). Within each session, however, 
subjects picked the envelopes one by one without replacement, and at the same time 
they were told not to open the envelope until instructed. Then they read the 
instructions, completed the quiz, and proceeded to the experimental tasks. There was 
no time limit for completing a single task or all tasks. After all subjects have finished 
their tasks, they were asked to open their envelope and enter the indicated lottery 
code and amount of offer into the computer7. The program would retrieve subjects’ 
decisions and show them their final payoff. For those who were to play the lottery, 
they were then offered to draw a chip from a bag of 100 chips, numbered from 1 to 
100. The association between chip numbers and monetary outcomes was given to 
subjects in the initial description of the lottery, as the left hand panel of figure 4.1 
illustrates. Each session took approximately an hour.  
 
                                                             
7 The experimenter would check whether subjects have entered their code and offer truthfully before they 
received their payment. All subjects did enter the information truthfully. 
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4.3 Data Analysis Strategy 
 
Our theoretical framework is more general than CPT, in the sense that decision 
weights are not restricted to be only probability-dependent or rank-dependent. 
Consider a lottery (x, p; y, 1-p) with x and y being outcomes (x>y>0) and p being a 
probability. Let the value of such lottery be represented by  
 
𝑉 = 𝑤𝑥𝑣(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑤𝑥)𝑣(𝑦)                     (4.1) 
 
where 𝑤𝑥 is the decision weight of the best outcome x, and 𝑣(. ) is an increasing 
utility function of monetary outcomes.  
The econometric method we use is semi-parametric estimation, which has been 
widely used in preference elicitation studies such as Viscusi and Evans (2006) and 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011a). In other words, we estimate point decision weights along 
with utility parameters without assuming a parametric form of the weighting function. 
We choose this method mainly for two reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, we focus 
on specific small probabilities, so we don't require the whole probability-weighting 
function. Secondly, our core interest lies in comparing the estimated sizes of decision 
weights between HS and LS lotteries, and between HP and LP lotteries, and 
estimating decision weights directly would allow us to make comparisons of decision 
weights more straightforwardly, and probably more precisely than inferring them 
from estimated parameters of an assumed weighting function.   
Our basic econometric model is represented by equation (4.1), with a power 
utility function 𝑣(𝑚) = 𝑚𝛼, where m is a monetary outcome. The power utility 
function is probably the most popular parametric family for fitting utility (Wakker, 
2008). The advantage of a power utility function is that it can be conveniently 
interpreted and has also turned out to be the best compromise between parsimony 
and goodness of empirical fit in the context of prospect theory (Stott 2006). In 
addition, some studies have shown that for decision contexts of small and moderate 
CHAPTER 4 
106 
 
payoffs, the power utility function fits no worse than alternative classes of functions 
(e.g. Abdellaoui et al. 2008) such as the exponential or the ‘expo-power’ class first 
proposed by Saha (1993)).  
So for binary lotteries, (x, p; y, 1-p) with x>y>0, we estimate the following 
model for each given p and for each of the four sets of lotteries (HS, LS, HP and LP): 
 
𝑐𝑒 = 𝑐?̂? + 𝜖                             (4.2) 
where 
𝑐?̂? = (𝑤𝑥𝛼 + (1 − 𝑤)𝑦𝛼)1/𝛼                     (4.3) 
 
For convenience we use w to denote the decision weight on the best lottery outcome 
x. The right hand side of equation (4.3) gives the CE obtained by applying the 
appropriate indifference condition to equation (4.1).  
It is a standard practice to assume that individuals’ decisions are noisy (e.g. 
Loomes 2005). There may be different sources of error, such as carelessness, hurry or 
inattentiveness, and in our setup, imprecise preferences (Hey and Orme, 1994). 
Moreover, as Harbaugh et al. (2010) suggest, failing to account for decision errors 
may significantly affect estimated risk preference parameters in ways that are 
task-dependent. To be specific, while decision errors are usually assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean, the error variance is more likely to be 
task-dependent. Given the nature of our elicitation task, we allow for two different 
sources of decision error heteroskedasticity8. First, each individual has to consider 96 
lotteries with various payoff ranges. Since the observed certainty equivalent 𝑐𝑒 is 
stated by subjects and is forced to be between the largest and smallest payoffs of the 
lottery, it is very likely that the error is proportional to the payoff range. Secondly, 
since our approach models a representative agent’s behavior, an individual’s decision 
will most likely depart from the average prediction. As subjects may be 
heterogeneous with respect to their ability to find their true certainty equivalent, we 
allow, and expect, the error variance to differ by individual. Our error specification is 
                                                             
8  Many studies have used heteroskedastic decision errors, such as Hey (1995), Blavatskyy (2007), and 
Fehr-Duda et al. (2010). In addition, Loomes (2005) has discussed reasons why it might be too restricted for 
models that have a stochastic component to impose constant decision error variance. 
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therefore: 
 
ϵ~𝑁(0, (𝑥 − 𝑦)𝜎2) 
 
where the error variance, (𝑥 − 𝑦)𝜎2, is proportional to the payoff range of lotteries.  
To sum up, our data analysis strategy is to estimate equations (4.2) and (4.3), 
with respect to three parameters: 𝛼 (power utility), w (decision weight of the best 
outcome) and 𝜎 (payoff-range-independent error parameter9). For each individual 
and each probability p=0.09, 0.21, 0.33, we have data comprising 32 CE values, and 
we did four estimations: one with HS lotteries, one with LS lotteries, one with HP 
lotteries and one with LP lotteries. By comparing the parameter estimates from the 
HS group and the LS group, we can see how relative outcome spacing (or the ratio 
x/y) of lotteries affect decision weights, and by comparing the parameter estimates 
from the HP group and the LP group, we can see how the expected payoff level of 
lotteries affect decision weights. In section 4.4, we report both aggregate-level 
analysis, in which we pooled all the individual data together and performed the same 
four estimations for each of the three probabilities, and individual-level analysis. 
The estimation technique we use is Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). 
Unlike Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) or Bruhin et al. (2010), we didn’t use the finite 
mixture regression model to account for individual heterogeneity for two reasons. 
First, the mixture model is very complex, and as they discussed, various problems 
may be encountered when maximizing the likelihood function of a finite mixture 
regression model, and it is normal that not all of these problems can be solved. 
Secondly, they used the finite mixture regression model to account for non-CPT type 
behaviors, whereas our basic model is already more general than CPT, as explained 
earlier. Compatible with this more general theoretical framework is the use of 
semi-parametric method in which our estimated decision weights need not be 
consistent with CPT. 
 
 
                                                             
9 For simplicity we will call 𝜎 the error parameter throughout the chapter. 
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4.4 Results 
 
We first report aggregate level results, then individual level results. For the latter, we 
also report and discuss the results of a robustness check. Finally we discuss the 
results regarding the test of the implication of my theory from Chapter 3. As we 
consider only two outcome lotteries (x, p; y, 1-p) with x>y, we will simply use 
‘decision weight’ to refer to ‘the decision weight attached to outcome x’ in this 
section.  
 
4.4.1 Aggregate Level Results  
 
Before we present our econometric results, we first report a general, and model-free, 
indicator of our subjects' revealed risk attitudes. The Relative Risk Premium index, 
RRP=(CE-EV)/EV, is calculated for each CE data point we obtained. Notice that 
slightly different from most of the literature (e.g. Dyer & Sarin 1982, Bruhin et al. 
2010) we have defined RRP so that a positive value corresponds to risk-seeking 
behavior and a negative one to risk-averse behavior. Although this is unusual, it is 
convenient in the light of the results to be reported.  
Generally subjects are risk-seeking, consistent with the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes predicted by Prospect Theory with an inverse-S shaped probability 
weighting function, that people are risk seeking for small probabilities of gains. They 
are more risk-seeking for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries, less risk-seeking for HP 
lotteries than for LP lotteries, and less risk seeking as probability of the best outcome 
increases. 
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Figure 4.2: Average RRP for different probabilities and different sets of lotteries 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the average RRP for all the 96 subjects over all lotteries of a 
given set and a given probability level. Since on average subjects are risk-seeking 
(according to this measure), it is unsurprising that people are more risk-seeking for 
HS lotteries than for LS lotteries, as shown on the left panel of Figure 4.2, because 
lotteries with high spacing have a larger x/y ratio and can be seen as more risky than 
lotteries with low spacing, when the probabilities of getting x are the same. However, 
the size of gap between RRP of HS lotteries and RRP of LS lotteries are surprisingly 
large and statistically significant (two-sided t-test, for all three probabilities p-values 
are 0.000). We will show later that this is probably because most subjects exhibited 
convex utilities of money in our study. The right panel of Figure 4.2 shows that 
people are less risk-seeking when the expected payoffs of the lotteries are larger. The 
difference is significant for p=0.09 and 0.21 (two-sided t-test, p-values are 0.001 and 
0.024 respectively). This is consistent with the well-known finding (e.g. Kachelmeier 
& Shehata 1992, Beattie & Loomes 1997, Holt & Laury 2002) that people are less 
risk-seeking or more risk-averse when the stakes of bets are higher. 
We now turn to one of our major interests, namely, whether the parameter 
estimates are different for different sets of lotteries.  
 
Result 1: At aggregate level, 
(i) The estimated curvatures of the utility functions are not significantly different 
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between HS/LS lotteries or between HP/LP lotteries (for the majority of the cases);  
(ii) There is a tendency for each of the three probabilities to be overweighted. 
Decision weights are systematically10 lower for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries, but 
are not systematically different between HP/LP lotteries.  
(iii) Decision error parameter 𝜎 is systematically larger for HS and HP lotteries 
than for LS and LP lotteries. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the parameter estimation results with all subjects’ CE data 
pooled together. From this table we can see that, in most cases, the ‘representative’ 
subject exhibits convex utility functions, and in almost all cases, probabilities can be 
seen as overweighted, as all decision weights w(p) are larger than their corresponding 
probability p. For each probability, we performed the Likelihood-Ratio test for each 
of the six pairs of parameters (for details see Appendix 4.2). According to the test 
results, utility curvature is not significantly different for HS and LS lotteries when 
p=0.09 or 0.21, and is not significantly different for HP and LP lotteries when p=0.21 
or 0.33. Decision weights are significantly lower for HS than for LS lotteries when 
p=0.21 or 0.33, indicating a significant and systematic effect of outcome spacing on 
decision weighting.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of outcome level on decision weighting is 
neither significant nor systematic at aggregate level. One possibility is that our 
manipulation of expected payoffs is not strong enough. In other words, if we enlarge 
the difference of expected payoffs between HP and LP lotteries, we may observe 
significant effect of outcome level on decision weighting. However, our study also 
brings another possibility: since existing studies of the effect of outcome level 
(mainly Etchart-Vincent 2004 and Fehr-Duda et al. 2010) did not explicitly control 
for potential effect of outcome spacing, their finding of a significant effect of 
outcome level on decision weighting might be driven by an effect of outcome 
                                                             
10 In our study, we say that an effect is systematic if for all three probability levels, the effect has the same 
direction, and for at least one of the three probabilities, the difference between parameter estimates is statistically 
significant. For example, the effect of outcome spacing is systematic because for all probability levels, w𝐻𝑆 is 
smaller than w𝐿𝑆 , and for p=0.21 and 0.33, w𝐻𝑆  are significantly different from w𝐿𝑆 . According to this 
definition, the effect of outcome level on decision weighting is not systematic at aggregate level. 
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spacing rather than outcome level.  
 
Table 4.3: Pooled estimation of the parameters for different sets of lotteries 
 Effect of Outcome Spacing   Effect of Payoff Level 
 p=0.09 p=0.21 p=0.33   p=0.09 p=0.21 p=0.33 
𝛼𝐻𝑆 1.258 
(0.164) 
1.317 
(0.175) 
1.369** 
(0.183) 
 𝛼𝐻𝑃 0.917** 
(0.100) 
1.021 
(0.097) 
1.147 
(0.103) 
𝛼𝐿𝑆 1.399 
(0.257) 
1.459 
(0.500) 
0.782** 
(0.474) 
 𝛼𝐿𝑃 1.385** 
(0.165) 
1.016 
(0.135) 
1.082 
(0.143) 
𝑤𝐻𝑆 0.262 
(0.030) 
0.307** 
(0.033) 
0.352** 
(0.037) 
 𝑤𝐻𝑃 0.300 
(0.021) 
0.359 
(0.020) 
0.393 
(0.020) 
𝑤𝐿𝑆 0.291 
(0.036) 
0.378** 
(0.038) 
0.461** 
(0.042) 
 𝑤𝐿𝑃 0.264 
(0.030) 
0.378 
(0.027) 
0.391 
(0.027) 
𝜎𝐻𝑆 1.623** 
(0.029) 
1.517** 
(0.027) 
1.493** 
(0.027) 
 𝜎𝐻𝑃 1.462** 
(0.026) 
1.324** 
(0.024) 
1.303** 
(0.023) 
𝜎𝐿𝑆 0.479** 
(0.030) 
0.499** 
(0.028) 
0.548** 
(0.028) 
 𝜎𝐿𝑃 0.846** 
(0.030) 
0.886** 
(0.029) 
0.914** 
(0.028) 
Note:  
1. Sample size N=96, so that for each estimation we have 1536 (96*16) observations;  
2. Standard error in parentheses;  
3. The parameter subscripts HS, LS, HP, and LP denote respectively the parameter 
estimations obtained with the HS lotteries, LS lotteries, HP lotteries and LP lotteries;  
4. For each given probability, there are six pairs of parameter estimates, (𝛼𝐻𝑆, 𝛼𝐿𝑆), 
(𝑤𝐻𝑆, 𝑤𝐿𝑆), (𝜎𝐻𝑆, 𝜎𝐿𝑆), (𝛼𝐻𝑃, 𝛼𝐿𝑃), (𝑤𝐻𝑃, 𝑤𝐿𝑃), and (𝜎𝐻𝑃, 𝜎𝐿𝑃); where the two 
elements of one of these pairs are statistically significantly different from one 
another at 5%, according to the Likelihood-Ratio test, this is denoted by ** attached 
to both elements.  
 
There is also a strong pattern of decision error variance between the different 
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lottery sets. The decision error parameter 𝜎 is systematically and significantly larger 
for HS lotteries and for HP lotteries. Given that HS and HP lotteries generally have 
larger payoff ranges (𝑥 − 𝑦)  than LS and LP lotteries respectively, the actual 
decision error variance of CE, (𝑥 − 𝑦)𝜎2, is even larger for HS and HP lotteries. It 
might be that our findings on 𝜎 reveal how people genuinely make mistakes under 
risk, but we cannot rule out that this result is partly a product of our design, in the 
sense that our elicitation method magnifies the payoff range effect on decision error 
variances. Although we are confident that our subjects did understand the 
experimental tasks and the incentive mechanism, it is arguable that for the purpose of 
preference elicitation, the valuation-based approach has its drawbacks (see e.g. 
Harrison 1992, Dave et al. 2010). It would therefore be interesting to know whether 
our results here are robust to the elicitation method, by using for example the 
choice-based approach instead of the valuation-based approach. We leave this for 
future research. 
 
 
4.4.2 Individual Level Results  
 
In the previous section we have only considered the results for the average decision 
maker. The parameter estimates of the pooled model may be misleading if there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the population. Therefore, we extend the analysis to 
account for individual heterogeneity in parameter estimates by applying the 
estimation strategy to each individual. 
We first calculated individuals’ average RRP over the 96 lotteries. Figure 4.3 
shows its distribution. 82.3% of the subjects are risk seeking (with positive average 
RRP). 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of individual average RRP over all subjects 
 
To see the effect of outcome spacing and expected payoff level, we further 
calculated each individual’s average RRP over lotteries of each of the four sets, HS, 
LS, HP and LP, pooling lotteries of different probabilities. The mean, median, and 
standard deviations of individual RRP for each set of lotteries are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Statistics of individual average RRP for different lottery sets 
 Mean Median S.D. 
All Lotteries 0.29 0.25 0.32 
HS 0.51 0.43 0.59 
LS 0.06 0.05 0.06 
HP 0.26 0.20 0.33 
LP 0.32 0.27 0.32 
 
Moreover, the distributions of individual average RRP are presented in Figure 
4.4. Its left panel plots the distributions of individual average RRP for HS lotteries 
against LS lotteries, and the right panel shows the distributions of individual average 
RRP for HP lotteries against LP lotteries.  
 
CE=EV 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of individual average RRP for different sets of lotteries 
 
Although by glancing at Figure 4.4 we can see that the effect of outcome 
spacing on RRP is much larger than the effect of expected payoff level, both pairs of 
distributions are significantly different at 5% according to the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Ranks test. The median of the average individual RRP is significantly larger 
for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries according to the sign test (p-value 0.000). We 
have checked whether this pattern also holds for risk averse subjects, and 
unsurprisingly the answer is no. For risk-averse subjects, their RRP is generally 
lower for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries. We can hence conclude that the overall 
result that people are more risk seeking for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries is 
mainly due to the fact that the majority of subjects in our study are risk seeking. The 
median of the average individual RRP is also significantly larger for LP lotteries than 
for HP lotteries (p-value 0.001). This is again consistent with the finding in the 
literature (e.g. Kuehberger et al. 1999, Holt & Laury 2002) that risk aversion 
(seeking) increases (decreases) with stake sizes.  
In terms of individual heterogeneity, the variance of individual average RRP is 
remarkably larger for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries, whereas it is almost the same 
between HP and LP lotteries. This is not surprising because in our design, the x/y 
ratio is much larger for LS than for HS lotteries, and we forced subjects’ reported CE 
HS median 0.43 
LS median 0.05 
HP median 0.20 
LP median 0.27 
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to be within the range (y, x). For example, for an LS lottery such as {£6, 0.21; £4, 
0.79}, the largest possible RRP is approximately 0.36, whereas for an HS lottery 
such as {£50, 0.21; 10, 0.79}, the RRP can be as high as 2.72.   
Now we report the parameter estimation results for each individual. Although 
96 subjects participated in our experiment, 12 of them were excluded from the 
individual analysis, because no MLE results can be obtained for them11. Hence the 
following results are based on a sample size of N=84. For each individual and each 
probability p, we did four estimations, with respectively CE data for HS, LS, HP and 
LP lotteries. In general, the individual-level results regarding the parameters are 
qualitatively consistent with aggregate-level results, but the former give us additional 
information about distributions of parameters and about level of individual 
heterogeneity. These results can be summarized below.  
 
Result 2: At individual level, 
(i) There is considerable heterogeneity in individual parameter estimates.  
(ii) Larger outcome spacing leads to smaller individual heterogeneity of utility 
curvature, a lower median decision weight, and both a larger median and greater 
individual heterogeneity of the decision error parameter.  
(iii) Outcome level generally has no systematic effect on utility curvature or decision 
weighting, but higher expected payoffs lead to a systematically larger median and 
greater individual heterogeneity of the decision error parameter.   
 
We will provide more details about the results of the parameter estimates one by 
one. Recall that for each individual we actually did 12 estimations, since we have 
three probabilities and for each probability we did four estimations with each of the 
four sets of lotteries (HS, LS, HP, LP). In what follows we will use 𝛽HS, 𝛽LS, 𝛽HP, 
and 𝛽LP to denote individual-level parameter estimates respectively for the four 
different sets of lotteries, where 𝛽 ∈ {𝛼, 𝑤, 𝜎} is one of the parameters of interest. 
                                                             
11 We used STATA for the MLE, and no convergence could be achieved for those 12 subjects thus no estimation 
results were recorded by STATA.  
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Utility Parameter 
 
The majority of subjects have convex utility functions for most of the estimations, as 
can be seen from Figure 4.5. It seems that this partly contributes to the risk-seeking 
behaviors of our subjects. There is much greater individual heterogeneity of the 
distribution of ?̃?LS than the distribution of ?̃?HS, although the medians of ?̃?HS and 
?̃?LS are only significantly different when p=0.33, according to Wilcoxon sign-test 
(p-value 0.000)12. Figure 4.5b shows the effect of expected payoff level on utility 
estimates. When p=0.09, the median ?̃?HP is significantly smaller than the median 
?̃?LP according to the sign-test (p-value 0.000), but the differences are not significant 
when p=0.21 (p-value 0.380) or p=0.33 (p-value 0.445). Similar results hold for both 
risk-seeking and risk-averse subjects.  
 
 
Figure 4.5a: Distributions of individual ?̃?HS and ?̃?LS for each probability 
 
                                                             
12 For more details of the statistical tests of this section concerning medians and distributions of individual-level 
parameter estimates, see Table 4.14 of Appendix 4.3.3. 
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Figure 4.5b: Distributions of individual ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP for each probability 
 
It is puzzling why there is much greater heterogeneity in the distribution of the 
estimated utility parameter for the LS lotteries than for HS lotteries, and with LS 
lotteries there are non-negligible negative utility parameter estimates. Such 
difference suggests that some of our subjects have substantially different utility 
estimates for HS and LS lotteries. There might be two explanations for this puzzling 
result. First, inconsistent with their decision attitude for HS lotteries, many subjects 
behaved more casually with LS lotteries, most probably because they cared less and 
paid less attention to their CE tasks when considering LS lotteries for which the best 
outcome and worst outcome do not differ much. For example, some of the subjects 
occasionally violated first-order stochastic dominance, that is, reported a higher CE 
for a (weakly) stochastically dominated lottery13. Since we have built in an error term 
to our model which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean, such 
occasional ‘crazy’ behaviors can hardly be captured by the error variance parameter 
if most of the errors are in the same direction. This may result in distortions of the 
estimated utility curvature, because for a given estimation, only x and y vary, but not 
the probability p, and lead to some psychologically implausible utility parameter 
estimates. Our data also shows that subjects who have negative ?̃? estimates violated 
dominance more frequently than those with positive ?̃? estimates.  
The second explanation could be that subjects behaved sensibly and consistently 
                                                             
13 These violations concern comparisons across CE tasks, not instances of CEs outside the range of payoffs of a 
given lottery. 
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with both HS and LS lotteries, but our estimation technique failed to recover their 
true parameters for LS lotteries. If the latter is true, it means that our estimation 
strategy probably cannot yield reliable, that is, unique and significant estimation 
results with binary lotteries that have a low x/y ratio. We did two things to try to rule 
out this possibility. First, as mentioned before, we did a simulation test to ensure that 
our estimation strategy works with our current lottery design, and the test shows that 
it works well. Secondly, we ran each estimations 20 times, (for both aggregate and 
individual level analysis), and can confirm that our estimation results are significant, 
and stable over the 20 replications.  
Given that the first explanation is favored, there is a possible concern that the 
inconsistency of utility estimates across lotteries sets would bias the estimates of 
decision weights and the error parameter. In other words, the systematic and 
significant effect of outcome spacing on decision weights and on decision error 
variance may be results of the individual difference of utility curvatures between HS 
and LS lotteries. However, in a later section we show that this is not the case 
according to our robustness checks. 
 
Decision Weight  
 
In terms of decision weights (attached to the best outcome of a lottery), the majority 
of subjects overweight p=0.09 and 0.21, and about a half of subjects overweight 
p=0.33, as Figure 4.6 shows. For all three probabilities 0.09, 0.21, and 0.33, the 
median ?̃?HS are significantly lower than the median ?̃?LS according to the sign-test 
(p-values 0.001, 0.000, 0.000, respectively), whereas there is no systematic 
difference between the median ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP. Specifically, only for p=0.09, are the 
median ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP differ significantly according to the sign-test (p-value 0.004), 
and the directions of the effect of expected payoff level are opposite for p=0.09 and 
p=0.21. 
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Figure 4.6a: Distributions of individual ?̃?HS and ?̃?LS for each probability 
 
 
Figure 4.6b: Distributions of individual ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP for each probability 
There is also no obvious difference in the level of individual heterogeneity across 
different sets of lotteries. Qualitatively similar results hold for both risk-seeking and 
risk-averse subjects. 
It seems that decision weights have stronger patterns at individual-levels than at 
aggregate-level, and that outcome spacing has greater and more predictable impact 
on decision weighting than expected payoff level does. As we have discussed, this is 
unsurprising given that our manipulation of payoff level difference is not strong 
compared to the literature (e.g. Kachelmeier & Shehata 1992, Fehr-Duda et al. 2010).  
What is more interesting is the direction of effect of outcome spacing. One 
might expect that the estimated w being higher for HS lotteries than for LS lotteries, 
because for the former the payoff gap (𝑥 − 𝑦) is much larger, so that outcome x 
would become much more attractive in HS lotteries than in LS lotteries, and that 
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people would tend to overweight the weight attached to x more. However, our results 
show the opposite, that people exhibit significantly higher decision weights for LS 
lotteries. We will show in a Section 4.4.4 that this finding on decision weights can 
potentially be accommodated by the theory presented in Chapter 3, in which 
Proposition 1 implies that the direction of the effect of outcome spacing on decision 
weights can depend on the utility parameter 𝛼. 
 
Decision Error Parameter 
 
The effects on decision error parameter 𝜎 are stronger and more stable than on the 
other two parameters. Consistent with the aggregate-level results, at individual level, 
subjects have significantly larger median ?̃?HS than ?̃?LS (p-value 0.000 for all three 
probabilities), and significantly larger median ?̃?HP than ?̃?LP (p-value 0.000, 0.027, 
0.021 respectively for p=0.09, 0.21, 0.33), according to the sign-test. There is also 
greater individual heterogeneity of the distributions of  ?̃?HS and ?̃?HP, as shown in 
Figure 4.7. However this result does not hold for risk-averse subjects, indicating that 
the gap shown in Figure 4.7 is mainly driven by risk-seeking subjects who are the 
majority.  
 
 
Figure 4.7a: Distributions of individual ?̃?HS and ?̃?LS for each probability 
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Figure 4.7b: Distributions of individual ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP for each probability 
 
Again, since in our model specification, the error variance is correlated with 
lottery payoff ranges (𝑥 − 𝑦), the difference of the actual decision error of CE 
would be much bigger, and the difference of the level of individual heterogeneity 
may be considerably larger for HS and HP lotteries than for LS and LP lotteries. In 
terms of heterogeneity, admittedly, this result may largely be due to the fact that 
subjects are forced to state their CEs between the range (y, x), and that HS lotteries 
have much wider payoff ranges than LS lotteries. However, this fact does not predict 
that people will make larger decision errors when they are allowed to. We conjecture 
that, as our results suggest, the possibility of larger mistakes itself induces a higher 
tendency to make larger mistakes. It is also interesting to ask whether this ‘error 
boundary effect’ is also significant beyond the type of elicitation task we use, but this 
is a question we defer to further research.     
 
 
4.4.3 Robustness Checks 
 
So far, we have found systematic impact of outcome spacing, but no systematic 
effect of outcome level, on decision weighting. We have also found that both 
outcome spacing and outcome level affect decision errors. However, as mentioned 
before, that some of our subjects have dramatically different utility parameter 
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estimates for HS and LS lotteries, we are concerned that this difference in utility 
estimates across lottery sets produces or magnifies the observed effects on decision 
weights and error variances. As a check on this, we investigate whether these effects 
would become smaller or even disappear if we hold each subject’s utility parameter 
constant between HS/LS lotteries and between HP/LP lotteries. We highly doubt that 
the individual-level utility curvature estimates we obtained for LS lotteries, as shown 
in Figure 4.5a, reveal the subjects’ true attitude towards money outcomes.    
We did three robustness checks, with three ways to hold the utility estimates 
constant across HS/LS and across HP/LP sets.  
Robustness Check 1: For each individual and each probability, we force ?̃?LS to 
be the same as ?̃?HS, and ?̃?LP to be the same as ?̃?HP. In other words, we re-estimate 
?̃?LS  and ?̃?LS  for the LS set with ?̃?HS  taken as a constant utility parameter. 
Similarly, to test the outcome level effect, we re-estimate ?̃?LP and ?̃?LP for LP 
lotteries with ?̃?HP taken as a constant utility parameter.  
Robustness Check 2: Similar to the first check, except that we now force ?̃?HS 
to be the same as ?̃?LS, and ?̃?HP to be the same as ?̃?LP. 
Robustness Check 3: For each individual and each probability, we estimate the 
three parameters with all the 32 lotteries, take the estimated utility parameter ?̃?ALL 
as constant across sets, and estimate 𝑤 and 𝜎 respectively for HS, LS, HP, and LP 
lotteries.  
With these checks, we implicitly assume that individual utility curvature is not 
affected by outcome spacing or outcome levels of lotteries. We are not aware of 
research on how outcome spacing or relative stake level affect utility curvature, but 
there has been a sizable body of evidence about the (absolute) stake level effect (e.g. 
Booij et al. 2010, Bombardini & Trebbi 2012, Vieider et al. 2013). These evidence, 
along with Rabin (2000)’s view, generally support the idea that people have changing 
relative risk aversion only when very large stakes are involved. Most of the studies 
that show evidence of an effect of payoff level on utility curvature used a payoff 
scaling-up factor of at least 10 (e.g. Scholten & Read 2014, Bouchouicha & Vieider 
2016). Since in our design, the expected payoff level has only approximately doubled 
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for HP than for LP lotteries, we don’t think our assumption about utility curvature 
would be too restrictive for the purpose of the robustness check. The results of these 
checks are summarized below (with details of these results provided in Appendix 
4.3). 
 
Result 3:  
(i) All three robustness checks yield qualitatively similar results (to previous ones 
reported in Section 4.4.2) regarding the effect of outcome spacing on decision 
weights and decision error, and regarding the effect of outcome level on decision 
error.  
(ii) Unlike the previous results, outcome level is now found to have a systematic 
effect on decision weighting. In these checks, decision weights are generally larger 
for LP lotteries than for HP lotteries.   
 
The results confirm that the effect of outcome spacing on decision weighting as 
well as on the decision error parameter is strong and robust. Furthermore, the 
robustness checks update our finding about the effect of payoff level on decision 
weighting, which this is now consistent with the handful of literature 
(Etchart-Vincent 2004, 2009; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010; Vieider et al. 2013). This seems 
to suggest that, for the baseline estimation in which utility parameters are not held 
constant across sets of lotteries, the inconsistency of estimates of ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP (for 
some subjects) more or less distorts the results about the effect of outcome level on 
decision weights. 
  
Table 4.5 shows how the effect of outcome level on decision weights differs 
across our estimation setups. As can be seen, in every column except those for p = 
0.09, the four estimated decision weights seem remarkably stable. For all three 
robustness checks, the effect of expected payoff level becomes systematic. For all 
probabilities, ?̃?HP is smaller than ?̃?LP, indicating that people seem to be more 
pessimistic about gambling when the stakes are higher. Moreover, according to 
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Wilcoxon sign-test, the gaps between median ?̃?HP  and ?̃?LP  are statistically 
significant at 5% for p=0.09 and 0.21 (p-values of these tests are all 0.00), though not 
for p=0.33.  
 
Table 4.5: Medians of individual estimates of ?̃?HP and ?̃?LP for different setups 
 p=0.09  p=0.21  p=0.33 
 
?̃?HP ?̃?LP 
 
?̃?HP ?̃?LP 
 
?̃?HP ?̃?LP 
Baseline Estimation 0.25 0.19 
 
0.32 0.37 
 
0.34 0.32 
Robustness Check 1 0.25 0.31 
 
0.32 0.36 
 
0.34 0.37 
Robustness Check 2 0.16 0.19 
 
0.32 0.37 
 
0.31 0.32 
Robustness Check 3 0.23 0.29 
 
0.32 0.36 
 
0.32 0.36 
Note: Again, baseline estimation refers to the one reported in Section 4.4.2 in which the 
utility parameter is not held constant across sets of lotteries.   
 
On average, subjects seem to neither overweight nor underweight the 
probability of 0.33 in our study, and the effect of outcome level almost disappears in 
this case. This leads us to a conjecture that, as mentioned before, that the size of the 
effect of outcomes on decision weighting seems to vary across probability levels. 
 
     
4.4.4 Testing the implication of Proposition 1 from Chapter 3  
 
For simplicity we will call the theory presented in Chapter 3 TC3. In general, the 
results of decision weights we have shown so far stand against PT and CPT, but 
could be accommodated by TC3 which allows decision weighting to be sensitive not 
only to outcome ranks but also (relative) outcome spacing. Furthermore, TC3 also 
has a specific prediction, derived from Proposition 1 of Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1), 
that for individuals with a concave utility function of monetary outcomes, their 
decision weights generally increase with outcome spacing (or, in our two-outcome 
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lottery case, with the x/y ratio), and for individuals with a convex utility function 
their decision weights would decrease with outcome spacing. It is important to notice 
that this prediction relies on three premises. First, preference parameters are 
measured using CPT with CE data. Secondly, the power utility function is assumed; 
Thirdly, individual power utility parameter is independent of lottery outcome spacing. 
Hence, the robustness checks make it convenient to test Proposition 1’s implication 
about the effect of outcome spacing, with individual utility estimates being held 
constant across lottery groups. 
Since we have three robustness checks, our test results differ slightly with 
respect to which robustness check is considered, that is, which utility parameter is 
taken as the outcome-spacing-independent utility parameter, ?̃?HS, ?̃?LS, or ?̃?ALL. For 
the first two robustness checks, we force the utility parameter to be 
outcome-spacing-independent, whereas for the third check, since the estimation set is 
the combination of HS and LS lotteries, ?̃?ALL  can be naturally seen as 
outcome-spacing-independent.   
To test Proposition 1’s implication, we first examine the proportions of subjects 
that behaved consistently with our prediction. For each probability p, we can sort 
subjects into four types according to their estimated utility function curvature and 
decision weight sizes14:  
 
Type 1: ?̃? > 1 and ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS 
Type 2: ?̃? > 1 and ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS 
Type 3: 0 < ?̃? < 1 and ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS 
Type 4: 0 < ?̃? < 1 and ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS 
 
Among these, Type 2 and Type 3 are consistent with the prediction. So we 
calculated the proportion of subjects belonging to Type 2 or 3, with respectively the 
                                                             
14 Since a decreasing utility function of money is neither realistic nor concerned with our theoretical prediction, 
we exclude those with negative power utility parameters from this test. 
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parameter estimates from the three robustness checks15. Our results show that the 
average proportions of subjects (over three probability levels) consistent with the 
prediction are respectively 74%, 85%, and 55% for Robustness Check 1, 2 and 3 
respectively.  
We also grouped subjects by whether they have concave or convex utility 
functions, and used the one-sided sign-test to test whether the median decision 
weight estimates differ significantly for HS and LS lotteries in the predicted direction. 
These results are summarized in Table 4.6. For subjects with concave utility, we 
tested the null hypothesis that ?̃?HS = ?̃?LS against the hypothesis that ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS. 
For subjects with convex utility, we tested the same null hypothesis against the 
hypothesis that ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS. A p-value of less than 5% suggests that the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, and hence our prediction is supported. 
In Table 4.6, the hypothesis tests for which the p-values are denoted with ** 
lend support to Proposition 1’s prediction. We can see that although the test results 
vary across the three checks, on average more than a half of the hypothesis tests 
favor our theoretical prediction. Particularly, these favoring tests correspond to the 
majority of our subjects who exhibit convex utility functions, while our prediction 
seems to work not very well with subjects who have concave utilities. Table 4.6c 
shows that for the latter type of subjects, the p-values are close to 1, indicating that 
the effect of outcome spacing on decision weights is insignificant in these cases. 
However, although the results as shown in Table 4.6 do not completely fit the 
prediction derived from Proposition 1 of TC3, it is always possible that the 
prediction fails because the second or the third premise mentioned above doesn’t 
hold. Furthermore, these results seem to suggest dependence of the effect of outcome 
spacing on the curvature of utility. Such dependence can play a role in TC3, but not 
in PT or CPT. Therefore, we think that TC3 is generally supported, given that we  
                                                             
15 For example, with Robustness Check 1, Type 2 would be those with ?̃?HS > 1 and ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS, and Type 3 
would be those with 0 < ?̃?HS < 1 and ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS. Notice that the ?̃?LS here are estimates from Robustness 
Check 1 but not from the baseline estimations. Since in Robustness Check 1 we have set ?̃?LS as a constant equal 
to ?̃?HS, the estimated ?̃?LS in Robustness Check 1 can be different from that in the baseline estimations. 
Similarly, in Table 4.6a, 4.6b, and 4.6c, the decision weight estimates are from Robustness Check 1, 2, and 3 
respectively, but not from the baseline estimations. 
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Table 4.6a: Statistical tests for different types of subjects (Robustness Check 1) 
Probability 
Group 
 
Subject type (No. of 
subjects) 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 
(p-value) 
p=0.09  ?̃?HS > 1 (N=51)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?HS < 1 (N=27)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.010**) 
p=0.21  ?̃?HS > 1 (N=58)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?HS < 1 (N=22)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.206) 
p=0.33  ?̃?HS > 1 (N=60)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?HS < 1 (N=17)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.314) 
 
Table 4.6b: Statistical tests for different types of subjects (Robustness Check 2) 
Probability 
Group 
 
Subject type (No. of 
subjects) 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 
(p-value) 
p=0.09  ?̃?LS > 1 (N=49)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?LS < 1 (N=9)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
p=0.21  ?̃?LS > 1 (N=44)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?LS < 1 (N=19)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.179) 
p=0.33  ?̃?LS > 1 (N=31)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?LS < 1 (N=11)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.033**) 
 
Table 4.6c: Statistical tests for different types of subjects (Robustness Check 3) 
Probability 
Group 
 
Subject type (No. of 
subjects) 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 
(p-value) 
p=0.09  ?̃?ALL > 1 (N=35)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?ALL < 1 (N=37)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.997) 
p=0.21  ?̃?ALL > 1 (N=39)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.000**) 
  0 < ?̃?ALL < 1 (N=30)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (1.000) 
p=0.33  ?̃?ALL > 1 (N=53)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS < ?̃?LS (0.036**) 
  0 < ?̃?ALL < 1 (N=21)  𝐻1: ?̃?HS > ?̃?LS (0.987) 
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have found a significant effect of outcome spacing on decision weighting, but this 
specific prediction tested in this section is only partly supported. For Robustness 
Check 1 and 2, Proposition 1’s prediction is supported in the majority of cases, but 
for Robustness Check 3, only a half of the cases are consistent with that prediction. 
Given the results, it seems still inconclusive whether the effect of outcome spacing 
on decision weighting depends on utility curvatures or not.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion and Discussions 
 
This study pursues two goals. First, we investigate and isolate the effect of outcome 
spacing and outcome level on decision weighting. Our data suggest that, for small 
probabilities less than 1/3, outcome spacing has a significant effect on decision 
weighting at both aggregate and individual levels, whereas outcome level only has 
significant effect at individual level. For a given probability p, subjects generally 
exhibit smaller decision weights (of the best lottery outcome) for lotteries with larger 
outcome spacing, and smaller decision weights (of the best lottery outcome) for 
lotteries with higher expected payoff levels. The second goal is to test a prediction of 
the theory in Chapter 3 of this thesis. We find that this prediction is partly supported, 
but no firm conclusion can be drawn regarding whether decision weighting for risk is 
affected by utility curvatures.  
Although our results only apply to small probabilities below 1/3, it is worth 
mentioning the potential theoretical and prescriptive implications of these results. 
First, from a theoretical point of view, the fact that decision weighting is 
systematically sensitive to outcome spacing and levels is a challenge to most of the 
theories of decision under risk that typically assume separability of decision weights 
and outcome valuation (e.g. PT). Decision models may misrepresent risk preferences 
considerably when decision weights interact with the level of payoffs or other lottery 
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characteristics in a material way. Although in CPT, decision weights can be different 
from probability weights16, the dependence of decision weights on outcomes is 
perhaps restricted too much by that the only feature of the outcomes that matters for 
the weights is their ranking. In light of our evidence, we think that models that stay 
too close to the classical ‘dual’ structure (i.e. a component of decision weighting and 
a component of utility of outcomes) would be too simple to explain the evidence. But 
modifying the decision weighting function so as to incorporate more factors, such as 
outcome spacing and outcome level, would inevitably entail some loss of parsimony, 
and it would be even trickier to incorporate factors such as the length of delay of 
uncertainty resolution (Abdellaoui et al. 2011b), source of uncertainty (Abdellaoui et 
al. 2011a), or the type of lottery outcomes (Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001), all of 
which are found to have impact on decision weighting. 
Secondly, since the majority of our subjects are risk-seeking in the experiment, 
our main finding that decision weights are generally smaller for lotteries with larger 
outcome spacing is counter-intuitive under the framework of CPT or other 
rank-dependent utility models (e.g. Quiggin 1982, 2012), even if decision weights 
can depend on outcome spacing. In other words, if the w parameter we have 
measured is understood as a decision weight attached to the utility of consequences, 
it is hard to understand why the decision weight of the best outcome of a lottery is 
lower when the best outcome is much better relative to its worst outcome.  
We think our results have brought a serious question regarding how we should 
understand the concept of decision weight and whether the classical ‘dual’ structure 
of decision models is still helpful for us to understand and predict individual 
behaviors. After all, TC3 has provided a potential ground for accommodating these 
results. We speculate that other theories such as Loomes & Sugden (1982), Bell 
(1985), Gul (1991), and Bordalo et al. (2012), may also explain our experimental 
evidence, since in these theories, outcome spacing of gambles matters (though in 
different ways). Unlike in PT or CPT where the evaluation of a prospect is 
                                                             
16 The common understanding is that decision weights are a function of probability weights, which reflect an 
intrinsic and perhaps context-free individual attitude towards chances. 
CHAPTER 4 
130 
 
independent of the alternatives available, a common feature of most of these theories 
is that they have modified the classic dual structure to take into account the impact of 
emotions or other psychological traits arising from comparisons of risky alternatives. 
This would allow the ‘decision weighting component’ of decision making to interact 
with the contextual factors of decision making in a more psychologically intuitive 
way. Therefore, in light of our findings, we think the modeling approach that takes 
into account the comparative and context-dependent nature of decision making is a 
more promising one, provided that not too much parsimony or interpretability is 
traded off.   
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Appendices for Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4.1 Details of the lotteries used in our experiment 
 
In Table 4.7 we provide basic statistics for each set of lotteries, with respect to 
their relative outcome spacing (i.e. ratio x/y) and outcome level (i.e. expected 
payoff).  
 
Table 4.7a: Lottery statistics, p=0.09 
  Ratio x/y  Expected payoff (£) 
  mean median min max  mean median min max 
HS  8.59 5.45 3.36 27.00  9.51 9.50 2.00 16.98 
LS  1.36 1.37 1.12 1.68  9.50 9.52 2.02 16.99 
HP  4.92 2.50 1.13 25.78  13.50 13.51 10.01 16.99 
LP  5.04 2.54 1.12 27.00  5.51 5.50 2.00 9.00 
 
Table 4.7b: Lottery statistics, p=0.21 
  Ratio x/y  Expected payoff (£) 
  mean median min max  mean median min max 
HS  8.50 5.41 3.34 25.88  12.50 12.51 4.98 20.00 
LS  1.36 1.37 1.11 1.66  12.50 12.48 5.01 19.98 
HP  4.93 2.48 1.12 25.67  16.50 16.52 12.98 20.00 
LP  4.92 2.52 1.11 25.87  8.50 8.50 4.98 12.03 
 
Table 4.7c: Lottery statistics, p=0.33 
  Ratio x/y  Expected payoff (£) 
  mean median min max  mean median min max 
HS  8.67 5.51 3.38 28.25  15.51 15.53 7.99 23.03 
LS  1.36 1.37 1.12 1.65  15.50 15.48 8.02 22.99 
HP  4.95 2.51 1.12 26.53  19.51 19.48 16.01 23.03 
LP  5.09 2.52 1.12 28.25  11.50 11.50 7.99 15.03 
 
 
Table 4.8 below shows a list of all the 96 lotteries for our experiment. 
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Table 4.8: The list of all lotteries for our experiment ((x, p; y, 1-p) with x>y) 
 
p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 
x y 
 
x y 
 
x y 
Set 1 
£79.90 £3.10 
 
£53.90 £2.10 
 
£45.10 £1.70 
£65.70 £5.60 
 
£50.80 £4.20 
 
£43.70 £3.90 
£58.30 £7.40 
 
£48.50 £6.10 
 
£43.60 £5.40 
£53.80 £9.00 
 
£46.80 £7.80 
 
£42.90 £7.20 
£51.60 £10.30 
 
£46.40 £9.20 
 
£43.30 £8.50 
£49.40 £11.60 
 
£45.50 £10.70 
 
£43.20 £10.10 
£48.50 £12.80 
 
£45.10 £12.10 
 
£43.40 £11.50 
£47.10 £14.00 
 
£44.80 £13.40 
 
£43.60 £12.90 
Set 2 
£16.20 £0.60 
 
£20.70 £0.80 
 
£22.60 £0.80 
£18.20 £1.50 
 
£21.50 £1.90 
 
£23.30 £2.00 
£20.10 £2.40 
 
£23.10 £2.70 
 
£24.40 £2.90 
£20.60 £3.50 
 
£23.10 £4.00 
 
£24.90 £4.20 
£21.70 £4.50 
 
£24.30 £4.90 
 
£25.70 £5.20 
£23.30 £5.40 
 
£25.40 £5.90 
 
£26.70 £6.20 
£24.00 £6.40 
 
£26.10 £7.00 
 
£27.30 £7.40 
£25.10 £7.40 
 
£27.20 £8.00 
 
£28.50 £8.40 
Set 3 
£15.50 £9.50 
 
£18.60 £11.50 
 
£21.70 £13.20 
£16.30 £10.50 
 
£19.50 £12.50 
 
£22.30 £14.40 
£16.70 £11.50 
 
£20.00 £13.70 
 
£22.90 £15.60 
£17.50 £12.60 
 
£20.60 £14.80 
 
£23.40 £16.80 
£17.80 £13.60 
 
£20.90 £16.00 
 
£23.50 £18.30 
£18.20 £14.70 
 
£21.20 £17.10 
 
£24.10 £19.50 
£18.70 £15.70 
 
£21.70 £18.30 
 
£24.60 £20.70 
£18.90 £16.80 
 
£21.80 £19.50 
 
£24.80 £22.10 
Set 4 
£3.20 £1.90 
 
£7.30 £4.40 
 
£10.90 £6.60 
£4.40 £2.90 
 
£8.20 £5.40 
 
£11.60 £7.70 
£5.60 £3.80 
 
£9.30 £6.40 
 
£12.70 £8.70 
£6.70 £4.80 
 
£10.30 £7.40 
 
£13.70 £9.70 
£7.80 £5.80 
 
£11.30 £8.40 
 
£14.50 £10.80 
£8.40 £6.90 
 
£11.70 £9.60 
 
£14.70 £12.10 
£9.30 £7.90 
 
£12.40 £10.60 
 
£15.60 £13.20 
£10.00 £8.90 
 
£13.00 £11.70 
 
£16.10 £14.40 
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Appendix 4.2 More details of data analysis  
 
In this part we first show details of our Maximum-Likelihood estimation model, and 
then how we conduct the Likelihood-Ratio test for the aggregate estimation results. 
Our estimation model is based on equation (4.2), (4.3), and our error specification 
that the error term 𝜖 is normally distributed with zero mean and a variance of 
(𝑥 − 𝑦)𝜎2. Hence we can set up a log-likelihood function for 𝜖: 
𝑙𝑛𝐹 = −
1
2
𝑙𝑛(2𝜋) − ln(𝜎√𝑥 − 𝑦) −
𝜖2
2(𝑥 − 𝑦)𝜎2
 
Note that x and y here denote lottery outcomes. According to equation (4.2) and 
(4.3),   
𝜖 = 𝑐𝑒 − ((1 − 𝑤)𝑥𝛼 + 𝑤𝑦𝛼)1/𝛼 
our final log-likelihood function is  
𝑙𝑛𝐹 = −
1
2
𝑙𝑛(2𝜋) − ln(𝜎√𝑥 − 𝑦) −
(𝑐𝑒 − ((1 − 𝑤)𝑥𝛼 + 𝑤𝑦𝛼)
1
𝛼)2
2(𝑥 − 𝑦)𝜎2
 
We then estimate 𝛼, w, and 𝜎 to maximize the value of this log-likelihood function, 
with x, y being lottery payoffs and ce being subjects’ input. We ran this estimation for 
different sets of lotteries at both aggregate and individual levels. For the latter we ran 
estimations for each individual. Since at the aggregate level, we cannot perform tests 
of parameter distributions as we did for individual level results, another test strategy 
is adopted: the likelihood-ratio test.  
To run the likelihood-ratio test for our aggregate level results, we introduced 
two dummy variables to our model instead of estimating the parameters separately 
with HS, LS, HP and LP lotteries. Dummy variable HIGHS has value 1 if a lottery 
belongs to the HS set and value 0 if belongs to the LS set. Dummy variable HIGHP 
has value 1 if a lottery belongs to the HP set and value 0 if belongs to the LP set. 
Each one of the model parameters we want to estimate, 𝛽 ∈ {𝛼, 𝑤, 𝜎}, is assumed to 
depend linearly on the dummy variables in the following way: 
𝛽 = 𝛽𝐿𝑅 + 𝛽𝐻𝑅𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑅   for the test of outcome-spacing effect 
𝛽 = 𝛽𝐿𝑃 + 𝛽𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑃   for the test of outcome-level effect 
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There is an outcome-spacing (outcome level) effect if the estimated 𝛽𝐻𝑅 (𝛽𝐻𝑃) 
is significantly different from zero. With this setup, we can use the likelihood-ratio 
test to test the null hypothesis that 𝛽𝐻𝑅 or 𝛽𝐻𝑃 equals zero. It is worth mention that 
estimating the model with the dummy setup specified above yields exactly the same 
estimation results as what we reported in Table 4.2, which were obtained by 
estimating the parameters separately with each of the four different sets of lotteries 
(HS, LS, HP, LP). 
 
 
Appendix 4.3 More details about estimation results  
 
Appendix 4.3.1 Statistical tests of aggregate-level estimates 
 
Table 4.9 shows details of the Likelihood-Ratio test results presented in Table 4.2, 
including the Likelihood-Ratio Chi-square value (LR chi2) and the corresponding 
p-value for each pair of parameter estimates and for each probability. Those denoted 
with ** indicate the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at the level of 5%. 
 
Table 4.9: Likelihood-Ratio test results for Table 4.2 
Null Hypothesis 
 p=0.09  p=0.21  p=0.33 
 LR chi2 p-value  LR chi2 p-value  LR chi2 p-value 
𝜶𝐇𝐒 = 𝜶𝐋𝐒  0.67 0.412  0.47 0.494  10.48 0.001** 
𝒘𝐇𝐒 = 𝒘𝐋𝐒  0.83 0.362  5.00 0.025**  7.76 0.005** 
𝝈𝐇𝐒 = 𝝈𝐋𝐒  1875.71 0.000**  1286.12 0.000**  1141.12 0.000** 
𝜶𝐇𝐏 = 𝜶𝐋𝐏  12.38 0.000**  0.00 0.969  0.21 0.649 
𝒘𝐇𝐏 = 𝒘𝐋𝐏  3.56 0.060  1.17 0.279  0.01 0.917 
𝝈𝐇𝐏 = 𝝈𝐋𝐏  325.66 0.000**  159.24 0.000**  157.44 0.000** 
 
 
Appendix 4.3.2 Statistics of the baseline estimations and robustness check 
results  
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Table 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 show respectively the individual-level parameter 
estimates statistics, including the mean, median, and standard deviations of the 
distributions over the 84 subjects, for the four estimation setups we use. 
 
Baseline Estimation 
 
Table 4.10a: Statistics of parameters of the baseline estimations (outcome-spacing effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  3.28 1.16 3.42 
 
4.93 1.31 8.38 
 
4.39 1.46 8.05 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  3.04 1.59 5.29 
 
1.73 1.21 3.03 
 
-0.68 0.81 3.14 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.18 0.13 0.19 
 
0.2 0.17 0.17 
 
0.24 0.24 0.2 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.27 0.23 0.21 
 
0.34 0.31 0.18 
 
0.44 0.43 0.2 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.71 0.57 0.47 
 
0.66 0.58 0.45 
 
0.71 0.63 0.42 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.27 0.25 0.13 
 
0.29 0.27 0.13 
 
0.31 0.29 0.14 
 
Table 4.10b: Statistics of parameters of the baseline estimations (outcome-level effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.86 0.7 1.46 
 
0.94 1.01 0.88 
 
1.26 1.13 1.19 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  1.76 1.36 1.44 
 
0.95 0.86 0.91 
 
1.31 1.11 0.9 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.29 0.25 0.18 
 
0.33 0.32 0.18 
 
0.35 0.34 0.17 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.24 0.19 0.18 
 
0.37 0.37 0.17 
 
0.35 0.32 0.17 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.6 0.48 0.42 
 
0.53 0.47 0.35 
 
0.62 0.54 0.4 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.39 0.34 0.2 
 
0.43 0.39 0.21 
 
0.46 0.4 0.21 
 
 
Robustness Check 1  
 
Table 4.11a: Statistics of parameters of Robustness Check 1 (outcome-spacing effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  3.28 1.16 3.42 
 
4.93 1.31 8.38 
 
4.39 1.46 8.05 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.18 0.13 0.19 
 
0.2 0.17 0.17 
 
0.24 0.24 0.2 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.26 0.21 0.18 
 
0.28 0.28 0.17 
 
0.3 0.31 0.18 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.71 0.57 0.47 
 
0.67 0.58 0.45 
 
0.71 0.63 0.42 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.29 0.28 0.14 
 
0.31 0.29 0.15 
 
0.35 0.33 0.16 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
136 
 
Table 4.11b: Statistics of parameters of Robustness Check 1 (outcome-level effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.86 0.7 1.46 
 
0.94 1.01 0.88 
 
1.26 1.13 1.19 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.29 0.25 0.18 
 
0.33 0.32 0.17 
 
0.35 0.34 0.17 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.33 0.31 0.2 
 
0.37 0.36 0.18 
 
0.37 0.37 0.18 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.6 0.48 0.42 
 
0.53 0.47 0.35 
 
0.62 0.54 0.4 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.44 0.4 0.21 
 
0.46 0.42 0.22 
 
0.49 0.46 0.22 
 
Robustness Check 2  
 
Table 4.12a: Statistics of parameters of Robustness Check 2 (outcome-spacing effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  3.04 1.59 5.29 
 
1.73 1.21 3.03 
 
-0.68 0.81 3.14 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.27 0.09 0.35 
 
0.32 0.23 0.31 
 
0.54 0.42 0.35 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.27 0.22 0.21 
 
0.33 0.31 0.18 
 
0.6 0.37 0.19 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.9 0.74 0.54 
 
0.75 0.67 0.44 
 
0.96 0.78 0.55 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.27 0.25 0.13 
 
0.28 0.27 0.13 
 
0.31 0.29 0.14 
 
Table 4.12b: Statistics of parameters of Robustness Check 2 (outcome-level effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  1.76 1.36 1.44 
 
0.95 0.86 0.91 
 
1.31 1.11 0.9 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.21 0.16 0.18 
 
0.34 0.32 0.2 
 
0.34 0.31 0.18 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.24 0.19 0.18 
 
0.37 0.37 0.17 
 
0.35 0.32 0.17 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.68 0.54 0.43 
 
0.58 0.5 0.36 
 
0.65 0.6 0.38 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.39 0.34 0.2 
 
0.43 0.39 0.21 
 
0.45 0.4 0.21 
 
Robustness Check 3  
 
Table 4.13a: Statistics of parameters of Robustness Check 3 (outcome-spacing effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐀𝐋𝐋  1.06 0.83 1.12 
 
0.98 0.96 0.94 
 
1.25 1.18 0.96 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.26 0.23 0.16 
 
0.33 0.32 0.17 
 
0.35 0.33 0.16 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.31 0.29 0.18 
 
0.38 0.37 0.17 
 
0.37 0.34 0.16 
?̃?𝐇𝐒  0.73 0.63 0.47 
 
0.68 0.59 0.42 
 
0.72 0.64 0.41 
?̃?𝐋𝐒  0.29 0.28 0.14 
 
0.3 0.28 0.14 
 
0.33 0.31 0.14 
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Table 4.13b: Statistics of parameters of Robustness Check 3 (outcome-level effect) 
Parameter 
 p=0.09 
 
p=0.21 
 
p=0.33 
 mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
 
mean median s.d. 
?̃?𝐀𝐋𝐋  1.06 0.83 1.12 
 
0.98 0.96 0.94 
 
1.25 1.18 0.96 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.26 0.23 0.17 
 
0.33 0.32 0.17 
 
0.35 0.32 0.16 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.31 0.29 0.18 
 
0.38 0.36 0.17 
 
0.36 0.36 0.16 
?̃?𝐇𝐏  0.6 0.48 0.42 
 
0.55 0.47 0.37 
 
0.62 0.57 0.38 
?̃?𝐋𝐏  0.45 0.4 0.28 
 
0.45 0.4 0.27 
 
0.47 0.43 0.21 
 
 
Appendix 4.3.3 A summary of the individual-level statistical test results for 
different estimation setups  
 
In Table 4.14, we summarize the statistical tests results based on which we draw our 
main conclusion of this study. Results concerning the effects of outcome spacing and 
outcome level on the three parameters are organized for each probability level: Table 
14a, 14b, 14c show the results for p=0.09, 0.21, and 0.33 respectively. We report two 
types of hypothesis tests we did, one for medians (one-sided Wilcoxon sign-test) and 
one for the whole distributions (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The former 
has the null hypothesis that the medians from the two samples are the same, and the 
latter has the null hypothesis that the two samples have the same distribution. In the 
table we report the qualitative results and the supporting p-value in the parentheses 
below For example, in Table 4.14a, the test of the equality of median ?̃?HS and 
median ?̃?LS, shows a p-value of 0.586, based on which we can accept the null 
hypothesis and therefore we use ‘HS=LS’ to denote this result. Since we used 
two-sided test of distributions, we only report whether the p-value supports equality 
of distributions or no equality.   
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Table 4.14a: Hypothesis test results of parameter medians and distributions (p=0.09) 
Estimation 
Setup 
 ?̃?  ?̃?  ?̃? 
 median distribution  median distribution  median distribution 
Baseline 
 HS=LS, 
(0.586) 
HP<LP, 
(0.000) 
HS=LS, 
(0.530) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.001) 
 HS<LS, 
(0.001) 
HP=LP, 
(0.101) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.001) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.022) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
Robustness 
Check 1 
 
N/A N/A 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP<LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.006) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.001) 
Robustness 
Check 2 
 
N/A N/A 
 HS<LS, 
(0.003) 
HP<LP, 
(0.000) 
HS=LS, 
(0.356) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.001) 
Robustness 
Check 3 
 
𝛼=1 
(0.156) 
𝛼=1 
(0.669) 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP<LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.001) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 
Table 4.14b: Hypothesis test results of parameter medians and distributions (p=0.21) 
Estimation 
Setup 
 ?̃?  ?̃?  ?̃? 
 median distribution  median distribution  median distribution 
Baseline 
 HS=LS, 
(0.380) 
HP=LP, 
(0.380) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.041) 
HP=LP, 
(0.418) 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP<LP, 
(0.004) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.005) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.027) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
Robustness 
Check 1 
 
N/A N/A 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP<LP, 
(0.002) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.230) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.050) 
Robustness 
Check 2 
 
N/A N/A 
 HS<LS, 
(0.046) 
HP<LP, 
(0.001) 
HS=LS, 
(0.297) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
Robustness 
Check 3 
 
𝛼=1 
(0.586) 
𝛼=1 
(0.831) 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP<LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.024) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.002) 
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Table 4.14c: Hypothesis test results of parameter medians and distributions (p=0.33) 
Estimation 
Setup 
 ?̃?  ?̃?  ?̃? 
 median distribution  median distribution  median distribution 
Baseline 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.445) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.518) 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.744) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.975) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.021) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
Robustness 
Check 1 
 
N/A N/A 
 HS<LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.230) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.061) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.011) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.001) 
Robustness 
Check 2 
 
N/A N/A 
 HS<LS, 
(0.002) 
HP=LP, 
(0.230) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP=LP, 
(0.187) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.000) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
Robustness 
Check 3 
 
𝛼>1 
(0.011) 
𝛼=1 
(0.088) 
 HS<LS, 
(0.038) 
HP=LP, 
(0.230) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.003) 
HP=LP, 
(0.114) 
 HS>LS, 
(0.000) 
HP>LP, 
(0.011) 
HS≠LS, 
(0.000) 
HP≠LP, 
(0.000) 
 
 
Appendix 4.4 Experimental Instruction 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making which we expect to last about an 
hour. You will be paid £2 for participating so long as you complete all of the required 
tasks. In addition, you may earn more depending on your decisions and upon chance. 
We will pay you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
There are some general rules you must follow:  
1. Please put away your mobile phones and do not talk to others at any time during 
the experiment.  
2. You will use your computer to make decisions during the experiment. Please only 
use the computer in the way that you are asked to. Do not close the software that is 
running or use the computer for any other purpose. 
3. You must not open your envelope until instructed by the experimenter. 
4. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand.  
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If you disobey these rules, you may be asked to leave without payment. 
 
Lotteries  
In this experiment, you will make a 
series of decisions involving 
lotteries and certain amounts of 
money. At the end of the 
experiment, you might receive a 
sum of money for sure or you 
might play a lottery to determine 
your payoff.  
The picture on the right shows 
a sample lottery which we refer to 
as Lottery A. Playing this lottery 
results in one of two possible outcomes: winning £8.00 or £2.00. Chances of each 
outcome are shown as percentages and indicated by the relative sizes of the pie slices. 
If you play a lottery, your payoff will be determined by a draw of chip from a bag of 
chips numbered from 1 to 100. For example, for Lottery A, you win £8.00 if the 
number drawn is from 1 to 10 and win £2.00 otherwise. So there is a 10% chance to 
win £8.00 and a 90% chance to win £2.00, as shown in Picture 1.  
During the experiment, you will see 96 lotteries, labelled from L1 to L96. The 
lotteries will appear in a random order. Pay attention when a new lottery appears 
because each lottery is different. 
 
The Task 
For each lottery, your task is to enter the amount of money that you think is just as 
good as the lottery. That is, in a given question you should state the amount of money 
so that you are equally willing to play the lottery or instead receive the amount 
you set for sure. Besides, we will assume that each of your decision also implies two 
things: First, you prefer the lottery to any sure amount of money less than the amount 
Picture 1: A sample lottery 
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you stated; Secondly, you prefer any sure amount higher than the one you stated to 
the lottery.  
The picture below provides an example of what a task screen will look like. The 
lottery is shown on the left and you enter the sum that you think is just as good as the 
lottery on the right. 
 
Picture 2: A sample experimental task 
 
Once you have entered your decision and are ready to proceed, click ‘Confirm’. 
Once you confirm, you won’t be able to change your response later.  
It is in your best interest to think carefully and, for each lottery, enter the 
amount that you really think is just as good as it. This is because of the way that we 
are going to determine your payoff. 
 
How is your payoff determined 
To explain how your payoff from the experiment is determined, we need to tell you 
about what is in your envelope. It contains a slip of paper with two things on it. One 
is a label identifying one of the 96 lotteries you considered: we will call this your 
“selected” lottery. For each of the lotteries we have a corresponding envelope, so that 
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the one you just picked could be any of the 96. The other thing written on the slip in 
your envelope is an amount of money highlighted in a text box: we will call this your 
“offer”, which can be any amount between the lowest prize and the highest prize of 
the selected lottery.  
To determine your payoff, we will compare the offer in your envelope to the 
amount that you stated was just as good as the selected lottery: 
– If the offer is more than the amount you stated, you will be paid the offer;  
 – If the offer is less than the amount you stated, you will play the selected lottery 
and be paid its outcome;  
 – If the offer is equal to the amount you stated, (since you have indicated that you 
are equally willing to have either) you will be paid the offer. 
Notice that you either receive the offer or play the selected lottery. Given that you 
prefer more money to less, answering the questions truthfully ensures you get the 
one you prefer. 
 
The experiment will start with a small quiz to test your understanding of the 
instructions. You can only proceed to the main tasks when everyone have completed 
the quiz successfully.  
If you need to ask a question now or later please just raise your hand. 
REMEMBER YOU MUST NOT OPEN YOUR ENVELOPE UNTIL 
INSTRUCTED!  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions                 
 
 
 
My goal in this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of individual 
decision-making under uncertainty, particularly under risk where people choose 
between lotteries with objectively known probabilities. The three main chapters 
presented show the major output of my research in the pursuit of the PhD degree. 
Chapter 2 proposed a non-fitting method by which the probability weighting 
function of CPT can be easily approximated, in combination with an existing method 
that elicits decision weights. The main advantages of this method are its simplicity 
and efficiency in terms of data requirements. Moreover, no elicitation of the 
subjective probabilities is needed for measuring probability weighting functions for 
the case of ambiguity. An experiment of choice under risk was run to allow for the 
application of the Neo-Lite method and the standard parametric fitting method. Since 
our method relies on the assumption of the Neo-additive functional form, we also 
compared the predictive power of this function with typical non-linear functional 
forms. Our results show that the Neo-Lite method provides a more efficient way, 
compared to standard parametric fitting, to obtain measurements of the Neo-additive 
weighting function. The latter performs almost equally well as the non-linear 
probability weighting functions in terms of in-sample predictions, though the general 
out-of-sample predictive performance is poor.  
This study contributes to the literature mainly in two ways. First, we have 
proposed an empirical method for the measurement of probability weighting function 
for CPT, and have shown that this method can be used as a quick and convenient 
way to obtain some pre-analysis results or to get a sense of the shape of the 
probability weighting function. Secondly, our experimental findings, that people 
have inverse-S shaped probability weighting functions for CE tasks but S-shaped 
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weighting functions for binary choice tasks, add to the literature further evidence of a 
descriptive limitation of CPT. This then puts into question the extent to which the 
functions of the CPT model measured with CE tasks can represent individual risk 
preferences1.   
Chapter 3 is partly motivated by the findings from Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we 
propose a model that explains, when preferences are elicited using CE tasks, why 
individuals are often found to have CPT probability weighting functions that are: (i) 
non-linear and inverse-S shaped; (ii) different for the domain of gains and losses; (iii) 
sensitive to the lottery outcomes. In addition, the model also allows the CPT 
probability weighting function to be considerably different for CE tasks and for 
binary choices. Our theory is based on the psychologically intuitive mechanism of 
attention-based state-weighting, and takes into account the comparative nature of 
decision-making (i.e. evaluation of a risky option can depend upon features of the 
broader set of alternatives in which it is embedded). With Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we 
have shown that our theory is equivalent to CPT with a much more complicated 
decision weighting function. 
We consider the contribution of Chapter 3 to be two-fold. First, it provides a 
theoretical explanation as to why people are often found to have inverse-S shaped 
non-linear probability weighting functions under CPT and why the weighting 
function can differ between the outcome domain of gains and of losses. The answer 
to these questions does not necessarily have anything to do with human 
psychophysics to distort likelihoods (if the latter exists). Instead we have shown that 
these findings can be accounted for with a decision-making process which does not 
presume context-independent distortions of objective probabilities. Secondly, our 
theory provides a coherent accommodation for evidence that could not be explained 
by EUT (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and that could not be explained by CPT 
(e.g. Birmbaun 2008, Fehr-Duda et al. 2010), including the preference reversal 
                                                             
1 It remains a controversial question, since the finding of preference reversals, whether valuations of lotteries or 
choices between lotteries better represents individual risk preferences. The argument here is not against the use of 
the CE method for preference elicitation, but against the combination of the use of CE and the use of the CPT 
model. For many other theories that can explain preference reversals, such as Loomes & Sugden (1982, 1983), 
Goldstein & Einhorn (1987), Schmidt et al. (2008), Bordalo et al. (2012), the CE approach may not be a problem. 
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phenomenon (e.g. Grether & Plott 1979, Cubitt et al. 2004). The two key ingredients 
that underlie our theory are the psychological mechanism of attention-based 
state-weighting (Bordalo et al. 2012) and reference-dependent decision making (e.g. 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 1992). Neither ingredients are brand-new ideas, but the 
combination of the two ingredients generates a surprisingly powerful theory. We 
think the potential of this theory presented in Chapter 3 is yet to be fully explored.  
Complementary to Chapter 3, the study of Chapter 4 pursues two goals. First, 
we investigate experimentally the effects of contextual factors related to lottery 
outcomes on decision weighting. Our data suggests that outcome spacing has a 
significant effect on decision weighting at both aggregate and individual levels and 
outcome level only has significant effect at individual level. These results can be 
accommodated by our theory presented in Chapter 3. The second goal is to test a 
specific prediction derived from Proposition 1 of Chapter 3, regarding the effect of 
outcome spacing and the dependence of that effect on value function curvatures. We 
find that this prediction is mostly supported for subjects with convex power value 
functions, but less supported for subjects with concave value functions.  
The main contribution of the last study is to show clear-cut evidence that, 
decision weights (of the best lottery outcomes) are affected by both lottery outcome 
spacing and outcome level. Besides, we have isolated the effect of outcome spacing 
from outcome level, and have shown that in our experiment, people are more 
sensitive to the former than to the latter2. These results challenge the CPT model, 
especially its rank-dependent decision weighting function, and provide empirical 
grounds for the idea that decision weights, in the framework of PT and CPT, can 
depend on contextual factors of the decision problem systematically and 
significantly.  
Admittedly, there are various ways this study could be extended or improved. 
For example, more research could be done to see the effects of outcomes on decision 
weighting for lotteries with a high probability to win the best outcome. Moreover, 
                                                             
2 This result, however, may not be general, because our manipulations of differences in lottery outcome levels 
are weaker than our manipulations of differences in outcome spacing.  
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robustness of our results could be further checked by using alternative preference 
elicitation techniques, such as choice-list tasks, rather than the stated-CE tasks. 
Nevertheless, we think the study of Chapter 4 has generated valuable insights 
regarding the way we should interpret decision weights. In light of the evidence 
presented, it is perhaps too narrow to interpret decision weighting as 
context-independent probability weighting, as in PT. There might exist a part of 
deviation of decision weights (from objective probabilities) that is individual-unique 
and context-independent, but it remains a question whether we should build that part 
into theoretical models (as in CPT), because it is rather difficult to observe the 
context-independent part of decision weighting even if we know it exists.  
Overall, this thesis has investigated several issues related to probability 
weighting and decision weighting, two key concepts from two of the most influential 
and widely used models of behavioral economics. The three studies presented in this 
thesis have updated our understanding of the two concepts and of the limitations of 
CPT. Standing on evidence from our studies, we are no longer sure the 
context-independent probability weighting is still a useful concept for descriptive 
models or for empirical research. Neither are we sure about whether CPT is still the 
right model through which we can best understand individual behaviors under risk, 
or whether CPT is the right model to extend. We think it is better for future theories 
of choice to take into account the comparative nature of decision-making. Although 
Chapter 3 has already provided such a model, there is certainly scope for further 
research, both theoretical and empirical, to be done. For example, more experimental 
tests could be done regarding other implications of our theory, such as the connection 
between decision weighting and loss aversion. Regularities about reference point in 
decisions under risk need also be further investigated and systematized. In addition, 
all three studies in this thesis can be extended to the case of ambiguity. The future of 
the area of individual behaviors under uncertainty remains exciting and vigorous.  
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